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Eisenkot’s Coalition Gamble: Is Removing Netanyahu Worth Political Dependence on Ra’am?

As Mansour Abbas reveals talks involving Islamist and ultra-Orthodox parties, Israel faces a question that goes far beyond coalition arithmetic.

Israel's political crisis has entered a new and increasingly revealing chapter.

On November 11, Ra’am chairman Mansour Abbas disclosed that discussions are exploring cooperation between his Islamist party and Israel's ultra-Orthodox factions, potentially supported by the Joint List, to facilitate the formation of a new government.

The revelation comes just three days after President Isaac Herzog entrusted Gadi Eisenkot with forming Israel's next coalition.

No agreement has been finalized, and the ultra-Orthodox parties have not publicly confirmed the arrangement described by Abbas. Nevertheless, the proposed parliamentary formula exposes the central contradiction confronting Eisenkot's political ambitions.

A former IDF chief of staff who presents himself as a defender of Israel's national interests may find himself relying on parties whose political priorities differ sharply from his own.

And all of this raises an unavoidable question: Has removing Benjamin Netanyahu become more important than building a coherent government capable of leading Israel?

The October 27 election produced a fragmented Knesset.

Netanyahu's traditional bloc secured 53 seats. Eisenkot's four-party alliance obtained 48. Ra’am and the Joint List together hold another 19.

The mathematics are straightforward. The politics are considerably more complicated.

Eisenkot cannot assemble a parliamentary majority with his existing allies alone.

He must attract additional partners, secure outside parliamentary support, negotiate with Netanyahu's Likud, or face the possibility of another election.

Abbas appears determined to exploit this political opening.

His stated willingness to help Eisenkot form a government suggests that Ra’am could become an influential participant in the process, even without formally joining the cabinet.

That distinction should not be dismissed as a technicality.

A party does not need ministerial appointments to exercise parliamentary influence. A minority government dependent on outside support must constantly consider whether the parties sustaining it will continue voting in its favor.

The question is therefore not simply who occupies cabinet seats.

It is who can determine whether the government survives.

On November 10, as Israel's 26th Knesset convened, members of the Joint List walked out of the parliamentary chamber during Hatikvah, Israel's national anthem.

The incident was particularly significant because the Joint List is among the parties whose external parliamentary support is being discussed as part of a possible government led by Gadi Eisenkot.

Mansour Abbas, chairman of Ra’am, remained standing during the anthem, although he did not sing. That distinction matters, especially when evaluating the positions and conduct of individual parties.

The walkout itself raises questions extending beyond parliamentary ceremony.

Hatikvah symbolizes the Jewish people's historical aspiration for national self-determination. For many Israelis, it represents a fundamental expression of the state's Jewish identity.

The Joint List's electoral platform, meanwhile, explicitly challenges the prevailing Zionist political consensus. Its representatives have the democratic right to express disagreement with national symbols, just as Israeli voters have the right to question the implications of that disagreement for parliamentary cooperation.

The concern becomes particularly relevant when a prospective government might depend on those same legislators for its survival.

Disagreements over Israel's national identity could translate into conflicts over education, national-service requirements, security legislation, and the government's response to regional threats. Whether those disagreements would prevent parliamentary cooperation remains uncertain, but they cannot simply be ignored.

There is also a difference between allowing a party to express its positions as an elected opposition faction and negotiating an agreement that gives it influence over a government's legislative survival.

Avigdor Lieberman, himself a participant in the political bloc seeking to replace Netanyahu, publicly criticized the walkout and questioned the prospect of coalition cooperation with its participants.

His reaction demonstrates that these concerns are not confined to Netanyahu's supporters.

For Eisenkot, the question is concrete: What agreement could reconcile the Joint List's objections to central elements of Israel's national identity with the commitments of a government that describes itself as Zionist?

The answer requires more than declarations of mutual opposition to Netanyahu. It requires publicly defined commitments, clear boundaries on parliamentary cooperation, and an explanation of how disagreements over foundational national questions would be handled.

Israel's political parties do not need to agree on every national symbol to participate in democratic life. But a government considering their support must be transparent about the political differences involved and the compromises it may require.

During the election campaign, Eisenkot explicitly rejected including Ra’am in a government under his leadership. He also established conditions for potential coalition partners, including support for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, universal national service, and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization that must be destroyed.

These principles were presented as nonnegotiable. Yet the developing political situation presents him with an uncomfortable test.

The ultra-Orthodox parties have longstanding objections to compulsory military service for their communities. Ra’am has historically maintained positions that conflict with important elements of the Zionist political consensus. The Joint List includes factions with substantial disagreements over Israel's national identity and security policies.

How does Eisenkot intend to reconcile these differences?

Will his partners accept his conditions, or will those conditions gradually lose their meaning as negotiations advance?

A political leader cannot campaign on uncompromising principles and then treat their implementation as optional simply because parliamentary arithmetic becomes inconvenient.

If Eisenkot can achieve a genuine agreement without sacrificing his declared commitments, he should present it publicly. If he cannot, the Israeli electorate deserves to know which promises he intends to abandon.

Abbas is no newcomer to Israel's coalition politics.

He understands that relatively small parties can exercise considerable influence when the larger political blocs cannot independently command a majority.

His latest comments suggest a willingness to help Eisenkot replace Netanyahu, while preserving flexibility over the precise nature of Ra’am's involvement.

Reports have also indicated that Abbas may be prepared to explicitly recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization in exchange for genuine political partnership.

Such recognition would be welcome, but it should not be treated as an extraordinary concession. Following the October 7 massacre, recognizing the terrorist nature of Hamas should be a basic requirement of responsible political leadership.

Nor should an acknowledgment of Hamas's terrorism automatically settle broader disagreements concerning national security, governance, or the character of the Israeli state. Those disagreements require substantive political negotiation, not symbolic declarations made under the pressure of coalition deadlines.

Abbas has every right to represent his voters and pursue legitimate parliamentary influence. But Eisenkot has an equally important obligation to explain the practical consequences of any agreement he reaches.

The confrontation between Abbas and Netanyahu introduces another revealing dimension. Following Netanyahu's speech at the opening of the 26th Knesset, Abbas accused the prime minister of incitement and claimed that his remarks endangered him and his family.

Such concerns should be taken seriously. Political disagreement must never become a justification for threats or violence.

Abbas also claimed that Natan Eshel, a Netanyahu confidant, contacted him to inquire about Ra’am's position regarding proposed legislation and the possible formation of an alternative coalition.

That allegation, which has not established that Netanyahu personally authorized negotiations, complicates attempts to portray political contact with Ra’am as inherently unacceptable.

The same standards should apply to every political leader.

Nevertheless, the existence of political contacts is not equivalent to a commitment to govern together. What matters is the nature of the agreement, the obligations it creates, and the policies it enables.

This is precisely the scrutiny Eisenkot must face.

Netanyahu has publicly called for a unity government involving Zionist and ultra-Orthodox parties. Eisenkot, meanwhile, has pursued an alternative framework that could ultimately depend on parliamentary support from Ra’am and the Joint List.

There is nothing inherently undemocratic about cooperating with elected Arab representatives. Their constituents are Israeli citizens entitled to representation.

But democratic legitimacy does not eliminate the need to evaluate the political compatibility of coalition partners.

Eisenkot must answer why compromise with Netanyahu is apparently less desirable than the considerable ideological concessions that could be necessary to secure support from factions with conflicting positions on national service, national identity, and security.

A unity government would not erase Israel's political disagreements. Nor would it absolve Netanyahu or anyone else of responsibility for past failures. It could, however, provide a framework for cooperation among parties that broadly agree on Israel's national character and central security priorities.

Dismissing that possibility while exploring a more ideologically fragmented arrangement demands a compelling explanation.

Simply promising to replace Netanyahu is not enough.

Israel cannot afford to treat the formation of its next government as an exercise in political revenge.

Iran remains a strategic threat. The consequences of October 7 continue to shape Israel's security environment. Military preparedness, social cohesion, and regional diplomacy require difficult decisions backed by a reliable parliamentary foundation.

A government whose survival depends on incompatible political demands risks turning every major decision into a negotiation over its own existence.

Eisenkot knows the importance of strategic coherence. His military career was built around evaluating objectives, identifying threats, and maintaining operational discipline.

Those same principles must now be applied to his political ambitions.

If his proposed government genuinely rests on a common national program, he should disclose that program and explain how its participants will uphold it.

If it exists primarily because several factions share a desire to remove Netanyahu, that is not a sufficient foundation for governing a country facing extraordinary challenges.

The distinction is fundamental.

Political opposition can win votes. It cannot, by itself, provide a national strategy.

As Abbas describes the emerging negotiations, the burden now falls on Eisenkot to demonstrate that his coalition project represents something more than an alliance of convenience.

Because the ultimate question is not whether Eisenkot can assemble enough parliamentary votes to become prime minister.

It is whether he can lead Israel without allowing the pursuit of power to compromise the principles he claims to defend.

Voices are written by Community Members. The views, facts and pictures are the authors' own; TheStateOfIsrael.com does not verify or endorse them.

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