Robert Malley

@Rob_Malley · Think tanky a analytici – USA/Británie

Robert Malley je bývalý americký vyslanec pro Blízký východ, přednášející na Yaleově univerzitě a emeritní prezident International Crisis Group.

8. 9. 2026 18:57 UTC
Další důležitý text od @yarbatman vysvětluje, proč ekonomický tlak způsobí Íránu obrovskou bolest, aniž by Islámskou republiku donutil ke kapitulaci. Jak píše: „Trumpův přístup ... může jistě uvrhnout většinu obyvatel země do nesmírné bídy. Samotnou Islámskou republiku však nedokáže úspěšně uškrtit... Aby Trumpova administrativa zvítězila ve své ekonomické válce, bude ... muset udusit 25 milionů domácností a více než milion firem. Jak se však v částech íránské ekonomiky zpomaluje dýchání, pro elitu země zůstane dostatek kyslíku.“Přeloženo z jazyka angličtina
1. 9. 2026 11:16 UTC
Excited to welcome @HamidRezaAz as @CrisisGroup's Senior Iran Analyst. He will join an exceptional Iran team. As anyone following his work knows, Hamid is an incomparable font of knowledge and analysis.
1. 9. 2026 10:59 UTC
Parution le 17 septembre chez @MaxMiloEditions de Demain, c’est hier — Vie, mort et quête de la paix en Israël/Palestine, livre que j’ai écrit avec Hussein Agha. Très touché par ces mots de @Villepin: « Robert Malley a écrit avec Hussein Agha ce que peu peuvent écrire : le Moyen-Orient éclairé par une longue expérience de la table de négociation, là où les principes se heurtent aux hommes et où l’on mesure le prix exact de chaque mot. Il a cette rare qualité — le courage, en vérité — de tenir ensemble les mémoires adverses, de comprendre sans absoudre, et de rappeler qu’aucune paix ne s’est jamais bâtie sur le déni de la douleur de l’autre. » https://t.co/K7KBI9lUyE
26. 8. 2026 21:48 UTC
An implacable, clinical takedown of the Board of Peace’s record in Gaza: https://t.co/C9FloRLLFU
25. 8. 2026 19:08 UTC
Powerful piece by @NateSwanson83: "The irony of Trump’s failed war on Iran—and his stop-start negotiations to try to end it—is that it has so severely weakened Washington’s ability to exert pressure on Tehran that no future administration will ever be able to revert to the traditional U.S. playbook. But that could also be the only upside of a war that has already exacted a heavy toll on U.S. munitions and the global economy. The war could—and should—force a broader reckoning with 47 years of failed strategy and change Washington’s approach for good." https://t.co/DuZfxA3MqK
24. 8. 2026 22:04 UTC
Four questions about the so-called D-day sanctions, and an overriding point: devastating a country is a far cry from accomplishing a defined policy objective: 1. Do we (or the administration) know what comes next? Not really. The announcement was as belligerent as it was vague. Bessent’s most revealing admission was that immediately imposing the sanctions in full would blow up the global financial system. If the Trump administration is unwilling to do that now, why would it be willing to do it at any point? And if not, what will they do when third parties refuse to cooperate? 2. Can the plan work? Putting aside the small matter that the administration has not specified what it intends to achieve, whether it can succeed depends on what “work” means. Can more pressure devastate Iran’s economy and inflict enormous suffering on its people? Absolutely. Expect the administration to regularly trot out statistics documenting economic contraction and currency collapse. But can more pressure force Iran’s leadership to surrender positions they consider essential? Almost certainly not. In fact, the more convinced they are that Washington seeks their overthrow, the less willing they will be to give in. Of course, they know and openly admit the depth of the economic crisis. If offered a broadly acceptable deal, many among them would have every incentive to take it. But that deal would probably have to be akin to the earlier MOU, only with greater clarity about Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. In other words, roughly the deal they might have accepted before and without D-Day… 3. What happens if the plan “works”? If the sanctions work in the sense of truly cratering Iran’s economy, Tehran is more likely to retaliate than capitulate, to ensure the US, the region, and the wider world also pay a heavy price for this economic warfare. That in turn would lead to the very military escalation the D-day sanctions are supposed to avert. 4. Finally, regardless of the outcome, can such draconian sanctions be justified? No doubt, elements of the Iranian leadership will pay a price. But, as @yarbatman points out, the principal victims will be ordinary Iranians whose suffering has become the chief measure of the policy’s success, targets of an unconscionable, indiscriminate, and almost certainly unlawful sanctions regime.
24. 8. 2026 17:32 UTC
From the October 2025 ceasefire deal, to the 30 July 2026 Board of Peace “historic” agreement with Hamas on decommissioning, to its almost immediate U-turn under Israeli pressure, our new @CrisisGroup report tells the story of a process that has failed to deliver most of its promises, a victim of Israeli obstructionism & opposition to any form of Palestinian self-rule & of a dysfunctional, lopsided U.S.-led process. Ten months on, there is no Israeli withdrawal, no reconstruction, aid is still restricted, & almost everyone in Gaza is crammed into a third of the strip. Changing this script will require raising the cost to Israel of blocking aid, continuing military strikes, & preventing any Palestinian self-governance. Otherwise, Gaza's 2.1 million Palestinians risk being consigned to permanent deprivation. https://t.co/Koxpd5wF3S
20. 8. 2026 17:25 UTC
True, targeted sanctions sometimes work, where the objective is specific, measurable, and does not call into question the system's survival. But if the goal is the Iranian regime's capitulation, as Tehran certainly assumes it is here, they won’t, no matter how devastating. Most likely, Iran will respond by seeking to ensure it is not alone in paying the price for the Trump administration’s economic warfare. Not to mention the catastrophic, unconscionable consequences for ordinary Iranians. Those are intrinsic to a policy whose own measure of effectiveness is how severely Iran’s economy is crushed.

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