로버트 말리

@Rob_Malley · 싱크탱크 및 분석가 — 미국/영국

로버트 말리는 전직 미국 중동 특사·예일대학교 강사이자 국제위기그룹 명예회장입니다.

2026년 9월 11일 오전 2:49 UTC
A few thoughts on where the US/Iran confrontation now stands: 1. Trump had a long-term plan, which was to asphyxiate Iran economically while increasing non-Iranian oil traffic through the strait. The problem is that a long-term plan has to survive the short term, and the odds were zero that Iran was going to sit still and accept this new normal. Its escalation was predictable, designed to make the US pay a heavy price for its economic warfare. So too was the Houthis’, driven both by local ambitions in Yemen and a desire to help the Islamic Republic tighten the squeeze on the oil market. 2. Trump has, in this sense, run into his own version of a catastrophic success: the more the blockade & sanctions strangled Iran’s economy, the greater Tehran’s incentive to escalate and the less it had to lose. 3. Trump essentially has three options: - To try to manage the conflict through calibrated retaliation and hope to establish a sustainable equilibrium that both hurts and deters Iran and avoids an uncontrolled military escalation. But Iran is unlikely to cooperate, and in any event, it would do little to bring down the price of oil. - To escalate -- against nuclear sites, civilian infrastructure or leadership targets -- in hopes of forcing Iran to back down. But this would further strain US military resources, be more likely to trigger greater counter-escalation, and thus send oil prices higher still. - Or to seek a negotiated solution, by far the better option. But for Iran to agree, any deal would probably have to resemble the earlier MOU, only with greater clarity about its control over the Strait of Hormuz. That may be the price to pay to end this unlawful, misbegotten war. Yet there is no indication Trump is prepared to go down that road, at least prior to the midterms…
2026년 9월 8일 오후 6:57 UTC
Another important piece by @yarbatman that explains why economic pressure will inflict enormous pain on Iran without forcing the Islamic Republic to surrender. As he writes, "Trump’s approach ... can certainly immiserate most of the country’s people. But it cannot successfully strangle the Islamic Republic itself... To prevail in its economic war, the Trump administration will ... need to asphyxiate 25 million households and more than one million firms. But as breathing slows in parts of Iran’s economy, ample oxygen will remain for the country’s elite."
2026년 9월 1일 오전 11:16 UTC
Excited to welcome @HamidRezaAz as @CrisisGroup's Senior Iran Analyst. He will join an exceptional Iran team. As anyone following his work knows, Hamid is an incomparable font of knowledge and analysis.
2026년 9월 1일 오전 10:59 UTC
Parution le 17 septembre chez @MaxMiloEditions de Demain, c’est hier — Vie, mort et quête de la paix en Israël/Palestine, livre que j’ai écrit avec Hussein Agha. Très touché par ces mots de @Villepin: « Robert Malley a écrit avec Hussein Agha ce que peu peuvent écrire : le Moyen-Orient éclairé par une longue expérience de la table de négociation, là où les principes se heurtent aux hommes et où l’on mesure le prix exact de chaque mot. Il a cette rare qualité — le courage, en vérité — de tenir ensemble les mémoires adverses, de comprendre sans absoudre, et de rappeler qu’aucune paix ne s’est jamais bâtie sur le déni de la douleur de l’autre. » https://t.co/K7KBI9lUyE
2026년 8월 26일 오후 9:48 UTC
An implacable, clinical takedown of the Board of Peace’s record in Gaza: https://t.co/C9FloRLLFU
2026년 8월 25일 오후 7:08 UTC
Powerful piece by @NateSwanson83: "The irony of Trump’s failed war on Iran—and his stop-start negotiations to try to end it—is that it has so severely weakened Washington’s ability to exert pressure on Tehran that no future administration will ever be able to revert to the traditional U.S. playbook. But that could also be the only upside of a war that has already exacted a heavy toll on U.S. munitions and the global economy. The war could—and should—force a broader reckoning with 47 years of failed strategy and change Washington’s approach for good." https://t.co/DuZfxA3MqK
2026년 8월 24일 오후 10:04 UTC
Four questions about the so-called D-day sanctions, and an overriding point: devastating a country is a far cry from accomplishing a defined policy objective: 1. Do we (or the administration) know what comes next? Not really. The announcement was as belligerent as it was vague. Bessent’s most revealing admission was that immediately imposing the sanctions in full would blow up the global financial system. If the Trump administration is unwilling to do that now, why would it be willing to do it at any point? And if not, what will they do when third parties refuse to cooperate? 2. Can the plan work? Putting aside the small matter that the administration has not specified what it intends to achieve, whether it can succeed depends on what “work” means. Can more pressure devastate Iran’s economy and inflict enormous suffering on its people? Absolutely. Expect the administration to regularly trot out statistics documenting economic contraction and currency collapse. But can more pressure force Iran’s leadership to surrender positions they consider essential? Almost certainly not. In fact, the more convinced they are that Washington seeks their overthrow, the less willing they will be to give in. Of course, they know and openly admit the depth of the economic crisis. If offered a broadly acceptable deal, many among them would have every incentive to take it. But that deal would probably have to be akin to the earlier MOU, only with greater clarity about Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. In other words, roughly the deal they might have accepted before and without D-Day… 3. What happens if the plan “works”? If the sanctions work in the sense of truly cratering Iran’s economy, Tehran is more likely to retaliate than capitulate, to ensure the US, the region, and the wider world also pay a heavy price for this economic warfare. That in turn would lead to the very military escalation the D-day sanctions are supposed to avert. 4. Finally, regardless of the outcome, can such draconian sanctions be justified? No doubt, elements of the Iranian leadership will pay a price. But, as @yarbatman points out, the principal victims will be ordinary Iranians whose suffering has become the chief measure of the policy’s success, targets of an unconscionable, indiscriminate, and almost certainly unlawful sanctions regime.
2026년 8월 24일 오후 5:32 UTC
From the October 2025 ceasefire deal, to the 30 July 2026 Board of Peace “historic” agreement with Hamas on decommissioning, to its almost immediate U-turn under Israeli pressure, our new @CrisisGroup report tells the story of a process that has failed to deliver most of its promises, a victim of Israeli obstructionism & opposition to any form of Palestinian self-rule & of a dysfunctional, lopsided U.S.-led process. Ten months on, there is no Israeli withdrawal, no reconstruction, aid is still restricted, & almost everyone in Gaza is crammed into a third of the strip. Changing this script will require raising the cost to Israel of blocking aid, continuing military strikes, & preventing any Palestinian self-governance. Otherwise, Gaza's 2.1 million Palestinians risk being consigned to permanent deprivation. https://t.co/Koxpd5wF3S
2026년 8월 20일 오후 5:25 UTC
True, targeted sanctions sometimes work, where the objective is specific, measurable, and does not call into question the system's survival. But if the goal is the Iranian regime's capitulation, as Tehran certainly assumes it is here, they won’t, no matter how devastating. Most likely, Iran will respond by seeking to ensure it is not alone in paying the price for the Trump administration’s economic warfare. Not to mention the catastrophic, unconscionable consequences for ordinary Iranians. Those are intrinsic to a policy whose own measure of effectiveness is how severely Iran’s economy is crushed.

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