As a pilot, when I hear a debate about the price of an aircraft, I tend to think about the morning after it lands. Suppose a crew comes back with a problem no one anticipated. Who can diagnose it? Who has the technical data to make the fix? How long before that aircraft can fly again? For an airline, the answers affect the schedule. For a country at war, they determine how many aircraft it can put in the air the next morning.
That is what I wanted to hear more about on November 3, when President Donald Trump said he and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had agreed to end annual American military assistance to Israel by the end of 2026. Trump said the United States would continue selling Israel weapons. He gave no details on how the two governments would wind down a funding arrangement scheduled to run through September 2028. Congress, which appropriates the money, still has a role.
I support Israel taking greater responsibility for financing its defense. What I want to know is whether an Israeli government that assumes more of the cost will also invest in the people, factories, and engineering work that give it more control over the result.
What the $3.8 billion buys
The annual figure covers two different commitments. Under the current memorandum, $3.3 billion is designated for military financing and $500 million for cooperative missile defense programs. Most of the financing goes toward American defense purchases. Israel has been able to spend a portion with its own suppliers, but the agreement phases out that allowance entirely by fiscal year 2028.
Consider that arrangement from the desk of an Israeli procurement officer. An American supplier and an Israeli company might each offer a solution to the same problem. If U.S. financing covers the American purchase while the Israeli bid must come out of the domestic budget, the two prices mean different things to the officer signing the order. The Israeli company could offer faster repairs or a design better suited to local needs and still struggle to win the contract.
Ending the grant changes that calculation. It also leaves Israel to find the money. A shekel committed to developing a future aircraft is a shekel the defense ministry cannot spend today on spare parts, flight hours, or interceptors. Anyone arguing for greater independence, as I am, owes the Israeli taxpayer an honest account of that trade-off.
Israel has wrestled with this choice before. In 1987, its government canceled the Lavi fighter program. The aircraft had begun as a relatively inexpensive design and grown into a more sophisticated and costly undertaking. American financing had helped sustain its development. Inside Israel, defense officials worried that completing it would force them to postpone other military programs. The U.S. Government Accountability Office documented both the financial pressures and the disagreements over what the aircraft would ultimately cost.
One detail in that history deserves more attention. After cancellation, some funding went toward continued development of avionics that Israel Aerospace Industries believed it could sell to the Israeli Air Force or to customers abroad. The cabinet had decided the country could no longer afford the whole aircraft. Engineers still had work worth carrying forward.
That distinction should guide the next decision. I want Israeli engineers to have a genuine chance to build a future fighter. I would also want them in the room if Israel chose to buy one abroad. Before signing, I would ask which systems Israel could modify itself, which repairs it could perform at home, and which spare parts would still have to arrive from overseas. Those answers might justify paying more for one aircraft than another. They belong in the price comparison from the beginning.
Americans have every reason to ask what their country gains from this relationship. Former Israeli diplomat Yoram Ettinger estimates the annual U.S. return at over 1,000%. He counts benefits such as intelligence sharing and the experience Israeli crews gain operating American equipment, including the F-35. I find the underlying argument more persuasive than any precise dollar figure. A manufacturer can learn from a pilot who encounters a problem its engineers never saw in testing. Putting an annual price on that knowledge is considerably harder. So is determining how much of it Washington would lose if Israel bought the same aircraft with its own money.
For a clearer example of what the two countries can accomplish together, consider Arrow 3. During a January 2019 test in central Israel, radar tracked a target, the battle management system calculated a response, and an Arrow 3 interceptor launched. Israel Aerospace Industries led the test in cooperation with the Israeli Air Force, with both the Israeli and American missile defense agencies participating. The system was designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. Here was a project with an identifiable engineering goal and a result both partners could evaluate.
I would preserve room for projects like that in any future agreement. Washington can decide which joint programs merit American funding. Israel should decide where relying on a foreign supplier creates a risk it cannot afford. And when the two countries do choose to build something together, both publics deserve to know what each partner contributes and what each gets to use.
As for Israel’s next fighter, I would leave open the possibility of buying American, building Israeli, or developing it with a partner. What I would insist on now is that Israel identify the capabilities it needs to keep at home and fund them long enough for its engineers to deliver. Then return to that aircraft on the ground. If a fault is discovered tonight and the squadron is needed tomorrow, what can Israel do for itself before the sun comes up? That is the question I would put to anyone negotiating the next agreement.
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