Skip to main content
100%
VoicesPolitics

Trump, Xi and Putin: Who Will Decide Iran’s Nuclear Future—and at What Cost to Israel?

As Trump, Xi and Putin prepare to meet, can diplomacy with Iran deliver lasting security for Israel and the Middle East?

On November 19, U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Shenzhen for what Beijing describes as the first face-to-face trilateral summit among the leaders of the three countries.

The agenda includes nuclear arms control, strategic stability and the Iranian conflict. Trump has also indicated that he intends to raise the war in Ukraine.

China has called the meeting groundbreaking. And in diplomatic terms, it certainly is.

Three nuclear powers, each with competing strategic interests, will sit at the same table to discuss issues capable of reshaping the international security environment.

But beyond the diplomatic symbolism lies a question that deserves considerably more attention.

Can a nuclear agreement negotiated among the world's leading powers genuinely protect the countries most exposed to the consequences of its failure?

For Israel, that question is far from theoretical.

Iran's nuclear ambitions cannot be considered separately from its regional military activities, missile capabilities and relationships with armed organizations across the Middle East.

For decades, Israel has regarded the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential security concern.

That concern exists within a broader strategic confrontation involving Iran's support for Hezbollah, Palestinian armed organizations and other regional actors.

The nuclear issue therefore extends beyond uranium enrichment and technical monitoring arrangements.

It concerns the possibility that an Iranian government possessing a nuclear deterrent could act with greater confidence in pursuing military and political objectives throughout the region.

A negotiated agreement might address parts of that problem. But its effectiveness would depend on what it actually restricts, what inspectors can verify, and what happens if Tehran fails to comply.

Nuclear restraint and regional security are related objectives, but they are not interchangeable.

An agreement that reduces one category of risk while leaving others untouched may still be worthwhile. It should not, however, be presented as a comprehensive solution.

The Shenzhen summit brings together leaders whose countries approach Iran from significantly different strategic positions.

For Washington, preventing nuclear proliferation is closely connected to regional security, the protection of American interests and commitments to partners such as Israel.

For Beijing, stability in the Persian Gulf is closely tied to energy security, commercial interests and China's broader diplomatic ambitions. China's recent outreach to Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia demonstrates its desire to participate in regional diplomacy.

Russia approaches the issue through its own security calculations, its relations with Tehran and its wider confrontation with Western powers.

These overlapping but distinct interests create opportunities for negotiation.

They also create potential conflicts.

China may prioritize regional stability and uninterrupted trade. Russia may seek broader strategic concessions. The United States may place greater emphasis on nuclear restrictions and deterrence.

None of these priorities is inherently surprising.

The difficulty emerges when an agreement acceptable to the three governments does not adequately address the security concerns of regional states. That is why the precise terms of any eventual arrangement will matter much more than the political significance of the summit itself.

One of the most revealing developments preceding the summit is Beijing's diplomatic activity in the Middle East.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning confirmed on November 16 that special envoy Zhai Jun had visited Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia to discuss regional tensions, including the situations in Iran and Yemen.

Beijing describes these efforts as an attempt to encourage dialogue, reduce tensions in the Gulf and promote political solutions. Such diplomacy deserves attention because it reflects China's increasing ambition to influence regional security discussions rather than confining itself to economic relationships.

Yet mediation carries responsibilities.

A diplomatic process must be evaluated not only by whether it reduces immediate tensions, but also by whether it creates conditions that can endure. De-escalation is valuable. Temporary calm, however, is not necessarily evidence that the underlying sources of conflict have been resolved.

If China seeks a larger role in Middle Eastern security, the practical question is whether it can help establish enforceable commitments rather than simply facilitate statements of diplomatic goodwill.

The distinction will be especially important in any negotiations involving Iran.

Russia's participation adds another layer of complexity. Moscow maintains relations with Tehran while simultaneously pursuing its own geopolitical objectives in Ukraine and beyond.

President Putin may view discussions over Iran and nuclear arms control as opportunities to address broader questions concerning Russia's international position.

That possibility does not make negotiations illegitimate.

It does, however, reinforce the importance of keeping separate security issues from becoming bargaining chips in arrangements that could affect other countries. The Iranian nuclear question should not be reduced to a concession exchanged for progress on an unrelated geopolitical dispute.

A lasting agreement requires clarity about its objectives, its obligations and its enforcement mechanisms. Without those elements, even an impressive diplomatic gathering may produce little more than temporary political reassurance.

Israel is not scheduled to participate in the Shenzhen meeting.

Nor does every international negotiation affecting Israeli interests require Israel to occupy a formal seat at the table. Major powers regularly discuss security questions involving their allies and partners. The essential issue is whether the resulting commitments take the concerns of affected countries seriously.

For Israel, several questions will be particularly important.

Would any proposed nuclear arrangement provide inspectors with sufficient access to verify compliance? Would it address undeclared nuclear activities and establish credible consequences for violations? Would restrictions remain meaningful over time, rather than merely postponing the possibility of renewed proliferation concerns?

And would Washington maintain meaningful coordination with Israel as negotiations develop?

These questions are more consequential than diplomatic photographs or declarations of historic progress. Israeli security cannot rest exclusively on assurances that an agreement will work. It requires credible evidence that the risks have actually been reduced.

The same principle applies to Gulf states and other countries exposed to regional instability. International diplomacy often celebrates the signing of agreements.

History, however, suggests that the durability of an agreement depends heavily on its design, implementation and the willingness of participating governments to honor their commitments.

A ceasefire can interrupt hostilities without resolving the causes of war.

An arms-control agreement can impose valuable restrictions without eliminating every strategic threat. A diplomatic breakthrough can open a path toward stability without guaranteeing its destination.

Recognizing those limitations is not an argument against negotiation. It is an argument for evaluating negotiation through measurable results.

If Trump, Xi and Putin can establish a credible framework that reduces nuclear dangers and helps prevent further regional escalation, their meeting could represent an important diplomatic achievement.

But any agreement must be judged by the protections it provides, not merely by the political stature of those who negotiate it.

For Israel, the distinction is particularly consequential. The Shenzhen meeting is significant because it brings together three countries whose decisions shape global security. But the summit's eventual importance will depend on what follows.

Will the leaders agree on a credible path toward nuclear restraint? Will Iran's obligations be clearly defined? Will effective verification and enforcement mechanisms accompany any commitments? Will the legitimate security concerns of regional states be incorporated into the diplomatic process? And will the discussions produce practical cooperation, or reveal the limits of the three powers' competing interests?

These questions remain unanswered ahead of November 19.

The world has good reason to welcome serious diplomacy among nuclear powers. It also has good reason to scrutinize the conditions under which diplomatic agreements are reached.

For Israel, and for the wider Middle East, the stakes extend beyond a single summit.

The measure of successful diplomacy is not whether powerful leaders can agree on the language of peace, but whether their agreements can reduce the dangers that make peace so difficult to sustain.

That is the standard against which Shenzhen should ultimately be judged.

Voices are written by Community Members. The views, facts and pictures are the authors' own; TheStateOfIsrael.com does not verify or endorse them.

No comments yet.

Something went wrong

We couldn't complete that action. Check your connection and try again.