다니 치트리노비츠
@citrinowicz · 이스라엘 안보 분석가 및 전직 공직자
다니 치트리노비츠는 INSS 이란 연구원으로, 이스라엘군 정보국 이란 담당 부서장을 지냈습니다.
In the end, the choice is becoming relatively straightforward, even if neither option is remotely attractive. The United States and its Gulf partners can accept some form of Iranian leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, based on the arrangement negotiated with Oman, and use that framework to restore a degree of stability. Or they can reject any change to the previous order and challenge Iran’s attempt to establish a new reality in the strait. But that path would make further escalation increasingly difficult to avoid. This is the uncomfortable strategic dilemma. Accepting the arrangement risks institutionalizing Iranian leverage over one of the world’s most important maritime and energy chokepoints. Rejecting it risks an escalating military confrontation that could further disrupt shipping, push energy prices higher, and potentially drag the United States back into a much broader regional war. There are no good options here. More importantly, there is no easy way back to the old status quo. Tehran appears to view its position in Hormuz as a strategic achievement and is unlikely to surrender it simply because Washington applies additional military or economic pressure. So the real choice is not between restoring the old status quo and accepting Iranian control. It is between trying to manage an unfavorable new reality through diplomacy, or attempting to reverse it through coercion and accepting the very real possibility of a much larger escalation. That is the decision Washington and the Gulf states increasingly have to make. #iran
If the administration believes Tehran will enter meaningful nuclear negotiations while the Strait of Hormuz remains restricted and the understandings contained in the memorandum are not implemented, it is likely misreading Iran’s strategy again. From Tehran’s perspective, the sequencing matters. Iran is unlikely to separate the nuclear file from the broader confrontation. Its position will almost certainly be that the first step must be reopening the strait and returning to the roadmap established by the memorandum of understanding. Only then would Tehran be prepared to resume discussions over the nuclear program, provided Washington also fulfills the commitments Iran believes it made under that framework. In other words, Washington cannot expect Tehran to negotiate the nuclear issue first in the hope that Iran will subsequently de-escalate in Hormuz. Iran’s logic is likely to be exactly the reverse: implement the existing understandings, restore the maritime arrangement, and then return to nuclear negotiations. If the administration is building its strategy around a different sequence, that would suggest a deeper misunderstanding of Iranian policy and bargaining behavior. This does not mean Washington should accept Iran’s demands. But it does mean it needs to understand the negotiating position it is actually confronting. Until the dispute over Hormuz and the memorandum’s implementation is addressed, there is little reason to expect serious movement on the nuclear file. The central issue is therefore not whether Iran is willing to negotiate. It is the sequence Tehran will demand before those negotiations can begin. #iran
One important point is being overlooked in this discussion: Iran is not an anarchic system when it comes to the strategic use of military force. Decisions of this magnitude normally move through an established chain of command. The Supreme National Security Council plays a central role in authorizing major national-security decisions; the Supreme Leader sits at the top of the system; and operational orders are then transmitted through the relevant IRGC commands, including the Aerospace Force when missiles and drones are involved. It is true that Iran has decentralized parts of its military command structure, particularly at the operational and tactical levels. But decentralization should not be confused with strategic autonomy. There is a fundamental difference between giving commanders greater freedom over how to execute a mission and allowing them independently to decide when Iran goes to war, whom it attacks, and which strategic targets it strikes. The suggestion that “rogue” elements could simply bypass this system and conduct a strategically consequential strike without the knowledge of the senior IRGC leadership would represent a major departure from what we know about Iranian decision-makin, including under Iran’s current leadership. That is why I would treat this report with considerable skepticism. And the problem may extend beyond this particular claim. If several dramatic accounts are coming from the same source—whether provided to @nytimes other media organizations, the credibility of that source’s broader narrative deserves careful scrutiny as well. One possibility that should at least be considered is that someone is attempting to shape perceptions: perhaps to magnify the appearance of divisions inside the Iranian leadership, or perhaps to provide an alternative explanation for the collapse of the previous model by portraying decisions as the work of rogue actors rather than choices endorsed by the Iranian leadership itself. That does not mean such reporting should automatically be dismissed. Iran's decision-making system is opaque, and internal disagreements certainly exist. But internal disagreement is not the same thing as the collapse of command and control. Absent compelling evidence that Iran’s strategic chain of command has fundamentally broken down, claims that rogue actors are independently launching major attacks should face a very high evidentiary bar. For that reason, I would characterize this particular report as highly questionable and deserving of considerable caution. #iran
The Gulf states are also approaching a strategic decision point in their confrontation with Iran and the broader Iran-aligned axis. They increasingly face two very different paths. The first is diplomacy: accepting a negotiated arrangement for the Strait of Hormuz while, in parallel, Saudi Arabia returns to negotiations with the Houthis over Yemen and the maritime confrontation around Bab al-Mandab. The second is to conclude that accepting these arrangements would effectively mean allowing Iran and its partners to rewrite the regional rules through military pressure. That would push the Gulf states toward a harder line, but one that carries a significantly greater risk of escalation. This choice is particularly difficult because the conflict has exposed important differences among the Gulf states over how to deal with Iran. Despite the escalation, Gulf capitals have also sought to preserve channels of communication with Tehran. They clearly understand the enormous economic and security costs of an uncontrolled regional war. But maintaining dialogue does not necessarily mean accepting the new reality Iran is seeking to establish. If the Gulf states reject a new arrangement in Hormuz that they believe legitimizes Iranian leverage over one of the world's most important energy corridors, the likelihood of another round of escalation will rise considerably. The same dilemma applies to Saudi Arabia and the Houthis: Riyadh must decide whether returning to negotiations represents pragmatic de-escalation or effectively rewards coercion. This is therefore becoming a moment of strategic choice for the Gulf. The current status quo is increasingly destructive to regional stability and cannot be sustained indefinitely. But recognizing that the status quo is untenable does not answer the most important question: What is the least dangerous way to change it? Do the Gulf states restore stability through a negotiated accommodation with Iran and the Houthis, even if that requires accepting some uncomfortable new realities? Or do they conclude that accommodation today will only invite greater coercion tomorrow and therefore choose confrontation despite the risks? The choice is no longer between stability and escalation. It is increasingly between two competing, and risky, paths for trying to restore stability: accommodation or confrontation. #IranWar #gcc
Once again, Iran may emerge as the biggest strategic beneficiary of this confrontation. Any serious disruption to Saudi energy infrastructure will push oil prices higher at precisely the moment when Iran’s own ability to move oil through the Strait of Hormuz is constrained. But the more important lesson is about the Houthis. The Houthis operate under remarkably few constraints. Combined with the strategic capabilities Iran has provided them over the years, this has transformed them from a localized Yemeni threat into a first-order regional strategic challenge. And they understand the asymmetry with Saudi Arabia very well. The Houthis have relatively little to lose and potentially a great deal to gain from escalation. Saudi Arabia is in exactly the opposite position: it has enormous economic infrastructure to protect, ambitious development plans to safeguard, and relatively little to gain from another prolonged war in Yemen. That asymmetry makes rebuilding deterrence extraordinarily difficult. The more Saudi Arabia strikes, the Houthis can simply climb another rung on the escalation ladder. So far, Riyadh has struggled to impose costs severe enough to change Houthi calculations. In fact, we may have to acknowledge that the deterrence equation Saudi Arabia is trying to restore no longer exists. The presence of American advisers in Saudi Arabia is important, but it is difficult to see how advisers alone fundamentally change this strategic equation. Unless Riyadh receives significantly greater external assistance, potentially including meaningful participation by additional partners , Saudi Arabia may eventually face an extremely uncomfortable choice: continue an escalatory cycle in which it has far more to lose than its adversary, or accept an agreement largely dictated by the Houthis. The current status quo looks increasingly unsustainable. After the Houthis’ latest operational gains, and with continued attacks against critical Saudi infrastructure, time may not be on Riyadh’s side. This is ultimately the strategic problem: Saudi Arabia needs the Houthis to fear escalation. The Houthis increasingly appear to believe that escalation works in their favor. #yemen #IranWar
A war that did not bring down the Iranian regime. A war that did not resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge, as the continuing uncertainty surrounding activities at Pickaxe mountain makes painfully clear. A war that did not eliminate Iran’s ability to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal. A war that did not sever Tehran’s ties to the Houthis, the Shiite militias in Iraq, or Hezbollah. But there is one achievement we are apparently supposed to celebrate: roughly 30 percent of oil traffic is now moving through the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway that was fully open before the war began. This is not strategic success. It is a colossal strategic failure whose tactical and operational achievements are increasingly overshadowed by what the war failed to accomplish. The question Washington and Jerusalem should now be asking is much more fundamental: Are there actually kinetic solutions to any of these core strategic challenges? Because if the Islamic Republic survives, with its nuclear problem unresolved, its missile-production capacity intact, its regional networks still functioning, and Hormuz less secure than before, then our strategic position after the war may be worse than it was when the war began. And that is before accounting for perhaps the most consequential outcome of all: the doctrinal transformation inside Iran itself. The Iran emerging from this war appears more willing to take risks, more inclined toward direct action, less hesitant, and potentially less predictable. Operational achievements matter. But wars must ultimately be judged by the strategic reality they leave behind. By that standard, it is becoming increasingly difficult to call this campaign a success. Will Iran’s regime eventually collapse under the weight of economic pressure? Maybe. No one really knows. But that is precisely the point. You cannot build a strategy around an outcome you cannot reliably predict. The regime could fall next month, in five years, or survive for decades. Economic pressure may weaken it significantly without producing political collapse, and it may simultaneously encourage Tehran to escalate abroad in an effort to impose costs on its adversaries. Regime collapse is therefore a possibility, not a strategy. A serious Iran policy must be built around what Washington can actually influence and plan for, not around the hope that economic pain will eventually produce a political outcome whose timing, mechanism, and consequences remain fundamentally unpredictable. #IranWar
I’m sorry to say it, but based on the Saudi Air Force’s performance during its previous campaign in #Yemen, I would be very cautious about assuming that airpower alone can stop the current Houthi advance. Saudi Arabia possesses some of the most sophisticated aircraft and weapons systems in the region. But advanced platforms do not automatically translate into battlefield effectiveness. What ultimately matters is the integration of intelligence and strike capabilities, pilot training and operational experience, target acquisition, battle-damage assessment, and, critically, coordination between air and ground forces. Dropping precision-guided munitions is not a strategy. The challenge is even greater today because the Houthis are not the same force Saudi Arabia confronted a decade ago. They have accumulated significant combat experience and developed increasingly sophisticated air-defense capabilities, making sustained air operations more difficult and potentially more costly. I hope I’m wrong. But if past performance is any indication, I would not build a strategy for stopping the Houthis around the assumption that Saudi airpower will be decisive. The uncomfortable truth is that Saudi Arabia cannot confront the Houthis alone. The events of last night only reinforce that reality. This is no longer simply a Saudi-Houthi confrontation. The Houthis have developed capabilities that pose a broader threat to regional security, maritime trade, and freedom of navigation. If the objective is to contain that threat effectively, Riyadh will need more than its own military capabilities. It will require a broad and credible international coalition willing to share the operational, intelligence, and political burden. That is the painful lesson: Saudi Arabia cannot carry this fight by itself, and pretending otherwise will only give the Houthis more room to expand their leverage. And again, I sincerely hope I am underestimating Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities. But I cannot shake the conclusion that when it comes to the Houthis, the Saudis need help, and they need it quickly. This is not about the quality of Saudi weapons systems. It is about the scale, complexity, and evolution of the Houthi threat. Riyadh should not be expected to confront that challenge alone. I hope the Saudis prove me wrong. But hope is not a strategy, and neither Washington nor Saudi Arabia should build its policy around the assumption that Riyadh can handle the Houthis by itself. #iranwar
The Houthis Are Changing the Rules of the Game and Washington and Riyadh will Need a New Strategy It is time to acknowledge an uncomfortable reality: Saudi Arabia was not prepared for this confrontation with the Houthis. For years, Riyadh’s approach was essentially containment. The Saudis sought to buy stability, support arrangements that would allow the Houthi government in Sanaa to function, and gradually move toward a political roadmap that would prevent another major war. But the #Houthis drew a very different lesson from recent events. They increasingly concluded that Saudi Arabia was more vulnerable, more risk-averse, and less willing to return to a full-scale war. Instead of reinforcing deterrence, Saudi restraint appears to have strengthened the Houthis’ confidence that escalation could produce additional gains. This matters for Washington because there is a temptation to believe that the problem can be solved through Tehran: pressure Iran hard enough, and Iran will force the Houthis to stand down. That misunderstands the relationship. Iran considers the Houthis one of its most important strategic partners in the region. Tehran has provided weapons, technology, expertise and other forms of assistance that have dramatically strengthened Houthi capabilities. But influence is not the same as control. The Houthis do not see themselves simply as Iranian proxies waiting for instructions from Tehran. They see themselves as partners in the so-called Axis of Resistance, with their own interests, ideology and decision-making process. Previous confrontations with the United States demonstrated the limits of Tehran’s ability, or willingness, to restrain them. That leaves Washington with an increasingly difficult problem. The United States has already fought a military campaign against the Houthis at considerable cost and with limited strategic results. There is little reason to believe that another round of strikes, by itself, will fundamentally change Houthi behavior. A renewed campaign would consume additional munitions and military resources while again exposing American assets, particularly at sea, to attack. Washington can and should provide intelligence, defensive and military assistance to Saudi Arabia and its partners. But it cannot compensate indefinitely for the weakness and fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp inside Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis are pursuing something far more consequential than another battlefield victory. Their advance toward Bab el-Mandeb potentially strengthens their ability to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. That is the real strategic issue. The Houthis do not need to defeat the United States Navy or conquer Saudi Arabia. They only need to demonstrate that they can repeatedly threaten commercial shipping, impose economic costs and force Washington and its regional partners to choose between accepting a new reality and entering another costly military confrontation. None of this means that the Houthis are invincible. They have vulnerabilities. Their military infrastructure can be attacked, their capabilities degraded and significant costs imposed on them. But destroying launchers is not the same as establishing deterrence. The central challenge is how to deter a highly ideological movement that is willing to absorb substantial punishment and possesses increasingly sophisticated missiles, drones and other capabilities developed with Iranian assistance. Saudi Arabia has already learned another important lesson: money may buy temporary calm, but it cannot buy strategic deterrence. The response therefore cannot remain a Saudi problem with occasional American military support. Protecting Bab el-Mandeb and freedom of navigation requires a broader and sustained international coalition combining maritime security, intelligence, military pressure, strengthening local partners and diplomacy. This will not be a quick campaign. And Iran is already benefiting. Tehran does not need to control every Houthi decision. From Iran’s perspective, a powerful Houthi movement capable of threatening Bab el-Mandeb, tying down Saudi Arabia, consuming American military resources and raising the economic costs of regional confrontation is itself a major strategic achievement. The main question is how to prevent the Houthis from permanently changing the strategic reality around Bab el-Mandeb. Because once they can force the United States and its partners to choose between costly escalation and accepting potential restrictions on freedom of navigation, they do not need to defeat America militarily. They have already achieved something far more valuable: changing the rules of the game. The Houthi advance and the attacks on Saudi Arabia are also exposing the so-called “Mecca Alliance” between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan to its first real strategic test — and so far, the results are hardly impressive. An alliance ultimately matters not because of the declarations made when it is established, but because of what its members are prepared to do when one of them comes under attack. Riyadh now faces a direct and growing Houthi threat, yet neither Ankara nor Islamabad appears eager to become meaningfully involved in confronting it. This raises an uncomfortable question: Is the Mecca Alliance an emerging regional security architecture, or is it becoming a paper tiger precisely when Saudi Arabia needs it most? The Houthis are providing the first serious stress test. If Turkey and Pakistan are unwilling to provide meaningful assistance when Saudi territory and strategic interests are under attack, Riyadh will have to reconsider what this alliance actually provides beyond political symbolism. For Washington, this matters as well. The United States has increasingly encouraged regional partners to assume greater responsibility for their own security. But the current crisis demonstrates the gap between announcing new regional security frameworks and actually creating alliances whose members are willing to share risks when deterrence fails. An alliance that works only in peacetime is not much of an alliance. #IranWar #yemen
צריך לומר את האמת: ההתפתחויות האחרונות בתימן חושפות לא רק את עוצמת האתגר החות'י, אלא גם את עומק הכשל האסטרטגי בהתמודדות עמו. א. סעודיה הגיעה למערכה הזו לא מוכנה. ריאד הופתעה מהנכונות החות'ית להפר למעשה את מפת הדרכים ולהמשיך במערכה עד להסרת המצור מעליהם. ההנחה הסעודית שלפיה ניתן יהיה לשמר לאורך זמן את השקט באמצעות הסדרים כלכליים ופוליטיים התבררה כשגויה. ב. מדיניות ההכלה הסעודית מיצתה את עצמה. עד לפרוץ המשבר הנוכחי, הגישה הסעודית התבססה במידה רבה על הכלת החות'ים, לרבות העברת כספים שנועדו לסייע במימון הוצאות הממשל החות'י. אלא שהמלחמה מול איראן חיזקה בצנעא את התפיסה שסעודיה חלשה ופגיעה יותר מכפי שסברו בעבר. לתפיסה הזו יש חלק משמעותי במה שאנחנו רואים כיום. ג. העברת מסרים לטהראן לא תפתור את הבעיה. איראן רואה בחות'ים נכס אסטרטגי מהמעלה הראשונה, אבל יכולתה לשלוט בתהליך קבלת ההחלטות שלהם מוגבלת. כבר בעבר ראינו כיצד החות'ים נכנסו לעימות עם ארצות הברית, למרות האיומים שהועברו מוושינגטון לטהראן. החות'ים אינם רואים בעצמם שלוחים איראניים שממתינים להוראות. מבחינתם, הם שותפים בציר והם מקבלים בעצמם את ההחלטות הנוגעות למלחמה ולשלום. ד. ספק רב אם וושינגטון רוצה לחזור למערכה ישירה נגד החות'ים. ארצות הברית כבר ניהלה מולם מערכה שהניבה הישגים מוגבלים, וקשה להניח שהיא ממהרת להיכנס שוב לעימות שיחייב הקצאת כוחות ומשאבים נוספים ויחשוף נכסים אמריקניים לפגיעה, בעיקר בים. וושינגטון יכולה להעניק לסעודיה סיוע מודיעיני וצבאי משמעותי, אבל גם כאן נחשפת בעיה: הכוחות הנתמכים בידי ריאד לא היו ערוכים למערכה הנוכחית. במשך תקופה ארוכה הייתה סעודיה עסוקה יותר בסילוק הנוכחות האמירתית מדרום תימן מאשר בהכנת המחנה שלה לעימות מחודש עם החות'ים. ה. בינתיים החות'ים משיגים הישגים אסטרטגיים. התקדמותם לעבר באב אל-מנדב מחזקת את יכולתם לאיים על אחד מנתיבי השיט החשובים בעולם. במקביל, "ברית מכה" עדיין מתלבטת כיצד להגיב. וגם אם תחליט להתערב באופן משמעותי יותר, כלל לא ברור שהדבר יספיק כדי לשנות את דפוס הפעולה החות'י. ו. לכן האסטרטגיה מול החות'ים חייבת להשתנות. אי אפשר להשאיר את ההתמודדות הזו על כתפיה של סעודיה בלבד. ייתכן שמדובר בתהליך ארוך, יקר ומורכב, אבל יש צורך בבניית קואליציה בינלאומית משמעותית שתתמודד עם האיום החות'י לאורך זמן. זהו איום שלא צפוי להיעלם בקרוב — אם בכלל. ז. החות'ים אינם כל-יכולים. יש להם נקודות תורפה, וניתן לפגוע בהן. הבעיה היא שקשה מאוד לבנות מולם משוואת הרתעה יציבה. האידאולוגיה שלהם, נכונותם לספוג מחיר והיכולת להשתמש באמצעי לחימה אסטרטגיים שאיראן סיפקה להם או סייעה להם לייצר, מקשות מאוד על יצירת הרתעה קלאסית. ומה שהניסיון הסעודי כבר הוכיח הוא שגם כסף אינו יכול לקנות פתרון אסטרטגי לבעיה הזו. בשורה התחתונה: הולך ומתברר שמדובר בהישג משמעותי לציר ההתנגדות. ארצות הברית ומדינות "ברית מכה" ניצבות כעת בפני דילמה קשה, משום שהחזרה לסטטוס קוו הקודם נראית פחות ופחות אפשרית. מבחינת איראן, זהו הישג אסטרטגי מובהק: היא אולי אינה שולטת בהחלטות החות'ים, אבל היא בהחלט נהנית מהיכולת שלהם לאיים על חופש השיט בבאב אל-מנדב ולהפעיל לחץ על ארצות הברית, סעודיה והמערכת הבינלאומית כולה.
הנשיא ג'וזף עון עשוי להתברר כדמות בעלת חשיבות היסטורית לישראל, במעמד המזכיר את אנואר סאדאת: מנהיג שמגיע לאחר עימות קשה ועקוב מדם עם ישראל, אך עשוי לראות בחזונו עתיד אחר לחלוטין ביחסים עמה. עון לא היה מגיע למעמדו הנוכחי אלמלא ההחלשה הדרמטית של חיזבאללה בידי ישראל. חיזבאללה רצה לראות את סולימאן פרנג'יה בארמון הנשיאות, ולא במקרה. חסן נסראללה ידע היטב מיהו ג'וזף עון ומה עלולה משמעות בחירתו עבור מאזן הכוחות בתוך לבנון. אבל כאן בדיוק מתחילה הדילמה הישראלית: ישראל יכולה הייתה ליצור את התנאים לשינוי הפוליטי בלבנון באמצעות כוח צבאי, אך היא לא תוכל להשלים את השינוי הזה באמצעות כוח צבאי בלבד. כל עוד ישראל נשארת בשטח לבנון וממשיכה בתקיפות, היא מקשה על עון ועל ממשלת לבנון להוכיח לציבור הלבנוני שניתן להשיג הישגים מול ישראל באמצעות המדינה והדיפלומטיה. במקביל, היא מעניקה לחיזבאללה את הטיעון החשוב ביותר שלו: שרק "ההתנגדות" מסוגלת לגרום לצה"ל לסגת מלבנון. ישראל אינה יכולה גם להפוך נוכחות צבאית בלבנון למדיניות קבועה וגם לחלום על הסכם שלום עם המדינה הלבנונית. לכן ישראל חייבת להחליט כיצד היא רואה את עתיד יחסיה עם לבנון. האם היעד הוא מלחמת התשה ונוכחות צבאית ממושכת, או ניסיון לנצל את חלון ההזדמנויות הנדיר שנוצר כדי לבנות מציאות אחרת? האפשרות השנייה אינה נטולת סיכונים. היא תחייב נסיגה ישראלית מרוב השטח הלבנוני במסגרת מהלך מדיני, הידוק הקשר עם ממשלת לבנון ותוכנית ארוכת טווח, יחד עם ארצות הברית, סעודיה וצרפת, לחיזוק הצבא הלבנוני ויכולתה של המדינה להרחיב את ריבונותה. הרווח הפוטנציאלי ברור וגם הסיכון. אבל גם להמשך המדיניות הנוכחית יש מחיר. אם ישראל תמשיך להסתמך על נשק ללא דיפלומטיה, זה רק עניין של זמן עד שחיזבאללה ינסה לבנות מחדש מודל של לוחמת גרילה נגד הנוכחות הישראלית. אחד ההישגים הגדולים ביותר של ישראל במערכה נגד הציר האיראני אינו רק הפגיעה הצבאית בחיזבאללה, אלא השינוי במציאות הפוליטית בלבנון. אם ישראל לא תדע לתרגם את ההישג הצבאי הזה למהלך מדיני, היא עלולה לראות אותו נשחק ולמצוא את עצמה שוב שוקעת בבוץ הלבנוני. אנחנו לא בשנת 2000. זו אינה אותה נסיגה חד-צדדית מול חיזבאללה בשיא כוחו. חיזבאללה חלש משמעותית יותר, ובעיקר, בלבנון קיימים כיום נשיא וראש ממשלה שעשויים להיות מוכנים לחצות את הרוביקון ביחסים עם ישראל. השאלה היא האם ישראל מוכנה לחצות אותו יחד איתם. ניצחון צבאי יצר את ההזדמנות. אך רק דיפלומטיה יכולה להפוך אותה למציאות אסטרטגית חדשה.
The depth of the U.S. commitment to Jordan’s security means Washington has little choice but to make every effort to intercept Iranian missiles threatening Jordanian territory, even at a significant cost in interceptors. That helps explain the scale of the defensive response to the latest Iranian barrage. But the broader strategic picture is increasingly troubling: both Washington and Tehran are failing to deter each other. Each side appears to believe that raising the military cost will eventually force the other to back down. Instead, the opposite is happening. Every escalation is answered not by restraint or capitulation, but by another escalation. This is the fundamental problem with the current trajectory. There is no obvious kinetic path back to a stable status quo. If the United States intensifies attacks on Iranian tankers, Tehran is more likely to expand its attacks on tankers in the Gulf, not reduce them. And additional Iranian attacks will, in turn, increase the pressure on Washington to respond. Iran is not deterring the United States, and the United States is not deterring Iran. Meanwhile, another race is underway: between the deterioration of Iran’s economy and the rising global price of oil. So far, neither side appears to believe that this economic pressure is sufficient reason to reduce its willingness to use force. The critical question, therefore, is whether someone will find a way to interrupt this dangerous escalation cycle and bring the parties back toward diplomacy or whether both sides will continue climbing the ladder until escalation becomes increasingly difficult to control. Seen in this context, last night’s events were not the end of an escalation cycle. They were another step toward the next one. #IranWar #iran
Initial assessment of the Iranian response: 1. Iran is escalating and nothing about that should be surprising. Tehran has repeatedly signaled that it will respond to growing U.S. pressure by moving up the escalation ladder, not by backing down. 2. The scale and coordination of the missile launches matter. Firing this number of missiles from multiple locations suggests that Iran has been rebuilding its operational capabilities. It also likely reflects growing confidence in the size of its remaining missile inventory and its ability to sustain additional rounds of attacks. 3. Iran appears to be aiming for more than signaling. Tehran likely calculates that a sufficiently large and complex salvo, potentially including cluster-warhead missiles, could overwhelm or penetrate U.S. and allied air defenses in Jordan. In other words, the objective is not simply to demonstrate capability; it is to inflict damage. 4. There is no reason to assume this round is over. Given previous IRGC threats, Iran could expand its response beyond missile attacks, including attempts to strike tankers while they are anchored in Gulf ports. 5. Iran’s strategic objective is increasingly clear: impose a much higher price for the U.S. “tanker-for-tanker” strategy and demonstrate that military pressure will not restore deterrence. This explains the steady movement upward on Iran’s escalation ladder. 6. The speed of Iranian decision-making is also significant. Tehran appears to have prepared a "menu" of retaliatory options in advance, allowing it to respond quickly rather than starting a new decision-making process after every U.S. action. 7. This creates a fundamental problem for Washington. It will be extremely difficult to identify the point at which additional U.S. military action suddenly restores deterrence. If Washington escalates, Tehran is likely to escalate again. Pressure is producing escalation, not capitulation. 8. The current status quo is therefore inherently unstable. Iran will not simply accept an indefinite maritime blockade, nor will it allow Washington to impose mounting economic costs without imposing costs of its own. The key question for Washington is no longer whether Iran will respond to additional pressure, but how far both sides are prepared to climb an escalation ladder that neither appears capable of controlling. #iran
Another rung on the escalation ladder. There is no kinetic solution to the Strait of Hormuz problem. Every attempt to impose one only brings Washington and Tehran closer to an escalation that may become increasingly difficult to control. A “tanker for tanker” dynamic will not compel Iran to back down. It will almost certainly trigger further Iranian retaliation, eventually forcing President Trump to make a difficult choice: escalate significantly or find an off-ramp. The fundamental problem is that the current status quo is inherently unstable. The assumption that economic pressure can continue indefinitely while allowing the United States to avoid a wider military confrontation is simply not supported by what we are seeing on the ground. Iran will respond to sustained pressure, and each additional round of retaliation and counter-retaliation increases the risk to global energy markets. Oil prices will rise even if the United States continues to strike or sink Iranian tankers. Military action may impose costs on Tehran. It does not solve the Hormuz problem. Without a credible diplomatic off-ramp, it risks turning coercion into an escalation cycle with no clear end state. #iran
أكرر التأكيد على نقطة أساسية: السعودية لا تخوض اليوم معركة تخصها وحدها، بل تواجه في اليمن تهديداً حوثياً مدعوماً من إيران يمس أمن المنطقة والمجتمع الدولي بأسره. ما يحدث لا يتعلق فقط بأمن الحدود السعودية. فاستمرار قدرة الحوثيين على تهديد الملاحة وطرق التجارة والطاقة وتحويل اليمن إلى منصة عسكرية إيرانية يمثل تحدياً مباشراً للاستقرار الإقليمي والدولي. لذلك، لا ينبغي ترك الرياض وحدها في هذه المواجهة. على شركائها في المنطقة وخارجها الوقوف إلى جانبها وتقديم الدعم الذي تحتاجه لمواجهة هذا التهديد واستعادة الردع. آخر ما تحتاجه المنطقة هو أن يخرج الحوثيون من هذه المواجهة وهم يعتقدون أن التصعيد واستخدام القوة قد حققا لهم مكاسب. مثل هذه النتيجة لن تكون مشكلة سعودية فقط، بل ستعزز الحوثيين، وتخدم استراتيجية إيران الإقليمية، وتزيد من احتمالات جولات جديدة من التصعيد في المستقبل. وهذا الأمر لا يقتصر على دولة أو طرف بعينه. المسؤولية تقع على عاتق جميع دول الخليج، والولايات المتحدة، والدول الأوروبية، وكذلك إسرائيل. إذا كانت السعودية تتحمل اليوم العبء الأكبر في مواجهة الحوثيين، فلا ينبغي تركها تخوض هذه المعركة بمفردها. فالتهديد الحوثي للملاحة والتجارة والطاقة والاستقرار الإقليمي يتجاوز حدود المملكة، ونتائج هذه المواجهة ستنعكس على المنطقة والمجتمع الدولي بأسره. لذلك، من مصلحة جميع هذه الأطراف مساندة السعودية ومنع الحوثيين من الخروج من هذه المواجهة وهم يشعرون بأن التصعيد والقوة مكّناهم من فرض إرادتهم. هذه ليست معركة سعودية فقط، بل تحدٍ إقليمي ودولي يتطلب موقفاً جماعياً. #اليمن
The bigger question after last night is whether we will finally see any meaningful movement from the Mecca Alliance, or whether it will prove to be little more than an agreement on paper. The Saudi logic behind building this framework was clear: Riyadh did not want to confront the Houthis alone. It sought a broader network of partnerships that could strengthen Saudi deterrence and provide political and potentially military support in a conflict the Houthis have increasingly forced upon the Kingdom. But the latest escalation is exposing the limits of that concept. What is becoming increasingly clear is that this is not a collective-defense alliance in any meaningful sense. The reluctance of Saudi Arabia’s partners to respond, presumably out of concern that they could be dragged into an unwanted confrontation, highlights the gap between signing security agreements and actually accepting risk on behalf of an ally. That matters far beyond Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has spent considerable political capital trying to build a regional security architecture that reduces its vulnerability and strengthens deterrence. A security framework that remains passive when Saudi territory comes under attack inevitably raises questions about its credibility. There is also a broader international dimension. Saudi Arabia and its partners are not simply fighting for Saudi interests. They are confronting an Iranian-Houthi strategy that threatens freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints and gives Tehran and the Houthis significant leverage over international commerce and energy markets. For precisely that reason, one might have expected much more substantial international and regional support for Riyadh. Last night was therefore more than another episode in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. It was a test of whether the new regional security architecture surrounding Saudi Arabia can translate political commitments into action when it actually matters. So far, the answer is far from reassuring. #IranWar #yemen
عزيزي جمال، هناك تشابه لافت بين المواجهة الأمريكية–الإيرانية وبين المواجهة المتصاعدة بين السعودية والحوثيين. الهجوم #الحوثي على السعودية الليلة الماضية جاء في ظل تصعيد كبير في العمليات السعودية ضد الجماعة، وبعد سلسلة من النجاحات الميدانية المهمة. والمنطق هنا يشبه إلى حد بعيد ما شهدناه في المواجهة بين إيران والولايات المتحدة: فكلما ازداد الضغط على طهران، بما في ذلك الحصار البحري، لم تتراجع إيران، بل صعّدت ردها ووصلت إلى حد إطلاق صواريخ باتجاه حاملة طائرات أمريكية. الخلاصة الأساسية هي أن زيادة الضغط على إيران أو الحوثيين لا تعني بالضرورة دفعهما إلى التراجع. على العكس، من المرجح أن تؤدي إلى تصعيد مقابل. وهنا تجد الرياض وواشنطن نفسيهما أمام معضلة متشابهة: إما خفض مستوى التصعيد ومحاولة إيجاد مخرج سياسي، أو توسيع العمليات العسكرية بهدف إضعاف الخصم بصورة أكثر جوهرية. الخيار الثاني قد يحقق إنجازات عسكرية مهمة، لكنه يحمل أيضاً ثمناً كبيراً، ولا توجد أي ضمانة لتحقيق نصر حاسم. وفي الوقت نفسه، يبدو أن كل يوم يمر يعزز الحجة التي تبنتها أبوظبي منذ سنوات تجاه الحوثيين: لا يمكن الاعتماد على الحوافز الاقتصادية وحدها لتغيير السلوك الاستراتيجي لجماعة مسلحة تمتلك مشروعاً سياسياً وعسكرياً طويل الأمد. السعودية لا تخوض اليوم معركة تتعلق بأمنها فقط. نتائج هذه المواجهة ستؤثر بشكل مباشر في أمن البحر الأحمر، وحرية الملاحة الدولية، وقدرة إيران والحوثيين على تهديد أحد أهم الممرات البحرية في العالم. ولذلك، هناك مصلحة إقليمية ودولية حقيقية في مساعدة #الرياض على إضعاف القدرات العسكرية التي تسمح للحوثيين بتهديد الملاحة. لكن لا يوجد خيار عسكري بلا ثمن. استمرار التصعيد يعني أيضاً زيادة خطر استهداف منشآت الطاقة السعودية، وارتفاع أسعار النفط، وتوسيع دائرة المواجهة الإقليمية. لذلك، إذا قررت السعودية وحلفاؤها مواصلة هذه الحملة، فمن الضروري أن تحظى الرياض بدعم دولي حقيقي، وأن تكون أهداف الحملة واضحة وواقعية، مع الاستعداد في الوقت نفسه لتداعيات التصعيد. ما يجري لم يعد مجرد جولة أخرى من الصراع السعودي–الحوثي. إنها معركة قد تسهم نتائجها في تحديد مستقبل الأمن في باب المندب، ومن يملك القدرة على تهديد أو حماية حرية الملاحة في هذا الممر الاستراتيجي.
There is a striking parallel between the U.S.-Iran confrontation and the escalating Saudi-Houthi conflict. Last night’s vicious #houthi attack on Saudi Arabia came amid a dramatic intensification of Saudi operations against the group and a series of significant battlefield gains. The logic is similar to what we have seen from Tehran: as U.S. pressure intensified, including the maritime blockade, Iran escalated rather than backed down, eventually crossing another threshold by launching missiles toward a U.S. aircraft carrier. The broader lesson is important: greater pressure on Iran and the Houthis should not be expected to produce capitulation. It is more likely to produce escalation. That leaves Washington and Riyadh facing a similar strategic dilemma. They can reduce tensions and search for a diplomatic off-ramp, or they can expand military operations in an effort to fundamentally weaken their adversaries. The latter may produce significant operational gains, but it will also carry substantial costs, with no guarantee of decisive victory. At the same time, each passing day strengthens the argument that Abu Dhabi’s more assertive approach toward the Houthis had merit. Years of incentives, economic inducements, and attempts to manage the threat did not fundamentally change the Houthis’ behavior or strategic ambitions. Saudi Arabia is now fighting a campaign whose consequences extend far beyond its own security. The outcome will affect freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints and the ability of both Iran and the Houthis to threaten international shipping. Riyadh therefore deserves meaningful international support in degrading Houthi capabilities. But there is no cost-free military option. Continued escalation will expose Saudi energy infrastructure to further attacks and could place additional upward pressure on global oil prices. If Riyadh and its partners intend to continue this campaign, they should do so with sustained international support, realistic objectives, and a clear understanding of the escalation risks. This is no longer simply another round in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. It is becoming a struggle over the future security architecture of the Bab el-Mandeb—and, ultimately, over who can threaten or protect freedom of navigation through this critical waterway. #IranWar #yemen
The #Houthis have no intention of backing down. Despite Saudi pressure through Riyadh-aligned forces in Yemen, the Houthis appear to believe there is no going back to the pre-escalation status quo. Their objective is not simply to survive the current pressure campaign, but to force Saudi Arabia to relent and lift the restrictions imposed on them. That puts Riyadh back in an extremely difficult strategic position. Escalation carries significant risks and could ultimately backfire. But making concessions is hardly cost-free either: it could give the Houthis additional political and economic space to consolidate their rule, rebuild their military capabilities, and deepen their relationship with Iran. The fundamental problem is that the old status quo is probably gone. Both options available to Saudi Arabia are therefore deeply problematic. Unless Saudi-backed forces can achieve dramatic battlefield gains that genuinely threaten Houthi control of northern Yemen, it is difficult to see the Houthis retreating without extracting significant concessions from Riyadh. And even in that scenario, it remains unclear whether military pressure would force them to compromise, or simply push them toward further escalation. For Saudi Arabia, this is increasingly becoming a choice not between a good and a bad option, but between two potentially costly ones. #yemen
The trust shattered between Iran and the Gulf states will be extremely difficult to rebuild. But Gulf leaders also understand that pushing Tehran into a corner and attempting to isolate it diplomatically does not necessarily produce greater security. Their emerging approach is better understood as diversification: maintain channels with Iran while, at the same time, significantly strengthening deterrence against it. Middle Eastern statecraft is rarely binary. It is not a choice between engagement and deterrence, diplomacy and military power, or Iran and Israel. Gulf states can talk to adversaries, cooperate with partners, and strengthen their own defensive capabilities simultaneously. Anyone expecting the Gulf states to simply abandon engagement with Iran and move decisively closer to Israel after the war should take another look at Gargash’s remarks. They capture an important lesson about how Gulf capitals are thinking about the regional order. And one final point: renewed Gulf engagement with Tehran does not automatically come at Israel’s expense. Gulf states can maintain relationships with both. But a meaningful deepening of ties with Israel will depend heavily on a significant change in Israeli policy above all, on the Palestinian issue. The region is moving toward hedging and diversification, not rigid blocs. Washington and Jerusalem would be wise to recognize that reality. And on a day when Israel’s defense minister is threatening to “crush” the Palestinian Authority, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Israel is moving in precisely the opposite direction. #IranWar
My numbers in the lottery has not yet come - but they will! In both cases, this is not an assessment it is crystal-ball strategy. And no serious national security policy should be built on predictions that no one can make with confidence. Mass protests in Iran could erupt tomorrow, or they may not happen for years. Right now, the regime appears stable. And even if large-scale protests do break out, the regime has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to use extreme violence against its own people to survive. If Israeli strategy is ultimately based on the assumption that economic pressure will bring Iranians into the streets and that those protests will then bring down the regime, that is not a strategy. At best, it is an educated guess. Hope for regime collapse is not an exit strategy. #iran
وهذه خلاصة موقفي من هذه القضية: كلمة تحذير لصنّاع القرار في إسرائيل بشأن العلاقات مع مصر. وإذا كان هناك إنذار ينبغي أن يقلقنا فعلًا، فهو موجّه إلينا نحن: إذا واصلت إسرائيل سياستها الحالية في المنطقة، وخصوصًا إذا استمرت في طرح فكرة دفع الفلسطينيين من غزة نحو سيناء، فقد نجد أنفسنا نعرّض بأيدينا أحد أهم الأصول الاستراتيجية لدولة إسرائيل للخطر. لقد شكّلت معاهدة السلام مع مصر اختراقًا تاريخيًا في علاقات إسرائيل مع العالم العربي. فهل نريد حقًا الوصول إلى وضع نضطر فيه مجددًا إلى بناء الجيش الإسرائيلي حول جبهة جنوبية والتفكير من جديد بمفاهيم إنشاء فيلق عسكري جنوبي؟ وبأي جنود تحديدًا؟ السلام هو خيار استراتيجي للطرفين. لكنه ليس أمرًا يمكن اعتباره مضمونًا إلى الأبد. ولذلك، يجب ألا يكون الهدف الإسرائيلي البحث عن مؤشرات حرب في كل خطوة مصرية، بل بذل كل ما يمكن لضمان أن يبقى السلام الخيار الاستراتيجي للقاهرة وللقدس في المستقبل أيضًا.
אני מציע זווית אחרת לחלוטין על היחסים עם מצרים ועל השיח סביב "התרעת האמת": א. למרות מלחמת חרבות ברזל, הנשיא א-סיסי שב ומצהיר כמעט בכל במה אפשרית כי השלום הוא בחירה אסטרטגית של מצרים. זו איננה אמירה חסרת משמעות, בוודאי על רקע המשבר העמוק ביחסים עם ישראל. ב. בניגוד למשברים קודמים, מצרים לא החזירה את השגריר ושמרה, גם בתקופות הקשות ביותר של המלחמה, על רציפות הערוץ הדיפלומטי עם ישראל. ג. עם כל הכבוד להתקרבות בין קהיר לאנקרה, מצרים לא הצטרפה לברית מכה. היחסים עם טורקיה אכן התחזקו משמעותית, אבל הם עדיין מלווים בחשדנות ובפערי אינטרסים. אסור להפוך כל התקרבות אזורית לברית המכוונת נגד ישראל. ד. מצרים רואה באפשרות של דחיקת פלסטינים מעזה לשטחה איום מוחשי על ביטחונה הלאומי. מבחינת קהיר זהו קו אדום. ולמרות זאת, א-סיסי הזמין את נתניהו לוועידת השלום במצרים. נתניהו הוא שבחר שלא להגיע. ה. המצרים מתעבים את חמאס ולוחצים עליו להתפרק מנשקו. אבל בניגוד לחלק מהשיח בישראל, הם גם מבינים שהיכולת לדבר עם חמאס היא נכס, משום שללא ערוץ כזה קשה מאוד להשפיע על המציאות בעזה ולתווך הסדרים. אפילו ישראל דיברה עם חמאס... ו. כיום גם ברור יותר כי התקיים מאמץ השפעה שנועד להציג את מצרים כאיום הולך וגובר בעיני הציבור הישראלי, לרבות באמצעות דיווחים כוזבים או מנופחים על המתרחש בסיני. העובדה הזו מחייבת זהירות רבה לפני שמאמצים כל דיווח על "הכנות מצריות למלחמה". ז. מצרים אכן מתעצמת צבאית, וישראל חייבת לעקוב אחרי ההתעצמות הזו. אבל מצרים, כמו כמעט כל מדינה מרכזית במזרח התיכון, מתמודדת עם שורה ארוכה של איומים ואתגרים שאינם קשורים לישראל: סכר התחייה באתיופיה, חוסר היציבות בסודאן ובלוב, האיום על נתיבי השיט והשלכות פעילות החות'ים, לצד אתגרים פנימיים וכלכליים כבדים. לא כל טנק או מטוס שמצרים רוכשת מיועד למלחמה עתידית בישראל. ח. ובניגוד בולט לתקופות קודמות, למרות המלחמה הקשה בעזה כמעט שלא ראינו הפגנות המוניות במצרים למען הפלסטינים. גם את העובדה הזו צריך להכניס למשוואה. כל זה אינו אומר שצריך לעצום עיניים. המשטר המצרי אינו מחנך את הציבור שלו לשלום עם ישראל, האנטי-נורמליזציה נותרה עמוקה, וישראל בוודאי חייבת לעקוב מקרוב אחר ההתעצמות הצבאית המצרית. אבל מכאן ועד לדבר על "התרעת אמת" מפני מצרים המרחק גדול. אם כבר יש כאן התרעה שצריכה להטריד אותנו, היא מופנית דווקא כלפינו: אם ישראל תמשיך במדיניות הנוכחית שלה באזור, ובמיוחד אם היא תמשיך להעלות אפשרות של דחיקת פלסטינים מעזה לסיני, אנחנו עלולים לסכן במו ידינו את אחד הנכסים האסטרטגיים החשובים ביותר של מדינת ישראל. הסכם השלום עם מצרים היה פריצת דרך היסטורית ביחסי ישראל עם העולם הערבי. האם אנחנו באמת רוצים להגיע למצב שבו נצטרך שוב לבנות את צה"ל סביב חזית דרומית ולחשוב במונחים של הקמת גיס דרומי? ועם אילו חיילים בדיוק? השלום הוא בחירה אסטרטגית של שני הצדדים. הוא אינו מובן מאליו, ולכן היעד הישראלי צריך להיות לא לחפש סימנים למלחמה בכל מהלך מצרי, אלא לעשות כל שניתן כדי שהשלום יישאר הבחירה האסטרטגית של קהיר ושל ירושלים גם בעתיד.
One thing should be clear from the latest interview with Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and one of the most powerful figures in Tehran today: Iran is preparing for escalation, not capitulation. Iran’s economic situation may be considerably worse than Rezaei is willing to acknowledge, or perhaps even fully understands. But Washington should not confuse economic pain with strategic surrender. Tehran has shown no intention of relinquishing its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Rezaei’s latest threats to establish a new “exclusion zone” only reinforce that point. This leaves the Trump administration approaching a critical decision point. Iran and Oman have been working on a framework for managing maritime traffic through the Strait, while Tehran continues to insist that reopening Hormuz must be tied to U.S. concessions, including relief from the naval blockade. If the administration accepts an Oman-Iran arrangement as the basis for renewed diplomacy, there may still be a path toward de-escalation. If it rejects such a framework and insists that economic and military pressure will eventually force Tehran to back down, another round of escalation becomes increasingly difficult to avoid. The most important warning sign is that Iran has already crossed another threshold: firing ballistic missiles toward major U.S. naval assets, including an aircraft carrier. Whatever the tactical outcome of those attacks, the strategic message matters. Tehran is demonstrating that even under severe economic pressure, it is prepared to climb the escalation ladder rather than surrender its leverage. #IranWar
אחד המאפיינים החוזרים במבצעי ההשפעה האיראניים, ושצריך להטריד אותנו במיוחד, הוא המעבר מהמרחב הדיגיטלי לעולם הפיזי. זה מתחיל בדרך כלל ברשת: האיראנים נכנסים לקבוצות קיימות או מקימים קבוצות חדשות, לא פעם בטלגרם – פלטפורמה שמאפשרת מעבר נוח יחסית משיח קבוצתי לתקשורת ישירה ואישית עם חברי הקבוצה. בשלב הבא הם מנסים לנצל את האמון שנבנה כדי להניע ישראלים לפעולה בעולם האמיתי. זה יכול להתחיל במשימות שנראות תמימות יחסית, כמו תליית פליירים, ולהתקדם לפעולות חמורות בהרבה, לרבות איסוף מידע ומעקב אחר אנשים. המגמה הזו הופכת מדאיגה יותר בשל שתי התפתחויות שפועלות לטובת האיראנים: היכרות הולכת ומעמיקה עם החברה הישראלית, ושיפור משמעותי ביכולות הטכנולוגיות שלהם, כולל שימוש ב-AI, בין היתר כדי להתגבר על מחסום השפה ולייצר עברית אמינה וטבעית יותר. סביר שהתופעה רק תלך ותחריף לקראת הבחירות. איראן לא תהסס לנסות ולהעמיק שסעים קיימים בחברה הישראלית, והיא יכולה לעשות זאת משני צידי המתרס בו-זמנית. מבחינתה, המטרה אינה בהכרח לקדם צד מסוים – אלא להחריף את הקיטוב, לערער את האמון ולנצל את המחלוקות שכבר קיימות בתוכנו. התופעה הזו החריפה מאז פרוץ מלחמת חרבות ברזל, וכבר כתבתי עליה בעבר במסגרת @INSS. https://t.co/ccf1Mjf1A3
Quoted @observer: recent attacks that exemplify Tehran’s emerging military doctrine under the rule of the late Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and his hardline backers in the IRGC. This regime is now highly controlled by the IRGC and wants to use its capabilities. Mojtaba Khamenei is definitely more radical than his father, and so we are seeing this more aggressive behaviour. Iran’s willingness to block the strait, and its attempt to rapidly rebuild its missile and drone capabilities, as part of a broader effort to raise the cost of the war for the US and control the pace of conflict to its advantage. Tehran’s newfound willingness to go on the offensive fits within this strategy. They are not lunatics; in their minds, this is the rational thing to do in order to build deterrence… to ensure no one is willing to attack them in future. That’s why this is a doctrinal change, not just a tactical one for the coming days. @msrmichaelson https://t.co/OqquXi4Yzb
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