데이비드 마코프스키

@DavidMakovsky · 싱크탱크 및 분석가 — 미국/영국

데이비드 마코프스키는 워싱턴연구소 아랍–이스라엘 관계 프로그램 책임자이며 『강하고 담대하라』의 공저자입니다.

2026년 9월 10일 오후 7:49 UTC
I went on PBS NewsHour last night to discuss the breaking report alleging high-level communication between Netanyahu and a leading Arab head of state with an explicit warning ahead of 10/7. As I noted last night, I have not seen sufficient evidence to substantiate that claim, but backchannel conversations with a Palestinian intermediary likely took place. Regardless, it’s unclear whether Hamas leader Sinwar’s warnings would have had a decisive impact given conversations of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia and Sinwar’s commitment to derail such a momentous development. https://t.co/6RmiEA1tiI
2026년 9월 6일 오후 7:12 UTC
The media boomlet over a possible Eisenkot-Bennett merger seems to be fading as Tuesday’s deadline for Israeli party lists approaches. While there were signs both leaders favored the move, the decisive factor appears to have been polling showing that the whole would not be greater than the sum of its parts—and might even cost them some of the most coveted voters: those on the soft right considering leaving Netanyahu. In any event, the two parties are part of the same Change Coalition and plan to work together if the bloc succeeds on Election Day, October 27. Instead, Eisenkot scored a notable addition: popular MK Chili Tropper, seen as a unifying figure in Israel. Tropper will be joined by Shira Shapira, mother of Aner Shapira, the young man who on October 7 repeatedly threw back multiple grenades Hamas terrorists hurled into a tiny roadside shelter packed with people fleeing the Nova festival. He threw back seven before an eighth exploded, killing him. His extraordinary actions saved several of those sheltering inside.
2026년 8월 29일 오후 10:22 UTC
Breaking silence, Netanyahu decries 'criminal violence' after settlers again attack besieged West Bank village — Finally. What about ordering Ben Gvir (BG) to arrest perpetrators? Arrests -the moral thing to do. Failure feeds the sense BG favors attacks. https://t.co/oCekD5kB9s
2026년 8월 23일 오후 9:55 UTC
Mossad chief meets Syrian FM in effort to defuse tensions after airstrike https://t.co/04DDNxgGsL
2026년 8월 23일 오후 5:32 UTC
Sunday evening prime-time news on @N12News reports that at last week’s Cairo meeting with Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya, Jared Kushner wanted to deliver a direct message: if Hamas tries to cheat on weapons decommissioning, the process stops—and no one will stand in Israel’s way if it takes military action against Hamas.
2026년 8월 23일 오후 3:23 UTC
Core contention of U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack on @pbsnewshour: Israel had a high-level backchannel—via the Mossad chief—to address its concerns with senior Syrian officials over the Abu al-Duhur airbase, yet suddenly jettisoned diplomacy for an airstrike. Barrack suggests political considerations may have played a role when there was still a chance to resolve the issue quietly. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz strongly disputes this account, saying Israel had “clear intelligence” of a potential Turkish threat, warned Syria at the highest levels and struck only after that warning went unanswered. Is Barrack right or wrong?
2026년 8월 21일 오후 9:48 UTC
Lebanese publication @ThisIsBeirut_, depicts troubling early indications that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is not taking basic measures to keep Hizbullah or its weaponry out of agreed-upon pilot zones in southern Lebanon. If accurate, this suggests little to no incentive for Israel to pull back. LAF inaction includes failing to check individual homes where Hizbullah most often stores weapons, not deploying roadblocks requiring identification to avert Hizbullah infiltration, and failing to prevent Hizbullah members from entering pilot zones under the cover of their affiliation with various NGOs. https://t.co/DgGvOVn0EF
2026년 8월 21일 오후 9:11 UTC
Kushner’s meeting with Hamas’ Khalil al-Hayya this week stood in stark contrast to the U.S.’ recent denial of a visa to Palestinian Authority president Abbas for the fall UN General Assembly in NY. It is bound to be interpreted in the Arab world as favoring Hamas, a designated terrorist org, over the PA. Perhaps Kushner was trying to signal that if you decommission your weapons, you can be a partner for negotiations, but regardless of the intention, it is bound to create a certain perception.
2026년 8월 19일 오후 11:23 UTC
Officially, Israel has not withdrawn from the Orange Line, which encompasses 64% of Gaza, to the Yellow Line established after last October’s ceasefire, encompassing 53%. Yet, despite denials, sources insist the large majority of Israeli soldiers have pulled back to the Yellow Line, even as Israel maintains physical obstacles and trenches along the Orange Line. Sources also say Israel has told the Board of Peace it will not fire on suspected Gazans between the two lines —Orange and Yellow — unless Israeli soldiers face an imminent threat.
2026년 8월 17일 오후 11:16 UTC
Scoop: Israeli sources say that, in compliance with President Trump’s wishes, Israel has quietly withdrawn in recent weeks from the so-called Orange Line in Gaza to the original Yellow Line stipulated in last October’s ceasefire deal. Under that deal, Israel controls 53% of Gaza. But in an effort to limit Hamas’s room to maneuver, Israel had subsequently extended its control to more than 60%, creating what became known as the Orange Line. (PM Netanyahu has put the figure closer to 70%, but this appears to have been an overstatement.) With Israel now in an election season, Netanyahu has sought to emphasize points of difference with Trump over Gaza to placate his political base. In a video to supporters, he declared that Israel will not withdraw from Gaza until Hamas completely disarms. Nor has Netanyahu publicly acknowledged his willingness—in compliance with Trump’s wishes—to refrain from strikes against Hamas beyond the Yellow Line absent an imminent threat, apparently believing such restraint would be politically unpopular.

연결된 기사