사이드 가세미네자드
@SGhasseminejad · 이란 관측가, 핵 전문가 및 반체제 인사
사이드 가세미네자드는 이란 경제·제재 담당 FDD 선임고문입니다.
خیزش مهسا هم خیزشی ایرانگرایانه و پهلویگرایانه بود. در خیزش مهسا نیز تنها نامی که توسط مردم فریاد زده شد پهلوی بود و شعارها ایرانگرایانه و ملی بودند.
Oman postpones Monday’s Hormuz meeting, removing the strongest near-term de-escalation catalyst What happened Oman has postponed the meeting scheduled for Monday between Iran and Persian Gulf states to discuss arrangements for maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi announced the postponement Sunday, saying it was “in the interests of consensus.” Reuters reports that no new date was provided. AP notes that Iraq had confirmed participation, while Bahrain had declined to attend. The postponement supersedes earlier statements by President Masoud Pezeshkian that an Iran-Oman route arrangement would be signed Monday and communicated to the International Maritime Organization. Essential background/context Expectations surrounding the meeting had already been unusually uncertain. A senior Iranian official told Reuters Saturday that no comprehensive signed Hormuz agreement was expected from the meeting, while Tehran and Muscat remained divided over Iran’s desire to collect transit fees. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi had also stressed that a technical Iran-Oman route arrangement would not itself constitute reopening Hormuz, because Tehran continues to link full reopening to U.S. actions concerning the blockade. The postponement therefore appears to reflect a deeper problem than simply scheduling: the participating states have not yet reached sufficient agreement over the scope, governance or political meaning of the proposed arrangement. Economic significance This is economically important because the prospect of a maritime arrangement was the largest plausible near-term mechanism for reducing war-risk insurance and freight premiums. A credible corridor could have increased tanker availability, reduced costs for Iranian imports, facilitated regional energy exports and improved the flow of intermediate and capital goods into Iran. Its postponement means those benefits are delayed and the current risk premium is more likely to persist. It also matters for the rial. Some of Sunday’s currency strengthening appears to have occurred while expectations of Monday diplomacy remained positive. The postponement was announced after much of the Iranian trading day had already occurred, so Monday’s FX market may provide a cleaner test of the domestic reaction. Implications/future trends The critical question now is whether the meeting has been delayed to finalize a workable framework or postponed because the parties fundamentally disagree. A short technical delay would be relatively benign. A prolonged inability to convene Persian Gulf states around a common traffic-management scheme would imply that commercial normalization is further away than markets had hoped. What to watch next Watch for a new meeting date, confirmation of participating governments, any revised Iran-Oman navigation map, Tehran’s position on transit fees, and U.S. acceptance or rejection of the resulting framework. The strongest evidence of progress will not be another diplomatic statement. It will be lower insurance premiums, lower tanker freight and sustained increases in loaded commercial passages.
As usual, NY Times latest story about Iran makes little sense. Taeb definitely was not and still is not in a position to order IRGC’s missile force to target tankers.
تمام تبلیغات و پروپاگاندای جمهوری اسلامی و انواع و اقسام مامورانش امروز یک هدف دارد: ایجاد این باور در ایران و جهان که جمهوری اسلامی سقوط نخواهد کرد یا اگر بکند وضع بدتر خواهد شد. شما هر جا دیدید افرادی با هر لحن و شیوه و زبانی میکوشند به شما بگویند سقوط جمهوری اسلامی ممکن یا مطلوب نیست بدانید با پروژه تبلیغاتی جمهوری اسلامی مواجهید.
Regional exporters adapt while fresh Iranian crude effectively disappears What happened A TankerTrackers assessment says not a single barrel of Iran-origin crude crossed the U.S. blockade line between the Sea of Oman and Arabian Sea during the latest 60 days. At the same time, southern Iraqi crude exports are now about 33% below prewar levels, compared with a 95% collapse in April, while UAE crude exports have returned to approximately prewar levels according to the company. TankerTrackers also estimates that crude ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman averaged 7.15 million bpd during the latest 14 days, up 56% from the previous month. TankerTrackers further estimates that Iranian production has fallen toward the amount needed for domestic refining and consumption, limiting the accumulation of large fresh crude inventories. That is a commercial-tracker estimate, not an official Iranian production statistic. Essential background/context These figures describe different stages of the oil chain. The 60-day zero refers specifically to Iran-origin crude crossing the U.S. blockade line. It does not establish zero Iranian refined-product exports, zero LPG, zero condensate movements, or zero sales of Iranian barrels that had already been stored outside Iran. Likewise, the 7.15 million bpd figure measures barrels involved in Gulf of Oman crude ship-to-ship transfer activity. It is not production, not throughput through Hormuz, and not proof that 7.15 million bpd reached final customers. TankerTrackers says its methodology uses AIS together with satellite imagery and shoreside photography, an important advantage when vessels disable or falsify AIS signals. Cross-check with U.S. government and other trackers Reuters reported on September 1 that Kpler, Vortexa and TankerTrackers all found no Iranian crude cargo had successfully transited Hormuz to China since the U.S. blockade resumed July 14. That is older evidence but is directionally consistent with the new TankerTrackers assessment. The White House’s August 28 statement also claimed zero Iranian oil exports from Iranian shores since the blockade resumed. However, the White House did not publish a vessel-level methodology, so its assertion should not be treated as a directly comparable commercial tracking dataset. EIA’s 4.9-million-bpd estimate for total 2Q26 Hormuz oil traffic measures a broader basket, crude, condensate and petroleum liquids, over an older period and is partly based on Vortexa. It therefore cannot be averaged with the current TankerTrackers figures. Economic significance The central economic fact is asymmetric adaptation. Neighboring producers are increasingly finding ways to monetize high oil prices through Gulf of Oman terminals, protected navigation, STS operations and alternative routing. Iran is not recovering fresh crude exports at the same pace. That means $100+ oil can materially strengthen the external accounts of Iran’s neighbors while providing Tehran much less relief. Implications/future trends The longer fresh Iranian supply is absent from China, the greater the probability that Chinese refiners entrench alternative suppliers and demand larger discounts if Iranian barrels return. Physical export exclusion can therefore create both an immediate foreign-exchange loss and a future loss of market power. What to watch next Treat four milestones separately: fresh terminal loading → crossing the blockade line → confirmed delivery to a buyer → access to usable payment. Only the complete chain materially improves Iran’s external accounts.
“The operation focused its messaging on the Iranian government, monarchist groups, and the Pahlavi camp. The actors spread a fabricated video attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and used the “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh” framing against the targets. This content was designed to strengthen the MEK’s position in the Iranian opposition.”
Producer prices nearly doubled year-on-year; agricultural PPI rose 144.3% What happened. SCI’s spring 1405 producer-price index stood at 614.1. Overall producer prices rose 28.3% quarter-on-quarter, 98.9% from spring 1404, and 66.7% on a four-quarter-average basis. Agriculture registered the highest broad-sector year-on-year increase at 144.3%, while its four-quarter-average increase was 86.9%. Essential background/context. PPI measures prices received by producers for output at the production stage. It is not a direct measure of producers’ input costs, profit margins or household retail prices. However, it indicates how prices will move. Agriculture’s 144.3% year-on-year PPI does not mean every agricultural input became 144.3% more expensive, nor does it imply consumer food prices must rise by the same amount. Donya-e Eqtesad’s claims about margin compression rely on interviews and cost evidence in addition to the PPI itself. Economic significance. The PPI numbers show extremely strong price pressure at the production stage. Agricultural output prices more than doubling year-on-year raises procurement costs for food processors and wholesalers, even if weak household demand prevents full pass-through to retail prices. The more serious medium-term risk arises if farm input costs rise faster than farm selling prices. In that case nominal revenue can increase while real margins and working-capital capacity deteriorate, reducing fertilizer, feed, seed or equipment purchases for subsequent production cycles. Implications/future trends. The likely adjustment can occur through two channels: higher downstream food prices or weaker future supply. The balance depends on household demand, subsidies, administered prices, access to credit and agricultural inputs. What to watch next. Watch subsequent PPI releases, food-processing producer prices, feed and fertilizer availability and physical production. Do not use the spring PPI mechanically to forecast September CPI; its greatest value is as evidence of severe upstream price pressure and potential supply impairment.
در جمهوری اسلامی تروریست حشدالشعبی که قصد تعدی به دختر ایرانی دارد مورد حمایت دولت است و دختر ایرانی و پسران ایرانی حامی او به زندان میافتند.
Tehran Plans to Expand Trade Through Türkiye What happened Donya-e Eqtesad reports that Iran’s cabinet has issued a 15-point package aimed at removing infrastructure, logistics, and administrative bottlenecks at the country’s northwestern border terminals, particularly Bazargan. The measures give the governor of West Azerbaijan greater coordinating authority, seek to improve cooperation among government agencies, expand truck-processing capacity, upgrade infrastructure, and ensure that border operations can continue during digital-system outages. Essential background/context Bazargan has become increasingly important as maritime disruption pushes a larger share of Iranian commerce toward Türkiye and overland routes connecting Iran to Europe and West Asia. But land crossings cannot automatically absorb port-scale trade volumes. Earlier Iranian reporting has documented truck queues, longer transit times, and rising freight costs along alternative land corridors. An open border can therefore remain a serious economic bottleneck if its processing capacity is insufficient. Why it matters economically The government is focusing on transaction times and physical capacity rather than merely signing additional trade agreements. Every day a truck or container waits at the border ties up cargo, transport capacity, and working capital. For intermediate and capital goods, slower clearance can disrupt factory production and investment even when shipments ultimately clear customs. If implemented effectively, a higher-capacity Bazargan corridor could partially reduce Iran’s dependence on southern maritime routes and lower the cost of trade with Türkiye and Europe. Implications / what to watch next The key indicators are daily truck crossings, average customs-clearance times, queue lengths, and the frequency and duration of IT-system outages. The package will matter only if these operational indicators improve. If trade volumes increase faster than border capacity, the 15-point package may simply prevent further deterioration rather than restore prewar logistics costs. Washington, in turn, can respond by intensifying diplomatic pressure on Ankara and strengthening sanctions enforcement against Turkish entities that facilitate Iran’s efforts to circumvent U.S. sanctions and maritime restrictions.
Iran’s Economy: What to Watch? September 9, 2026 First, watch Iran’s oil-export supply chain. As the United States targets oil tankers while maintaining its blockade and enforcing sanctions, Tehran’s capacity to transport oil even in future is shrinking. Second, watch the 233,000-toman dollar and the roughly 44% foreign-exchange premium. A move toward 240,000 would heighten the risk that the latest depreciation becomes entrenched in industrial and retail pricing as businesses adjust prices to reflect higher replacement costs. Third, watch the sanctions risk arising from the IAEA referral. Russia and China make immediate UN punitive action unlikely, but Iranian retaliation against inspectors or violations of safeguards obligations could prompt fresh U.S. and European measures, even without Security Council sanctions. Finally, distinguish temporary adaptation from lasting structural change. Tehran can reroute part of its trade and use alternative payment systems at significant cost to its economy . But neighboring countries are simultaneously investing billions in infrastructure designed to bypass Iran, and permanently erode its geographic leverage. Bottom line: Iran’s economy is increasingly managing scarcity and access rather than expanding underlying economic flows. Unless fresh oil exports recover, trade costs fall, and access to foreign exchange becomes more reliable, the most likely trajectory remains a weaker rial, import compression, declining investment, and further erosion of real household consumption.
Six brothers from a working-class neighborhood in Tehran built a small furniture workshop into a successful nationwide business. Then, in January 2026, one of them, Hamid Arzanlou, was shot in the head by regime forces in Tehranpars. His brother Vahid ran to help him. He was shot twice in the neck. Both brothers fell into comas. Hamid died first. Vahid died days later. Their mother lost two sons. Five children lost their fathers. They were heroes. They had also played an important role in the furniture market strikes that accompanied the January uprising.
A great piece by members of the Iran Prosperity Project’s water experts.
Join the #lastbreath campaign to raise awareness about the execution wave in Iran.
«از روانشناسان، روانپزشکان و درمانگران ایرانی میخواهم برای حمایت فوری، مستمر و محرمانه از خانوادههای جاویدنامان پیشقدم شوند. از همه هممیهنانم نیز میخواهم منتظر درخواست کمک نمانند. اگر خانوادهای از جاویدنامان را میشناسید، به سراغشان بروید؛ احوالشان را بپرسید، صدایشان را بشنوید و در کنارشان بمانید.» شاهزاده رضا پهلوی
وحید و حمید ارزانلو، جانفداهای میهن و کارآفرینان قهرمان شش برادر از یکی از محلههای کارگرنشین تهران، توانستند یک کارگاه کوچک مبلسازی را به تجارتی موفق در سراسر کشور بدل کنند. اما در دیماه ۱۴۰۴، یکی از این برادران به نام حمید ارزانلو، در منطقه تهرانپارس با شلیک مستقیم نیروهای رژیم به سرش هدف قرار گرفت. زمانی که برادرش، وحید، برای کمک به او شتافت، خود نیز با اصابت دو گلوله به گردنش به شدت مجروح شد. هر دو برادر به کما رفتند؛ حمید پیش از برادرش جان سپرد و وحید نیز چند روز پس از او جان باخت. در این فاجعه، یک مادر داغدارِ دو فرزندش شد و پنج کودک، پدران خود را از دست دادند. حمید و وحید تنها رهگذرانی نبودند که قربانی این خشونتها شوند؛ آنها قهرمانهایی بودند که در اعتصابات بازار مبل که همگام با خیزش دیماه به وقوع پیوست نیز شرکت داشتند.
Iran’s Economy Today: Managing Scarcity Not Solving It September 7, 2026 Iran’s gasoline reform is moving from announcement to implementation. Starting September 8, the price of third-tier gasoline purchased with filling-station cards will double from 5,000 to 10,000 tomans per liter; other pricing tiers remain unchanged. Officials have also disclosed a gasoline deficit averaging roughly 10 million liters per day over the past five months and hope that the higher price could reduce consumption by at least 3 million liters per day. The rial recovered some ground during Monday’s trading but remains severely weakened. The free-market dollar ended Monday at 222,100 tomans, compared with a regulated commercial remittance rate of 161,466 tomans, a free-market premium of roughly 37.6%. Meanwhile, reported average daily turnover in the official commercial foreign-exchange market has risen to $131 million in September, from $46 million in April. Authorities are pursuing two parallel tracks: channeling more trade through formal foreign-exchange mechanisms and supporting banking-system liquidity. This week, the Central Bank supplied 70 trillion tomans through repo operations. The conflict is also prompting structural adjustments across the region. The UAE says it is accelerating investment in east-coast ports, pipelines, railways, and alternative trade corridors to reduce the dependence of its energy exports and commerce on Hormuz. Qatar, meanwhile, is working to reopen the Strait and create conditions for renewed U.S.–Iran negotiations. Domestically, tax receipts rose about 55% year on year to 800 trillion tomans during the first five months. But the annual tax target increased by almost exactly the same percentage, so the headline revenue growth does not, by itself, demonstrate a faster pace of budget execution. Electricity shortages continue to constrain production: the Labor Ministry has authorized factories to shift workers’ weekly rest days to make up for production hours lost to power curtailments. The regime is also seeking to expand overland transit through Iraq and accelerate renewable-energy investment. The balance of risks remains tilted to the downside. The regime is trying to reroute trade, ration supplies, and manage economic flows. But sustaining those flows is becoming more costly, while the external shock is driving lasting changes in regional trade routes and energy infrastructure.
Iranians are mobilizing and they say clearly what they want. “Iran will rise again, with solidarity and national will. Long live the Shah.” https://t.co/qOFFNtoGAM
As the United States steps up sanctions enforcement against the Islamic Republic in Iran and its energy sector, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has increased its imports of Iranian fuel. It is time to sanction the Pakistani entities involved for their blatant violations of U.S. sanctions.
Iran’s Economy: Scarcity Management Intensifies The most important new development is Tehran’s announced plan to establish an additional restricted maritime zone around the Strait of Hormuz, extending from the U.S. blockade line to Iranian loading ports. Mohsen Rezaei says vessels approaching the Strait without coordinating with Iranian authorities will be added to an Iranian sanctions list. Rezaei also claimed that Hormuz is “completely closed.” That assertion, however, conflicts with observable shipping traffic and U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s statement that more than 9 million barrels per day are currently transiting the Strait. The second major development is a domestic gasoline price increase. The government announced that, beginning September 8, gasoline purchased with filling-station cards, the third pricing tier, covering purchases beyond the 110-liter monthly quota, will cost 10,000 tomans per liter. Prices for the first 60 liters will remain at 1,500 tomans per liter, and the next 50 liters at 3,000. Meanwhile, Iran claims it used an earlier ceasefire window to move 70–80 million barrels of previously accumulated oil outside the blockade area and is now selling those stocks. Tehran is also combining temporary relief with tougher enforcement of its trade controls. Foreign-exchange repatriation deadlines have been extended because of wartime disruptions, but unresolved obligations exceeding €3 million will eventually be referred to prosecutors. Separately, surging Pakistani demand for Iranian liquefied petroleum gas is overwhelming the Rimdan border crossing, while the Central Bank is preparing a gold-linked securities offering equivalent to 100,000 coins. The outlook remains negative. The gasoline price hike will add to inflationary pressure as the blockade persists and sanctions enforcement intensifies. More broadly, the regime is increasingly managing scarcity and access rather than expanding underlying economic flows. Unless fresh oil exports, banking access, and high-capacity trade routes recover, the economy will remain exposed to further currency depreciation, increasingly expensive imports, and weakening real economic activity.
«به رژیم ضحاکی و رهبر مفقودش میگویم:..گمان نکنید با کشتار دهها هزار میهنپرست توانستهاید اراده ملت را درهم بشکنید. آتش خشم و اعتراض مردم خاموش نشده است. ملتی که برای آزادی، رفاه و آیندهای بهتر ایستاده است، در برابر سرکوب، فساد، بیکفایتی و تحمیل فقر سکوت نخواهد کرد.» شاهزاده رضا پهلوی
دقیق و درست از کامیار بهرنگ “به همین دلیل مبارزه سیاسی با جمهوری اسلامی برای یک ملیگرای ایرانی موضوعی حاشیهای یا انتخابی میان چند اولویت نیست. تا زمانی که نظامی بر ایران حاکم است که منافع خود را در تضاد با منافع ملی تعریف میکند، دفاع از ایران و تلاش برای پایان دادن به آن دو موضوع جدا از یکدیگر نیستند.”
از انجمن ایران-آلمان و گروههای همکارشان برای برگزاری این نشست و از همه شرکتکنندگان که از راههای دور و نزدیک در این برنامه شرکت کردند تشکر میکنم. همراه با دیگر دستاندرکاران پروژه شکوفایی ایران از شاهزاده رضا پهلوی که به ما اعتماد کردهاند تا در این پروژه ملی فعالیت کنیم سپاسگزارم. @PahlaviReza
Why Does Tehran Threaten U.S. Forces but Spare Israel? We are seeing a great deal of huffing and puffing from pro-regime figures about how the Islamist regime escalated the military confrontation, targeting U.S. naval assets, and is wiling to impose significant American casualties. What is striking, however, is the absence of comparable actions and even threats against Israel. American military strategists should be asking why Tehran is reluctant to escalate directly against Israel, a much smaller and weaker country than the U.S., while increasingly willing to expand its operations against U.S. forces. That asymmetry reveals something important about the regime’s calculations, perceived vulnerabilities, and deterrence thresholds.
Iran’s trade under a three-prong attack! The immediate threat Tehran faces is the tanker campaign. Saturday’s U.S.-confirmed strikes on three Iranian tankers materially increase physical oil-transport risk. The threat is expansion of the operation to oil and gas and gasoline infrastructures. The second threat is secondary-sanctions contagion. Golden Global is a small institution; the larger question is how banks in Turkey, the UAE and China alter their behavior before Treasury announces its next target. Third is the 227,000-toman dollar. With a roughly 41% gap between the free-market and “Mobadelei” rates, both inflation pass-through and the economic value of preferential FX allocation are becoming more extreme. Fourth, actual industrial electricity allocations deserve close attention. Steelmakers receiving 15% of requirement despite a promised minimum of 40% demonstrate that the claimed improvements in national electricity balance have not yet translated into predictable supply for energy-intensive industry which casts a shadow of doubt on the claim itself. Finally, the interaction among the new gold-linked monetary instrument, kalabarg expansion and gasoline policy will show how the government intends to manage a difficult three-way trade-off: absorbing inflationary liquidity, keeping producers financed and preserving household purchasing power. The newest information points to an economy facing simultaneous pressure on all three sides of its external transaction chain: physical shipment, financial settlement and domestic currency conversion. Saturday’s tanker strikes attack transport capacity; the Golden Global action raises the cost of moving exports proceeds; and the dollar’s rise to 227,000 tomans increases the domestic price of whatever foreign currency still reaches the economy. Meanwhile, energy rationing constrains production and monetary authorities must choose between suppressing liquidity and supplying enough working capital to prevent further output losses. Without a material reopening of export and payment channels, the baseline remains continued depreciation, very high inflation, import compression and weakening real productive capacity.
Oil minister discloses major damage to Asaluyeh gas refineries, Tehran fuel depots and petrochemical utilities What happened Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad provided one of the most detailed official accounts yet of wartime damage to Iran’s energy infrastructure. He said that on March 18, 2026, four South Pars gas-processing plants, Asaluyeh refineries 3 through 6, were struck. A significant share of production initially had to be reduced, although some units returned within hours and reconstruction began within several days. Paknejad says a “significant portion” of the lost capacity has since been restored and expects further production recovery over the coming months. These are official Iranian claims and have not been independently audited. Paknejad also confirmed that the Rey, Shahran and Ghochak fuel depots in Tehran were hit during earlier attacks and that Rey’s loading facilities were damaged. The ministry shifted part of the fuel-distribution logistics from southern and central regions to compensate. He further said petrochemical facilities in Mahshahr and Asaluyeh were struck, including utilities supplying steam, electricity and nitrogen as well as process units, causing a significant initial loss of petrochemical production capacity. Background The regime entered the conflict with structural shortages in gas and electricity already in place. Energy infrastructure is also highly networked. Damage to a utility plant, gas-processing train or fuel-loading terminal can constrain output far beyond the physical footprint of the damaged facility. Why it matters economically The Asaluyeh damage matters directly for the coming winter. Gas processing determines how much field production becomes usable pipeline gas for households, power plants and industry. Any capacity still offline when temperatures fall increases the probability that industrial consumers will again be rationed first. Petrochemical damage also has a foreign-exchange consequence. Petrochemicals are among Iran’s most important non-oil export categories, so lost output weakens an alternative source of FX at precisely the moment crude exports are constrained. Damage to Tehran’s fuel depots similarly reduces distribution resilience even if aggregate gasoline production appears adequate which is not. Outlook Watch actual gas processing, petrochemical production, loading capacity at the Tehran depots and industrial gas allocations as temperatures decline. Paknejad’s statement that further production gains should appear over the next several months is a forecast, not yet a realized recovery.
연결된 기사
- U.S. Strikes Iranian Tankers After New Missile Attempt on Navy Warship
- IAEA Board Refers Iran to UN Security Council for First Time in 20 Years
- UAE Expands Ports and Trade Routes to Protect Energy Exports
- Netanyahu Says Israel Is Working to Bring Down Iran’s Regime
- Netanyahu Says Toppling Iran’s Regime Is Israel’s Main Remaining Task
- Iranian Command Threatens Harsher Strikes on U.S. Warships if Blockade Continues
- U.S. Sanctions Turkish Bank Over Tens of Millions in IRGC-QF Transactions
- U.S. Strikes Three Iranian Oil Tankers After IRGC Targets Navy Warships