마이클 나이츠
@Mikeknightsiraq · 싱크탱크 및 분석가 — 미국/영국
마이클 나이츠는 이라크 민병대와 걸프 안보를 추적하는 워싱턴연구소 연구원입니다.
역사적 통찰을 하나 덧붙이자면, 2015년 10월 아랍에미리트-예멘 연합군이 마이윤/페림에 도착했을 때 후티 역시 그 섬을 방어하지 않았습니다. 그들에게 떠날 기회가 주어졌고, 그들은 그 기회를 잡았습니다. 반면 그들은 북서쪽의 자발 우마이리와 두밥 마을을 방어하는 것을 정말 좋아합니다. 그곳이 그들의 자연스러운 진격 한계선이며, 가능한 한 빨리 그들을 몰아내야 할 곳입니다. 후티로부터 해방된 뒤 삶이 나아졌던 하이스, 코크하, 모카 주민들의 삶이 이제 끔찍해질 것이라 생각하니 마음이 찢어집니다.
영어에서 번역됨홍해 연안의 방어선 붕괴와 이후 두밥 남쪽에서의 결집을 아주 잘 설명한 글입니다. 잘하셨습니다 @IbrahimJalalYE
영어에서 번역됨Folks sometimes ask what capabilities Saudi's new partners Pakistan and Turkey can bring: umm, how about combat experienced, mountain-specialized special forces.
Always up for a fight, this fellow Mahmoud Al Sobaihi. I did like his counterattack towards Al Anad in 2015. He'd only just got out of Houthi captivity and he was soon back in it. Folks from the lands between Aden and Taizz are quite hardcore, as my own ancestors learned the hard way in the 1960s.
I can well believe - and have assessed previously - that the new key launchpad is not Basra/Muthanna or Anbar but rather the centre-east of Iraq - the Maysan-Babil-Wasit triangle.
He was a patriot who did not choose to join the Houthi ranks in occupied Tihama even though his coastal defense background would have earned him a plumb position. Instead he stayed out of their hold and fought his way back to Khokha with the Amaliqa. Not many Tihamis chose to be warriors but he was, before, during and after the liberation of Khokha in 2017.
The Iran-backed label is a battlefront of its own that took years to establish in the information space. The enemy doesn't like it, and for that reason I like it. Beyond the headlines, those in a position to do something about the Houthis generally know what they need to know about the Iran-Hez-Houthi partnership.
So, I'm gonna say it: I don't think the Houthis are very committed to the Stockholm Agreement. I'd almost say they made a mockery out of it, and everyone who supported it. I find it odd also that no one in the international community is losing their mind about how a Houthi offensive in the Red Sea might cause humanitarian crisis.
What did I say days ago? Mokha is probably not the key target. It's Dhubab / Bab el Mandeb.
It's getting interesting to argue who is actually tolling Hormuz. And in a sense who has been profiting from lower Red Sea closure for years now.
Exactly - they're surprisingly bad at attacking any semi-prepared defense; they're serially poor at defending cities and coastal areas; but they would be harder to dislodge from highlands and no Yemeni offensive has ever successfully developed a "second echelon" of forces to exploit an initial break-in onto the centrally massif. The Houthis only still hold terrain because of the weakness of Yemeni/int'l forces, not intrinsic Houthi strength.
A good idea. The winning formula against the Houthis is concentric attack on 6> fronts with air power intervening as needed. The Houthis have never successfully defended terrain, even plateau, under such conditions.
The Al Barh to Jebel Naar corridor is highly defensible. You have highway, flanked by wadis to SE and volcanic foothills to NW. Less obvious than the threat to Mokha, Houthi control of Al Barh reopens their infiltration lines to the volcanic hills east of Dhubab, (i.e., Jebel Umairi), which is a backdoor to Bab el Mandeb.
Something of a pattern forming, to put it mildly. Sudani and Asaib-linked folks regularly targeted. They flew too close to the sun in 2022-2026 and tried to have it all. I think there's still more right-sizing of Asaib to come by other CF factions and the judiciary.
Good leverage if Saudi can activate it, upon need.
Dangerous moment - the militias desperately wanted the PMF law passed to secure their multi billion dollar budget in perpetuity. See https://t.co/gYHgOWOqeX
Released immediately that PMF security got him. A total sham.
The Tadaween Tactical Assembly Area as it was in the Marib battle days of Aug-Oct 2015. Lots of mentions here