
러시 도시
@RushDoshi · 아시아
이스라엘국은 아시아 섹션의 중국 관련 연구·분야별 전문지식 보도를 위해 러시 도시를 팔로우합니다.
Thanks for the exchange, Dennis! I might share your skepticism but for a few details. 1) U.S. officials thought the imagery mattered enough in the case of that attack to take it to the WSJ and to raise it with Beijing directly multiple times. I don't think we're in a position to dismiss the story outright. 2) While imagery on fixed targets isn't always high-value, it can be, and the situation here may be different. US strikes degraded Iran's ability to see the battlefield, but the the targeting improved over the summer, which is also when these transfers took place. We know that high-quality and timely imagery can help with targeting, battle damage assessment, mapping air defenses, and locating high-value mobile targets. 3) We've seen this movie before because China did much the same for Russia in Ukraine, and the Russians were desperate for the imagery, and it wasn't irrelevant either. That wasn't about forces in motion either. I'm realistic that this kind of thing is going to happen. But when the President is asked about it, his response should not be "it's fine" but to put down a marker. And it is notable that we are unwilling to draw red lines ourselves but are quite willing to respect Beijing's red lines, including on arms sales.
This feels like a milestone moment in Trump China policy. There are credible reports that China’s provision of satellite imagery to Iran may have resulted in American fatalities. The President isn’t even denying those reports. But he is brushing them off to keep the summit on track. Meanwhile, China warns any arms sale to Taiwan might kill the summit — and the President obliges and keeps the sales on ice.
This is a major candidate for elected office mainstreaming anti-Indian racism. He knows that Texas state law requires at least 90% of UT Austin freshmen to be Texas residents. International students comprise only 4% of recent freshmen. But presumably he sees political advantage in using a non-representative photo (of culturally assimilated South Asians!) to suggest a foreign takeover of the university.
The most likely path to upsetting the fragile U.S.-China detente has long been tensions over China's support for Iran. Now, the WSJ is reporting that China's provision of satellite imagery may have resulted in the deaths of three U.S. servicemembers. Lots still unknown. https://t.co/iL0YHCP41p
Appreciate @abrownepek discussing the need for “allied scale.” I’ve been in Tokyo the last few days. Lots of agreement here that this is the best (and perhaps only) path to techno-industrial resilience. Some say the alliances are too wounded for this to happen. We think there is more resilience than often understood. Now is the time to develop practical proposals for the world after Trump. https://t.co/zkHmZZdSiy
It is not an “exclusionary economic bloc” to give better trade terms to allies than to China in some sectors. Plenty of high-value trade will continue with China in that model — but others will also have a shot. And indeed, there is even an inclusive option for China in this approach: they can invest in our economies (with tech transfer, use of local suppliers, labor compliance, network and data compliance, and JVs) and make enormous profits while we gain capacity, jobs, and resilience. Without barriers, they will not do so. But your argument is that we should not treat China differently from others, no matter environmental or labor differences, no matter the massive subsidies or its non-market economy, and regardless of risks of dependency! That argument is in effect a call for free trade with China at the expense of our workers and businesses. I suspect you will disagree, but to me, your arguments on China seem functionally neoliberal and at odds with labor interests. Take electric vehicles. I don’t know what is “left” about saying that protecting workers from China’s mercantilism in the auto sector could lead to war, but that’s your argument, is it not? One that basically calls the position of UAW and USW reckless, just as you’ve called the position that we should treat China differently on trade reckless, even though it is in fact materially different? On issues of international economics involving China, your argument to me seems to be that if we protect our workers and businesses in some cases (e.g., restrict the free flow of goods and capital between the US and China) we are risking war or being “exclusionary,” therefore we should not protect our workers and businesses. Again, this is functionally neoliberalism.