Andrea Stricker
@StrickerNonpro · Iran watchers, nuclear experts & opposition
Andrea Stricker is FDD's nonproliferation deputy director.
🚨Pickaxe Mountain update: @iaeaorg Director General Rafael Grossi to @business: “There are some indications that there is movement around this construction site,” Grossi said. “We don’t have any concrete information as to activities that may be taking place there.” https://t.co/1xXDy8VYlq @POTUS in a speech at the Republican Convention this week: "We notice there's a little activity at Pickaxe. I would advise Iran not to get cute because we will have to hit them very hard." https://t.co/Ie6XR8WTm3
Striking the right tone: Syria statement by new @usunvie Amb. Griffith before yesterday's @iaeaorg Board of Governors vote to rescind its 2011 non-compliance finding for Damascus. There is progress, but much more to do and the Syrian authorities' cooperation is needed. "The United States therefore supports the present resolution deciding to terminate the provisions of the Board’s resolution GOV/2011/41, adopted in June 2011. However, we also wish to note that the work of Syria and the IAEA is not yet complete. Evaluation of information and samples obtained by the IAEA is ongoing, and many questions related to Assad’s program remain unanswered due to the former regime’s secrecy. We therefore look forward to detailed additional reporting from the Director General, as requested in today’s draft resolution, so that the Board’s decision today can be further validated. We also request that the Director General provide the Board with a detailed assessment of Syria’s previously undeclared nuclear program. We also call upon the Syrian government to continue its proactive cooperation with the IAEA and to bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) to its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency as early as possible, and to implement its provisions in full. The conclusion of an AP would be an important demonstration of the Syrian Government’s enduring commitment to transparency and to fostering international trust." https://t.co/eKxOrAof55
In the absence of Tehran rectifying its nonproliferation violations, the United States should continue the naval blockade and Operation Economic Outcast and thereby force the regime to make hard choices about funding proliferation efforts in the future. My latest @FDD Policy Brief: https://t.co/xoTSoevYbM
My former colleagues @TheGoodISIS have done a really outstanding breakdown of questions surrounding "black box" controls, technology leakage, and Saudi access to a U.S. enrichment plant on Saudi soil. However, while I rarely disagree with them, this overwhelming list of proliferation considerations points me to the opposite conclusion: this is a bad idea. Washington would be far better off insisting on the gold standard in the Middle East (no enrichment, no reprocessing, Additional Protocols) than toying with decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. The United States can assist with reactors, safety, training, and the like but insist enrichment and fuel fabrication stay on U.S. soil. https://t.co/97ymLpsvLd My take: https://t.co/wuEbYuEstt
The IAEA referral of Iran to the UNSC sends a clear message: irrespective of U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the ongoing conflict, Tehran is still required to meet its safeguards commitments. My @FDD Policy Brief: https://t.co/IuWJnn3BZr
The yay’s have it, folks, with two-thirds required to pass. Iran’s nuclear file is headed back to the UN Security Council for the first time in 20 years. There, will Russia and China move to penalize Iran for refusing IAEA access to most sites for more than a year? Doubtful, but the move carries political significance and upsets Iran in any case.
Statements before a vote on an IAEA resolution sending Iran’s proliferation case back to the UN Security Council for the first time since 2006, ongoing in Vienna at this late hour.
The Islamic Republic continues executing its young people. No deals with this terrorist regime.
.@dcexaminer Editorial Board weighs in on the U.S.-Saudi deal: Congress “should press the administration to renegotiate the deal to include a ban on uranium enrichment and reprocessing. Congress should also require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, the strongest inspections regime to date.” Also appreciate the kind-shout out as a concerned nonproliferation watcher: https://t.co/eQ8XBxlQL5
This would be a mistake. The IAEA has only just restarted its investigation. There are numerous outstanding questions about past activities and present locations of now missing equipment for post-Assad Syria to clarify.
Worth a listen. Lots going on for the agency with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukraine, and Iran:
Interesting that Saudi-Israel normalization is one component of this. Trump had demanded that happen before a U.S.-Saudi 123 nuclear accord goes into effect, which will occur before the end of November unless Congress mounts a veto-proof joint resolution of disapproval or Trump withdraws the 123 deal from consideration.
Iran’s proliferation case may be heading back to the UNSC next week over a year+ of denying IAEA access to most sites, longstanding safeguards issues:
My review of the newly-released U.S.-Saudi nuclear accord finds major flaws and deficiencies. Congress should take a stand against a deal that risks a new cascade of proliferation and work to reverse it if the agreement takes effect.👇https://t.co/dQhdIhp1ZE
More positive movement on nonproliferation and disarmament in Syria: Syria begins destroying Assad-era chemical weapons https://t.co/MLjX9MPzaY
The United States is still closely watching Pickaxe Mtn, where Iran could rebuild a nuclear program, as well as the destroyed/inaccessible Natanz, Esfahan, and Fordow sites.
Quoted by @NewYorkSun @bennyavni on damage done to Iran’s nuclear program: “On the nuclear front Iran has ‘lost years’ worth of effort, equipment, facilities, centrifuges, so they have been set back dramatically,’ an arms proliferation watcher at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Andrea Stricker, tells the Sun. Yet, she adds, ‘We do have missing nuclear material, unaccounted for nuclear material enough for up to 22 nuclear weapons in the low and high enrichment.’ […] America must demand that inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency get access to Iran’s facilities, Ms. Stricker says.” https://t.co/NqHC0rq36g
Evergreen story: Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program Is Unclear, U.N. Watchdog Says https://t.co/ToWVLLEzzO
Timely conversation with @batchelorshow today on the proliferation implications of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement and what’s needed from Congress to block it, after @WSJ reporting on the accord’s concerning contents: https://t.co/g5JnvP7u9P
My recent piece takes on the administration’s stated justifications for putting an enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia—and explains the dangers of upending decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy:
Saudi Nuclear Agreement Could Open a Path to 20% Enrichment @WSJ @mgordonwsj @laurnorman report on the concerning details: https://t.co/IusoJf9afR
Pentagon cuts access to classified information amid Iran war concerns https://t.co/e9MFf9Xxz2
Syria 🇸🇾 nuclear news after new @iaeaorg reporting: "In 2007, Israel bombed an undeclared site in Syria's eastern province of Deir al-Zor that Tuesday's [IAEA] report confirmed was a nuclear reactor under construction." "The IAEA confirmed the presence of around 73 metric tons of natural uranium metal at a connected location, of which 55 tons were in the form of fuel rods, the report said, adding that fuel for the reactor was made at a location in Syria." "'The Agency is able to establish that the former Syrian authorities had failed to report nuclear material, facilities and activities as required,' the report said, listing the reactor, fuel fabrication plant and a location where the fuel was stored as facilities that should have been declared." https://t.co/b0r5gTHTF9
In essence, there is a large, submerged building at Natanz where Iran stored depleted and 2-5% enriched UF6, and it is not known if the material was relocated to nearby tunnels, for example, or is still intact there, since the facility was not struck in 2025 or 2026. A separate building likely also previously contained equipment to dilute material. This is not itself an enrichment facility. https://t.co/QiPSnxycZt https://t.co/M3rvZ5SukP
.@FDD Nonproiferation Program advisory board member Amb. Robert Joseph and @FDD_CMPP advisor Amb. Eric S. Edelman sign a letter to @ENERGY @SecretaryWright, alongside three other former officials, Henry Sokolski, Robert Einhorn, and Gary Samore, calling on the Trump admin to make the Saudi nuclear deal and side agreements public: “Keeping these documents from the public [raises] a fundamental question: If the agreement and supporting side letters were negotiated to promote a peaceful, safe, nuclear exchange, what is it that the Energy Department or the administration has to hide?” https://t.co/73U0IFgVQe
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