니콜 그라예프스키
@NicoleGrajewski · 이란 관측가, 핵 전문가 및 반체제 인사
니콜 그라예프스키는 러시아·이란을 전문으로 하는 시앙스포 교수이자 핵안보 연구자입니다.
“Russia’s drone capabilities have improved so much that Tehran asked Moscow this year for advanced Geran drones for use in its war with Israel and the US” @maxseddon @fabrice_deprez https://t.co/IzxpMVnUJm
These are not ordinary academic exchanges. They involve well-known Russian institutions and defense-linked entities, many of which have been sanctioned and are integrated into Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is highly unlikely that foreign researchers would receive access to sensitive work on uranium, propulsion, navigation, or UAV-related technologies without institutional vetting and state approval. It is also absurd to suggest that investigating these networks is not in the public interest when some of the researchers collaborate with Russians connected to UAV and navigation technologies now being used in Ukraine. These are public research records and longstanding institutional relationships, not secret targeting files. It strains credulity to suggest that Israel, the United States, or any functioning intelligence service would first learn these individuals’ names from an RFE/RL article. That remains true even if one considers it entirely benign for a researcher who later joined the AEOI to conduct uranium-thorium isotope research with scientists from the Kurchatov Institute, or for another to co-author work with the head of a Russian navigation project whose industrial partner manufactures the Orlan-10 UAV and was sanctioned for assisting GRU electronic espionage.
The article concerns Iranian researchers in sensitive, dual-use nuclear and aerospace fields sent to Russia. Read the full quote. Iran does not send researchers to the Moscow Institute of Aviation or to work with Rosatom on enrichment for apolitical reasons.
Pickaxe Mountain is much more difficult to destroy and the structural composition is allegedly difficult to penetrate with existing conventional weapons
Several Iranian officials, most notably the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, have threatened NPT withdrawal in response to the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution on noncompliance.
“The U.S. launched new attacks on Iranian oil tankers on Tuesday in response to a fresh attempt by Tehran to strike U.S. warships in the Middle East” https://t.co/S6NWhqS67j
“The Pentagon is investigating the high likelihood that an explosion in southern Iran that destroyed a home hosting a wedding celebration was caused by a U.S. bomb that missed a nearby target” https://t.co/ApeHqrKBoI
“U.S. government investigators have taken the extraordinary step of subjecting roughly 50 members of the U.S. military’s Joint Staff to polygraph tests over leaks to journalists, including about how the Iran war has created a shortage of crucial munitions” https://t.co/GOwOtDSGw3
A good reason to study what interests you instead of metaforecasting world events — when I started working on Russia and Iran it was a pretty fringe topic where I constantly had to justify the importance of studying both countries (more so Russia than Iran)
“In a joint appearance at a regional security meeting, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Tuesday thanked Russian President Vladimir Putin for his support in wartime and urged that their nations work together to oppose U.S. sanctions.” https://t.co/FzyXvYwfAg
“U.S. forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets including air defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine laying capabilities, and communications sites.”
Iran appears to be targeting Bahrain, the UAE, and Kuwait, expanding the scope of its strikes following earlier strikes against Jordan.
Major @FT investigation by @maxseddon, @MilesMJohnson, and @charles_clover: Moscow has been helping Iran acquire the engineering know-how to design and improve its own ramjet-powered supersonic cruise missiles. https://t.co/a3PyAawh5e
“The strikes hit several sites across Iran’s southern shores, including a military base in Bandar Abbas, the perimeter of the commercial airport on Qeshm Island, and targets in Sirik and Jask.” https://t.co/7mOi9UoIJn
Putin sees U.S. as weakened by Iran war, intelligence reports say https://t.co/EIiEiaoLsF
From Chapter 6 of my book: the first iteration of maximum pressure inadvertently pushed Iran closer to Russia (and China). Subsequent events only deepened that trajectory. It’s still important to consider the second- and third-order effects of what “economic D-Day” morphs into. https://t.co/rsNO0JMlkN
Interesting that the U.S. is seeking information on these very well-known figures, likely trying to get information from Iranians on their whereabouts within the country.
The central uncertainties are political as well as technical: whether weaponization has been authorized, what survived the war, whether Iran can reconstitute a covert production chain and what risks Tehran is willing to accept.
Rezaei’s statement should be read as evidence of a changing political debate, not proof that Iran already has embarked on an operational weapons program. Hidden centrifuges and surviving uranium would reduce warning time, but they would not eliminate the technical bottlenecks.
This explains the divergent timelines. Optimistic estimates assume Iran can recover its uranium, activate covert enrichment and use earlier weaponization work. Others anticipate months for a crude device and much longer for a reliable missile warhead.
Iran certainly has experience in many of these areas, especially from its pre-2003 weaponization work. But knowledge is not a functioning production chain. The war damaged facilities, supply networks and personnel, creating new technical bottlenecks.
A crude device would be easier to build than a warhead for a missile. Under the Amad Plan, Iran worked to integrate a nuclear payload with the Shahab-3, but a reliable warhead would still require miniaturization and extensive testing.
Iran would then need to convert uranium gas into metal, cast and machine the core, manufacture a precise implosion system, integrate the neutron initiator and firing system, and validate that the complete design would function reliably.
Iran may have hidden centrifuges, components or even complete cascades. But that does not prove a covert enrichment plant exists, is operational, has access to suitable uranium feedstock or can produce weapons-grade material without detection.
Before the war, Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium stockpile and advanced centrifuges produced very short breakout estimates (the time required to enrich sufficient material to weapons grade). They did not account for conversion, weapon assembly, testing or delivery
연결된 기사
- Trump Renews Threat to Strike Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain Very Soon
- Satellite Analysis Finds Record 2026 Activity at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain
- IAEA Detects Movement at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain, Nuclear Work Unconfirmed
- Mohsen Rezaei Says IAEA Moves Will Push Countries Out of NPT
- U.S. Strikes Iranian Tankers After New Missile Attempt on Navy Warship
- Iranian Officials Say Four Killed, 50 Wounded at Wedding in U.S. Strike
- Vance Says U.S. Is Fully Investigating Reported Strike on Iranian Wedding
- Senior U.S. Military Officials Faced Polygraphs Over Iran-War Munitions Leaks
- U.S. Forces Begin Striking IRGC Targets in Iran After Attempted Attacks
- Iran Fires Ballistic Missiles at Two U.S. Bases in Jordan
- Jordan Says Eight Missiles Destroyed After Iran Targeted U.S. Bases
- UAE Air Force Responds to Drone Approaching From Iran Over Territorial Waters