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Gadi Eisenkot’s Dangerous Gamble: When Removing Netanyahu Becomes More Important Than Governing Israel

As Israel’s 26th Knesset convenes, Eisenkot’s legislative offensive raises a fundamental question: How far is he willing to go to keep Netanyahu out of power?

Gadi Eisenkot has wasted little time revealing his priorities. On the opening day of Israel’s 26th Knesset, his Yashar party joined other factions in introducing legislation to establish a state commission of inquiry into the October 7 massacre, impose term limits on prime ministers, and reverse major institutional reforms enacted under Benjamin Netanyahu.

On paper, these measures are presented as an effort to restore accountability and strengthen democratic institutions. In practice, their timing, political context, and potential consequences raise serious questions about Eisenkot’s judgment and his priorities.

Israel deserves accountability for October 7. It also deserves a government capable of defending its national interests without making political survival dependent on parties whose positions fundamentally conflict with its strategic priorities.

These two objectives should never be mutually exclusive.

The atrocities of October 7, 2023, represent one of the gravest failures in Israel’s history. Investigating the political, military, intelligence, and institutional decisions that preceded the massacre is not merely appropriate; it is essential.

But accountability cannot begin and end with Benjamin Netanyahu.

Eisenkot himself served as IDF chief of staff from 2015 to 2019, during a period in which Israel's security establishment operated under assumptions about Hamas that deserve comprehensive examination.

That history does not establish personal responsibility for October 7. It does, however, make a broader point unavoidable: any credible investigation must examine the institutions, doctrines, and decisions that shaped Israel's security posture over many years.

A serious inquiry should not protect politicians, generals, intelligence officials, or former military leaders from scrutiny.

The proposed commission's independence, scope, and appointment procedures must therefore be assessed carefully. The families of October 7 victims deserve answers, not a political instrument disguised as accountability.

Eisenkot's legislative agenda extends well beyond October 7.

Term limits, changes to judicial governance, restrictions on executive authority, and the reversal of previous government reforms are now being advanced together as part of a broader effort to reshape Israel's political institutions.

Some of these measures deserve serious parliamentary debate. But their simultaneous introduction, while Eisenkot is attempting to form a government, creates the unmistakable appearance of a political campaign designed around dismantling Netanyahu's legacy.

Opposing Netanyahu is a legitimate political position.

Building an entire governing strategy around excluding one man is something else.

Israel faces security threats, regional instability, difficult economic decisions, and unresolved questions about its long-term strategic direction.

These challenges demand leadership based on coherent policies rather than political resentment.

Netanyahu's record is open to criticism, but disagreement with him does not justify treating cooperation with the Likud as inherently unacceptable while exploring alternative parliamentary arrangements with parties whose positions may be far more difficult to reconcile.

This is where Eisenkot's political calculations become particularly troubling.

Following the October 2026 election, neither Netanyahu's bloc nor Eisenkot's Zionist alliance secured a parliamentary majority. Arab-led parties consequently hold enough seats to potentially determine whether an alternative government can survive.

Among them is Ra’am, an Islamist political party led by Mansour Abbas.

Eisenkot publicly stated in September that Ra’am would not join a government he leads unless it accepted conditions including recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and acknowledgment that Hamas is a terrorist organization that must be destroyed.

Yet excluding a party from cabinet seats is not the same as rejecting its parliamentary support.

A minority government can remain politically dependent on outside votes even when the parties supplying those votes hold no ministries.

That distinction matters enormously.

If Eisenkot refuses a unity arrangement with Netanyahu but ultimately relies on external support from Ra’am or the Joint List, he will owe the Israeli public a convincing explanation.

What political compromises would such an arrangement require? Which national-security decisions could become vulnerable to parliamentary pressure? And how would he reconcile his declared principles with the practical demands of remaining in office?

These are questions about political parties, their policies, and their prospective influence over government—not about the ethnicity or religion of Israeli citizens.

The issue is not whether Arab citizens should participate in Israel's democracy. They have every right to political representation.

The issue is whether a prime minister should build a government whose survival depends on parliamentary factions that reject central elements of his national-security agenda.

There is an alternative Eisenkot appears reluctant to embrace: negotiating seriously with Netanyahu and other Zionist parties to establish a government around shared national priorities.

Such negotiations would undoubtedly require compromise.

But compromise with a political rival should not automatically be considered less acceptable than dependence on parties with fundamentally divergent positions on Israel's national identity and security strategy.

The country has endured war, internal polarization, and profound national trauma.

Its political leaders should be capable of distinguishing between personal rivalry and the responsibilities of national leadership.

Eisenkot, a former IDF chief of staff, understands better than most that strategic decisions must be judged by their consequences rather than their emotional appeal.

That standard should apply to his political decisions as well.

Israel Cannot Afford Leadership Defined by Opposition Alone

A commission of inquiry may be necessary. Institutional reform may be debated. Political accountability must remain a democratic principle.

But none of these objectives excuses a governing strategy built primarily around preventing Netanyahu's return to office.

Eisenkot must demonstrate that he has a viable plan to govern Israel, not merely a parliamentary formula for defeating a political adversary.

He should explain the limits of any potential arrangement with Arab-led parties, the security principles he will refuse to compromise, and why cooperation with Netanyahu's bloc is less acceptable than a government dependent on outside support from factions with opposing national priorities.

Ultimately, the measure of leadership is not how effectively a politician can isolate his rival.

It is whether the government he constructs can protect the country, uphold its foundational principles, and make difficult decisions without sacrificing national interests for parliamentary survival.

Israel deserves a government built around its future, not one held together merely by opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu.

Voices are written by Community Members. The views, facts and pictures are the authors' own; TheStateOfIsrael.com does not verify or endorse them.

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