Ali Shihabi
@aliShihabi · Gulf & Arab world
Ali Shihabi is a Saudi author and commentator close to the royal court.
Ali Shihabi said the kingdom anticipated an escalation was coming + had been building up the Yemeni government-forces for months.The #Houthis are getting hit badly on the battlefield he said. “They are suffering and lashing out, so this was expected.” https://t.co/PtXPZ8gCA4
Riyadh has been preparing for a long-term conflict with the Houthis, according to Ali Shihabi “Saudi has realized that the Houthis have not been reasonable and there is very little chance of reaching a political settlement with them,” Shihabi told @CNN https://t.co/mYUn14Ujp5
Saudi Arabia and the Art of Changing Course: From Resetting NEOM to the Logistics of War By Ali Shihabi When the NEOM project was announced in 2017, it embodied the appetite for extremely ambitious projects that marked the early beginnings of Vision 2030: a futuristic city on the Red Sea coast, powered by clean energy and driven by data, transcending the constraints inherited from an earlier phase in the country’s life. The designs were dazzling and the ambitions genuine, but there was also, as later became clear, a real danger that the vision would outrun the capacity to execute it. What matters today is not simply that Saudi Arabia reset the NEOM project, but that it did so decisively, without assuming that the original plan had to remain fixed and unaltered. This willingness to change course is not a weakness; it has become one of the Saudi state’s most important strengths. Some critics treated the rescoping of NEOM as evidence of failure. The more balanced reading, however, is that Riyadh chose execution discipline and a reprioritization of goals. The Public Investment Fund’s new strategy shifts NEOM’s focus from tourism and futuristic urban design, which previously received priority, toward renewable energy, industry, and data centers. The fund’s broader strategy also gives greater weight to logistics, minerals, artificial intelligence, and clean energy. Saudi officials have been strikingly frank about this shift. Economy and Planning Minister Faisal Alibrahim told Reuters that the government would not “hesitate” to acknowledge when a project needed to be modified, postponed, or rescoped. This is not the language of retreat. It reflects a government learning to allocate capital with greater rigor as conditions become more difficult. The war that began in late February provided a much harsher test of this mindset. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has had to operate not in a world of comprehensive master plans, but under military pressure and direct pressure in markets. The same government that was willing to redesign NEOM before its costs placed greater pressure on investment priorities has shown that it can absorb shocks, redirect trade, and make difficult operational decisions quickly. The principle is the same in both cases: when circumstances change, the Saudi system does not cling to its original plan when conditions call for changing it; it adapts to the new reality. Nothing illustrates this better than the East-West pipeline. When the war effectively brought crude-oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz to a halt, the Saudi route to Yanbu on the Red Sea became a principal outlet for exporting crude. The pipeline can carry as much as 7 million barrels a day to the west coast, of which about 5 million barrels are available for export. This infrastructure gave Saudi Arabia an option that its neighbors largely lacked. Iraq, Kuwait, and other producers were forced to make deeper cuts because the alternatives available to them were limited after the Strait of Hormuz could no longer be used. Thus spare capacity, sometimes regarded in normal circumstances as expensive insurance, proved to be an enormously important strategic asset. Yanbu also gives Saudi Arabia flexibility within the Red Sea itself. If the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at its southern entrance came under threat, crude shipped from the kingdom’s western coast could move north through the Suez Canal to Mediterranean and European markets. Asian customers could still be supplied as well, by moving cargoes through the Suez Canal and then around the Cape of Good Hope, although the much longer voyage would impose higher shipping costs on Saudi Arabia. This additional flexibility leaves the kingdom better placed to adapt not only to a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but also to disruption of shipping at the Red Sea’s other major chokepoint. It is another example of how geographic options and infrastructure investment strengthen a state’s resilience. The same applies to imports. Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast has emerged as a backup logistics pillar for the entire Gulf region. Incoming cargo volumes to Jeddah rose dramatically after the conflict began, and other Red Sea ports, including NEOM, also saw a major increase in activity after the crisis disrupted access to Gulf ports east of Hormuz. In practical terms, Saudi Arabia has not merely become more resilient; it has also become a vital logistical artery for its neighbors. This is a strategic development whose implications extend far beyond the current crisis. None of this means Saudi Arabia is insulated from danger; clearly, it is not. Its energy facilities have been attacked, at times temporarily reducing production. But resilience does not mean avoiding all damage. It means retaining the ability to keep operating, redirect supplies, restore productive capacity, and preserve market performance after taking a blow. Saudi Arabia has institutional experience on which it can draw. Following the September 2019 attacks, which knocked 5.7 million barrels a day of production offline, Aramco restored production capacity of 11.3 million barrels a day within 11 days, according to Reuters. Last October, Aramco’s chief executive said the company could maintain production of 12 million barrels a day for a year, while the International Energy Agency estimated Saudi Arabia’s spare production capacity at about 2.43 million barrels a day. Spare capacity, alternative export routes, and recovery plans may appear excessive in peacetime, but in wartime they look like a form of wise state management. That is why the NEOM story should be reconsidered. Reordering priorities and implementation phases, while directing more attention to industrial and logistical assets, is not merely a correction to one project’s course; it reflects a growing capacity for decisiveness in Saudi policymaking. A state prepared to confront hard questions about what can be built, when it should be built, and in what order is less vulnerable to paralysis when conditions deteriorate. China offers a cautionary comparison in this regard. Its decentralized development model encouraged local officials to expand construction in pursuit of economic growth. The result was trillions of dollars invested in infrastructure with limited use, empty urban projects, and excess industrial capacity. Saudi Arabia was at risk of moving in a similar direction, but it began reviewing course much earlier and reassessed its priorities before commitments that would be difficult to change later became entrenched. California’s high-speed rail project offers another cautionary example. When the project was initially put before voters, the planned rail network between San Francisco and Los Angeles was estimated to cost about $33 billion. Today its cost is estimated at about $126 billion under a modified and simplified design, and could reach $231 billion without the proposed cost-cutting measures. Despite years of spending and extensive civil construction, the project has still not laid the first section of its high-speed rail track. This comparison underscores the importance of reassessing ambitious projects early. Changing course may invite criticism, but postponing hard decisions can allow costs and institutional commitments to accumulate until adjustment becomes many times more expensive. Saudi Arabia’s transformation is still incomplete, and many things could still go wrong. But a country that can rescope NEOM before its costs escalate in ways that constrain available options, redirect crude exports when Hormuz is closed, retain the ability to supply customers when Bab el-Mandeb is threatened, turn Jeddah into a supply artery for the Gulf, and continue operating after an attack demonstrates that it possesses something more valuable than futuristic imagination: the ability to recognize shifts in reality and act on them. In the Middle East today, that may be more important than any dazzling design.
Translated from ArabicFrom recalibrating #NEOM to rerouting oil and trade in wartime, #SaudiArabia is showing that strength lies not in rigidly defending old plans, but in adapting decisively as circumstances change. My latest article in @ArabNews on resilience as an emerging Saudi strength. https://t.co/yoaho8KJIt
Some people wonder why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is investing heavily in the electronic gaming sector. In addition to being a huge global industry, electronic games can provide real benefits for individuals and society. Well-designed games help develop strategic thinking, problem-solving, creativity, teamwork, quick decision-making, and perseverance. They can also be an effective educational tool, making learning more interactive and engaging, helping students understand complex subjects through simulation and practice, and developing digital skills that are becoming increasingly important in the modern economy. When played in moderation, electronic games are not merely a means of entertainment, but a tool for learning, developing skills, and stimulating thought.
Translated from ArabicPeople wonder why #Saudi Arabia is investing so heavily in video games. Gaming can have real benefits for individuals and society . Games can develop strategic thinking, problem solving, creativity, teamwork, quick decision making and persistence. https://t.co/GtsvydBqaL
"Iran’s bet is that President Trump will blink as November’s elections near and accept a bad deal. Economic pressure may be his best remaining option to achieve U.S. objectives over time" via @WSJopinion