무함마드 알바샤
@BashaReport · 레바논, 시리아, 튀르키예, 이라크, 예멘
무함마드 알바샤는 예멘과 후티 세력을 추적하는 위험자문업체 바샤 리포트를 운영합니다.
Or could these be the North Korean missiles destined to Sana’a that were intercepted and later released by @CENTCOM in 2003? https://t.co/HwdEr4Mcdj
I’ll be joining @AJEnglish live in six minutes [9:30 ET] on Inside Story to discuss the war in Yemen. https://t.co/VvaJjtaUF2 https://t.co/O5maZFwQaP
The main debate today Was the missile debris recovered in Raghwan, Marib, really from a DF-15A? And if so, whose missile was it? Was this a Saudi launch that misfired, or a Houthi ballistic missile launch? The identification and origin remain unconfirmed, but the answer could have major implications for the next phase of the Yemen war. What’s your assessment?
What do you think @fab_hinz? Houthi ballistic missile fell near civilians in Raghwan, Marib, and appears to be a Burkan-3 or Zulfiqar. According to the @DefenseIntel, the Houthis first launched the Burkan-3 in 2019 and displayed an identical system under the Zulfiqar name in 2021. The DIA assesses a demonstrated range of 1,200 km with a 250 kg payload and says the system is consistent with Iran’s Qiam or Rezvan MRBM. You can find the full guide of Houthi arsenal here: https://t.co/MNqEZWTjrb
Meanwhile, anti-Houthi operations are slowly but surely continuing in Al-Jawf governorate.
The Houthis are now mocking Syrians who posted AI-generated images of themselves in Yemeni clothing to support anti-Houthi operations. In response, Houthi accounts are posting AI images of themselves in Syrian attire, declaring support for opponents of the so-called “Jolani.”
#تدقيق_الحقائق فيديو قديم من الريان، حضرموت يناير ٢٠٢٦م https://t.co/onUklkyP1W
هام | الحوثيون استخدموا @claudeai من شركة @AnthropicAI في برمجة أنظمة توجيه صاروخية كشفت شركة Anthropic، في تقريرها الصادر في سبتمبر 2026 حول رصد ومواجهة إساءة استخدام الذكاء الاصطناعي، عن خلية مقرها شمال اليمن (تحت سيطرة الحوثي) استخدمت Claude وClaude Code ضمن ثلاثة برامج لتطوير أسلحة موجهة. وبحسب التقرير، كانت الخلية تعمل على تطوير صاروخ موجه يستخدم حاسوب طيران من فئة الهواتف الذكية ونظام توجيه في المرحلة النهائية، وصاروخ باليستي متعدد المراحل بمدى مستهدف يتجاوز 2000 كيلومتر، إضافة إلى مجموعة صواريخ متعددة النسخ تحمل اسم «R2000»، تشمل نسخة لمركبة انزلاقية فرط صوتية. وقالت Anthropic إن المجموعة استخدمت Claude Code للقيام بمهام يؤديها عادة مهندسو البرمجيات، خصوصاً في تطوير برمجيات التوجيه والملاحة والتحكم اللازمة لتوجيه المركبات الجوية والحفاظ على استقرارها. وشمل ذلك دمج نظام طيار آلي مفتوح المصدر مع حاسوب طيران من فئة الهواتف، وكتابة برمجيات التحكم وتقدير الموقع، وضبط إعدادات التحكم، وتشغيل عملية بناء البرمجيات الثابتة، وإجراء محاكاة للطيران. كما أدارت المجموعة عدة نسخ من Claude في الوقت نفسه بطريقة تشبه فريقاً هندسياً صغيراً. خُصصت إحدى النسخ لكتابة الشيفرة، وأخرى للبحث، وثالثة لمراجعة الشيفرة التي أنتجتها النسخة الأولى. وقالت الشركة إن أنظمة الحماية لديها منعت العديد من طلبات المجموعة، لكنها لم تتمكن من منعها جميعاً. ووفق التقرير، حاول المستخدمون تجاوز إجراءات الحماية عبر إخفاء أهدافهم والغرض الحقيقي من البرمجيات، إضافة إلى تقسيم العمل على جلسات متعددة بحيث لا تكشف أي جلسة منفردة كامل المشروع. ولا تقول Anthropic إن المجموعة نجحت في إنتاج سلاح عملياتي. وقالت إنها لا تملك دليلاً على نجاح الخلية في إدخال جهاز عامل إلى الخدمة، لكنها أكدت أن المجموعة أجرت اختبار إطلاق لصاروخ موجه. ويبدو أن الاختبار فشل، إذ عادت المجموعة خلال ساعات إلى Claude لمحاولة معرفة أسباب الفشل. وقالت Anthropic إنها حظرت الحسابات المرتبطة بالنشاط وشاركت معلومات حول التهديد مع جهات في القطاعين العام والخاص. لكن التقرير أشار أيضاً إلى أن المجموعة كانت قد بنت بالفعل أدوات محاكاة تعمل دون اتصال بالإنترنت ولا تعتمد على Claude أو بيئات الحوسبة الهندسية الأخرى مثل MATLAB.
Important: Houthis Used @claudeai @AnthropicAI for Missile Programming Excerpt from the Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 GTG-87001: Disrupting a Yemen-based guided weapons engineering cell using Claude to develop guidance software Summary We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant. The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced. Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent. These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed. We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We banned accounts associated with the actors and shared threat information with public- and private-sector partners to mitigate risks posed by the actors. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or other engineering computing environments such as MATLAB. https://t.co/hADJ9sz0XF
Breaking | Strikes on Houthi technicals in Mocha, Yemen https://t.co/l15gf72lIK
New Front in Central Yemen? Reports indicate Houthi forces are making a slow push toward the strategic Hayjat al-Abd road, a rugged mountain route that serves as one of Taiz’s most important links to Lahj and Aden in southern Yemen. The road has long functioned as a lifeline for the movement of civilians, food, fuel, humanitarian supplies and commercial goods into government-held parts of Taiz. Its importance has grown during the war because the Houthis have historically controlled or restricted several of Taiz city’s main northern, eastern and western approaches. Hayjat al-Abd became part of the southern corridor that allowed government-held Taiz to remain connected to Aden and other areas outside Houthi control. When the road is closed, alternative mountain routes are far more difficult and expensive, particularly for trucks carrying fuel and other supplies. Control of the road therefore carries both military and economic weight. A Houthi advance that puts Hayjat al-Abd under their control or sustained fire could disrupt a major supply line into Taiz, increase pressure on government forces and civilians, and strengthen the Houthis’ position around a city that has been one of Yemen’s key front lines since 2015. https://t.co/Chz32uzcPX
Yemen’s National Defense Council chaired by @PresidentRashad said the government will not allow the Houthis to turn the country’s western coast, islands, or Bab al-Mandab Strait into a platform for threatening international shipping. The council reviewed recent developments along the western coast of Taiz, including the repositioning of government forces, and said any temporary Houthi advance would not create a permanent military or political reality. It said government forces are seeking to regain the initiative and that military operations will not be limited to one front or region. The council stressed that defending Bab al-Mandab, Yemen’s coastline, islands, and territorial waters is also critical to protecting freedom of navigation, maritime security, and global trade. It also called on the UN Security Council, Red Sea states, and international partners to prevent the Houthis from using Bab al-Mandab and Yemen’s western coast as leverage against international shipping and trade.
Another wave of Houthis strikes on Saudi.
The Yemeni Armed Forces @Yem_army_media have announced that they will begin a military operation using “various weapons and firepower” against Houthi movements. Civilians have been warned to stay off the Taiz-Mokha road and avoid the area marked on a map released alongside the warning. Influential Saudi journalist @alrougui said that Iranian-backed Houthi forces were deliberately drawn into open terrain, signaling that a new phase of the operation is about to begin. The Yemeni Armed Forces have also issued a direct warning to civilians to stay away from the designated area, describing it as a “kill box” marked on the published map.
BREAKING | A verified email from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), a Houthi-established body based in Sana’a, Yemen, addressed maritime navigation in the Red Sea. The email stated verbatim, “Armed Forces affirm that maritime navigation in the international waters of the Red Sea is safe, with the exception of the previously imposed ban on Saudi vessels. There are no further developments in this regard.”
It has now been 21 hours since the Yemen National Army Media Center @Yem_army_media last posted a video from the Al-Jawf and Marib fronts.
Houthi forces are now freeing detained fighters along Yemen’s western coast, including some who were reportedly due to be released under the prisoner exchange agreement signed in Amman earlier this year. https://t.co/8owC1BAm1A
Will the Houthis continue their winning streak and push toward the former North-South Yemen border, potentially opening the road toward Aden, the temporary seat of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, and threatening its survival? Or will they stop at the old southern border, as their public messaging has suggested, and negotiate with southern Yemeni forces from a position of strength? The next few hours could provide a critical indication of Houthi intentions and whether this offensive ends at the old border or develops into a much broader campaign toward southern Yemen. My vote: They won’t enter Aden, well at least for now.
Breaking Houthi forces have reportedly begun arriving on the strategic Red Sea islands of Jabal Zuqar and Greater and Lesser Hanish. The move follows weeks of Houthi operations aimed at cutting supply lines to the islands, including reported strikes on piers and attacks on supply vessels. The islands are strategically important because of their position near the southern Red Sea shipping corridor and Bab al-Mandab. Their capture would mark another significant shift in control following the Houthi advances along Yemen’s West Coast. https://t.co/4wr4SP87pL
Breaking | Houthis captured the former 17th Brigade in the Al Omari Base with the Dhubab Airstrip. They are now 30 kilometers from Bab Al-Mandab strait. https://t.co/VFeYMqqvln https://t.co/DiHCKWmeif
Tensions are rising along the Aden-Lahij-Taiz south western corridor near Bab Al-Mandab strait as some Southern Resistance commanders lobby to ban northern units from the National Resistance Forces and National Shield Forces to enter the south fully armed. The issue is already creating friction on the ground. Some northern forces attempting to move south have reportedly been detained, with their weapons seized. The dispute comes as National Resistance Forces regroup following the collapse of the West Coast front, raising questions over where these forces will redeploy and whether southern factions will permit armed northern units to operate from territory under their control.
Breaking | #Yemen | Heavy airstrikes target Houthi positions in Al-Tuhayta, Al-Salif, and Kamaran Island in Hudaydah Governorate. https://t.co/IexXpvxJ37
حتى الساعة الثامنة من صباح اليوم بتوقيت اليمن، لم يتمكن الحوثيون من السيطرة على مدينة المخا الساحلية، ولا تزال تحت سيطرة القوات المشتركة مقاومة وعمالقه ودرع الوطن. أما المقاطع التي انتشرت خلال ساعات الليل، فبعضها صُوّر في مناطق بحيس والخوخة سيطر عليها الحوثيون مساء البارحة، ولم تكن داخل المخا. كما يُرجح أن مقاطع أخرى صوّرها موالون للحوثيين من داخل المدينة، قبل تداولها على أنها توثق دخول قوات الجماعة إلى المخا. لكن هذا لا يعني أن الوضع الميداني بات أفضل. فبحسب آخر المعطيات، وصلت قوات الحوثيين إلى محيط يختل، على مسافة نحو 16 كيلومتراً شمال المخا، فيما توجد قوات أخرى قرب جبل النار، على بعد نحو 22 كيلومتراً شرق المدينة.
Update ⚠️ It is 8 AM local time in Yemen. The Houthis HAVE NOT [for now] seized the port city of Mocha. The city remains under the control of the joint forces of the @nrfyemen, @diralwatan, and @alamalikah. Some of the videos circulating overnight are actually from newly Houthi-controlled areas in Hays and Al Khawkhah, not from inside Mocha. Other videos appear to have been filmed by Houthi supporters inside the city and presented as evidence that Houthi forces had entered Mocha. That is not the case. This does not mean the situation has improved. It is simply the current sitrep. Houthi forces are now around 16 km north of Mocha, near Yaktul, and around 22 km east of the city, near Jabal al-Nar.
Houthis resume joint missile and drone attacks on Saudi