Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad · Iran watchers, nuclear experts & opposition
Babak Vahdad is an independent OSINT analyst covering Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf.
Just listened to the Russian and Chinese interventions at the UN Security Council meeting on Iran, and the difference in tone was interesting. - Moscow went well beyond its usual criticism of Western policy, questioning the very legitimacy of the meeting and arguing that no decision had been taken to restore previous UNSC resolutions or re-establish the 1737 Sanctions Committee. The Russian representative also accused European countries of ignoring developments on the ground while using both New York and Vienna to build political pressure on Tehran. - China took a more diplomatic line. While explicitly tracing the roots of the current nuclear crisis to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the subsequent maximum-pressure campaign, Beijing focused on reducing tensions, finding common ground and returning to diplomacy on the basis of equality and mutual respect. - The difference is subtle but significant: Moscow is challenging the political and institutional framework through which pressure on Iran is being rebuilt, while Beijing seems more interested in defining the terms of a possible diplomatic way out. #Iran
Excellent analysis by @Malbrunot on how the Gulf monarchies are navigating the confrontation with Iran. - The most striking revelation: according to French and Gulf diplomatic and industry sources, the UAE and Qatar provided money to Tehran, in one form or another, to shield themselves from Iranian strikes after the mid-June US-Iran agreement. - A remarkable insight into the quiet diplomacy, and hard calculations, taking place behind the scenes in the region. #Iran
What is happening in Yemen cannot be isolated from the wider Iran-US confrontation. Escalation around Mocha and Bab el-Mandeb changes regional calculations and, above all, makes the regional coordination needed to sustain a diplomatic track between Tehran and Washington increasingly difficult if not impossible. #Iran
Interesting timing for the call between Oman’s Badr al-Busaidi and Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan. - It comes as heavy fighting is underway in Yemen between the Houthis and Saudi-backed forces, while tensions around Hormuz remain high. - Officially, they discussed regional developments, freedom of navigation and de-escalation. With Muscat maintaining channels with both Tehran and Sanaa, it is hard to see Yemen not being part of the broader picture. #Iran
Those in Tehran who might once have worried about such developments are long gone. #Iran
In its Statement No. 15, the IRGC says that, in retaliation for U.S. strikes on five Iranian oil tankers, its Navy targeted two U.S. vessels and eight oil tankers, claiming they suffered heavy damage. - It also says another 10 ships were targeted while attempting to cross the “prohibited and unsafe zone” in the Strait of Hormuz with U.S. support. #Iran
The IRGC Navy has issued an unusually explicit warning following the latest US strikes on Iranian oil tankers. - It is telling crews of oil tankers in and around ports in Kuwait and Bahrain to immediately leave their vessels, whether docked or at anchor, warning that they will be targeted. - The statement accuses both countries of hosting US forces and being complicit in US military actions. #Iran
Iranian channels close to the IRGC are stressing the importance of the U.S. AUV now in Iranian hands, particularly the potential value of reverse engineering it. Even if access to sensitive software is limited, studying its sensors, navigation, communications and underwater architecture could still be useful for Iran’s own surveillance and countermeasure capabilities in the Strait of Hormuz. - In the previous hours, the IRGC had claimed the capture of the U.S. unmanned underwater vehicle near Hormuz and separately announced the interception and destruction of a U.S. MQ-1 over the Strait. Iranian officials are presenting both episodes as evidence that their surveillance now covers the air, surface and underwater domains. - The U.S. version is different. CENTCOM has acknowledged losing an underwater military drone, but says it suffered a technical malfunction during a mission. -Reuters also quotes a U.S. official saying the vehicle malfunctioned more than a day earlier and did not carry classified sonar or radar equipment. - Tehran is nevertheless presenting the episode as a major technological and operational success. Qalibaf went as far as saying that the U.S. “smart submarine” program had been knocked out. More broadly, this fits the harder posture now emerging around Hormuz: Mohsen Rezaei says Iran has fundamentally revised its operational approach toward U.S. ships and bases, while the Khatam al-Anbiya command is warning that any attack on Iranian tankers will trigger strikes on U.S. bases and interests across the region. #Iran
Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing today. - According to Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, they discussed regional developments, diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions, and the need to ensure security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. #Iran
As expected Kayhan’s Hossein Shariatmadari sharply escalates the attack on Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami over their calls for an “honorable end to the war” and an “honorable peace.” - He claims their remarks reflect a “common and highly suspicious source,” align with US and Israeli demands, and calls on judicial and security bodies not to ignore them. - A clear sign of how politically sensitive, and increasingly securitized, the debate over ending the war has become inside Iran. #Iran
Agree with Hamidreza here. The regional diplomatic signals emerging yesterday do not mean diplomacy has much of a chance. - My point is that the Yemen front makes this even harder. Saudi-backed government forces have launched a major offensive in Al-Jawf, opening another significant front against Ansarallah. - With Saudi Arabia-a key player in any regional diplomatic effort-once again facing an escalating Yemen front, it is difficult to see how the current diplomatic momentum can produce much, at least for now. #Iran
Quite a few pieces moved today around the Iran-US file: - Araghchi attended a parliamentary committee meeting where Iran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz were discussed. - Al Jazeera reported that the Qatari delegation which visited Tehran on Sunday brought proposals to lower tensions from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, and explored a possible return of Tehran and Washington to talks. - Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesman then told CNN that Doha’s priority is reopening Hormuz, preventing further attacks on Iran and working towards a lasting settlement-not just another temporary pause. - Trump reposted the WSJ piece saying Pezeshkian and Qalibaf want to negotiate an end to the war while Iran still has leverage. - And tonight, RT, citing a political source in Tehran, says Washington has sent new proposals to Iran through mediators. Tehran has reportedly responded with its own conditions, while contacts continue. - None of this means a deal is around the corner. But there is clearly a lot more going on behind the scenes than we can see. #Iran
Pezeshkian was already under attack at home. After this, he’ll be grilled even more. #Iran https://t.co/byzLHr4ubb
Another phone call worth adding to the diplomatic activity I highlighted this morning (below the previous tweet). - Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan held separate calls with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar and Iran’s Abbas Araghchi, discussing ongoing efforts to preserve regional security and stability. - This adds another piece to the increasingly dense pattern of contacts between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz continue. - It is also worth recalling that yesterday Araghchi spoke with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, with the two discussing “comprehensively” the latest developments in the ongoing Iran-U.S. negotiations. - Taken together, these contacts suggest that regional diplomacy around both Hormuz and the negotiations is becoming increasingly active. - Also worth noting: Reuters reported today that mediators and Iran are discussing a “new formula” to resolve the current standoff, although its terms remain unclear. - Time will tell if something is moving. - As the saying goes, a pessimist is just a well-informed optimist (forgive me for this). #Iran
Qalibaf’s remarks today spell out more clearly the logic behind Iran’s recent retaliation. “The era of proportional responses is over,” he said, adding that the recent strikes on U.S. bases were “only the beginning.” From now on, any attack on Iran’s security or interests would be met with a response that is “faster, heavier and more painful.” - Qalibaf is essentially saying that Tehran no longer sees proportionality as the basis of its response. The message is that Iran intends to impose costs greater than those it suffers, in the hope that the prospect of escalation itself will deter the next U.S. strike. - The other half of Qalibaf’s speech is also interesting. He openly acknowledges the pressure from inflation, unemployment, sharp currency fluctuations and problems in managing the market. Adds that people will not accept mismanagement simply because the country is at war. - That helps explain why he repeatedly linked “internal cohesion” to “external deterrence.” Tehran is trying to show that it can absorb pressure and escalate abroad, while clearly aware that the economic front may increasingly become a vulnerability at home. #Iran
Worth noting these phone calls among regional leaders at a moment when tensions in Hormuz are increasing. Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi held separate calls with Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan and Turkish FM Hakan Fidan, discussing the latest diplomatic efforts aimed at restoring regional stability and addressing insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz. - Separately, the Egyptian and Pakistani foreign ministers discussed the need to resume implementation of the Islamabad Memorandum between Iran and the United States and work toward a broader agreement to end the war and prevent further regional escalation. - Still too early to read this as a diplomatic breakthrough, but the intensification of regional contacts is worth watching. #Iran
In its Communiqué No. 11, the IRGC says it attacked a U.S. unmanned surface vessel attempting to enter what Iran calls a “protected area” of the Strait of Hormuz. - The new element is the extension of Iran’s interdiction campaign to U.S. unmanned naval assets. - It looks like after warships and commercial vessels, remotely operated U.S. platforms entering areas Iran considers restricted are now also being treated as targets. #Iran
According to some Iranian channels, Iran may have used an anti-ship ballistic missile, possibly the advanced Khalij-e-Fars ASBM, against a US aircraft carrier for the first time. - Tehran had so far avoided using this kind of ballistic missile, allegedly because of the risk of escalation. - Meanwhile, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Command says attacks against US Navy vessels will increase if the naval blockade continues. - It seems Tehran is now taking the possibility of a further escalation at sea much more seriously. #Iran
In a decade, from “freeze for freeze” to “tanker for tanker”. What’s next? #Iran
Just read an interesting analysis published by IRGC-linked Javan, titled “The Opportunities of Standing with the East”. Main points: - It argues that the war may have produced a strategic shift in Iran’s foreign-policy debate. - According to Javan, “Looking East” is no longer seen simply as a tactical card to pressure the West, but a structural necessity. - This is the perception now spreading even among parts of Iran’s traditionally West-oriented elite. - The argument rests mainly on China, Iran’s largest economic partner. A key buyer of its oil, supplier of goods and industrial machinery, and a key hub for alternative trade and transport corridors. - BRICS and the SCO are also presented as elements of an emerging architecture less dependent on the dollar and Western institutions. - Interestingly, Javan does acknowledge the limits: China will not abandon its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Russia can also be a competitor, and neither Beijing nor Moscow is likely to fight directly for Iran. - The conclusion: Iran should pursue a “smart Eastern diplomacy”,using the emerging multipolar order and US-China competition to strengthen its strategic position. - As the analysis is published on Javan this represents how IRGC system see the changing multipolar world in the coming years and what are the strategic choices for Teheran after the war. #Iran
IRGC-linked platform: “The issue with Hormuz is no longer whether a ship can pass through, but with what probability, at what cost, and with what degree of certainty it can do so.” #Iran
2/2. A relevant part of the criticism has recently been moving from economics into national security and foreign policy. - In this regard, conservative and hardline critics argue that, after the forty-day war, Pezeshkian placed excessive emphasis on the dangers and costs of another conflict and invested too much political capital in trying to preserve the Islamabad Memorandum and the prospect of an understanding with Washington. - In this reading, the argument goes, Pezeshkian made a substantial mistake by repeatedly signalling Iran’s desire to avoid renewed war instead of pushing for deterrence. - Indeed, as has been written elsewhere, Washington and Israel gradually came to believe that Tehran was more inclined towards diplomacy than towards exerting a stronger military posture. - Subsequent US and Israeli pressure on Iran and its regional allies is being presented by these circles as evidence that the strategy failed, with huge costs for the Country. - Beyond the overall debate described, it is worth noting that the domestic argument over engagement with Washington is changing. - The internal economic situation, with the middle class heavily affected by the costs of the war and of US pressure, is increasingly attributed to Pezeshkian’s sometimes less-than-sound policies. - For all the reasons described, the April 2027 elections look particularly interesting. - They may offer the first measurable indication of whether the post-war environment has strengthened the constituencies advocating a harder approach. - They will also highlight Pezeshkian’s electorate’s attitude vis-a-vis diplomacy and an accommodation with the US as a credible route towards economic and strategic relief. - There is also the possibility that disappointment instead produces political disengagement. - In my view, the latter possibility should not be underestimated. As those critics argue, erosion of Pezeshkian’s support does not automatically mean that former supporters are moving towards the hardliners. A substantial part may instead move towards abstention. - Yet that too could alter Iran’s internal balance of power by strengthening more organised conservative forces. - The significance of April 2027 will extend well beyond who controls Iran’s municipal councils. The elections could provide an early indication of how the war has redistributed political capital inside the Islamic Republic. - It will also be interesting to see whether the military and security apparatuses will play a greater role than in the past. #Iran
🧵#Iran 1/2. Mohammad Saleh Jokar, chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s Internal Affairs and Councils Committee, has announced that Iran’s next municipal and local council elections will be held on April 30, 2027. - Though they are local elections, one should consider that, if held as scheduled, they will be Iran’s first electoral test of the post-war period, therefore an important indicator of how the recent conflict has shaped Iran’s internal balance of power. - The vote will come at a moment when Pezeshkian is under increasing criticism for his economic policies. - As is emerging these days from comments published in IRGC-linked media, a growing part of Iran’s conservative and more hardline political current is pushing a critique of his presidency, highlighting in particular three issues: economic performance, management of the war and the attempt to end the war by reaching an accommodation with the United States. -Some observers are focusing on Pezeshkian’s social and electoral base. One conservative assessment argues that his “social capital” may have fallen by roughly half since 2024. - Indeed Pezeshkian won 16.4 million votes in the presidential runoff, equivalent to around 26.7% of eligible voters. On the basis of recent internal polling (whose reliability is not of course guaranteed), his critics now estimate stable support for the government at around 13%. - The comparison is methodologically imperfect (votes cast in an election and approval measured two years later are not equivalent indicators), but the political problem looks real. - Pezeshkian (described after the election as a kind of Iranian Gorbachev by some reformist circles) is being held responsible for the worsening economic conditions, in particular rising living costs and the currency crisis and inflation. - More generally, the critics refer to the widening gap that emerged later between the expectations generated by his election and the results delivered by his government. - They also increasingly question his management of economic expectations, which normally translate into economic dynamics not always in line with the expectations of the Government and the competent economic institutions. -Pezeshkian’s last public references to shortages of resources and foreign currency, and his warning that the dollar could rise substantially further, have been described as evidence of a president who describes the crisis rather than manages it. - In other words, amplifying uncertainty when the economy needs confidence, predictability and stability.
Vance says US not talking to Iran unless they stop shooting at ships. #Iran https://t.co/vcwSjGkwtX
After Witkoff met Tahnoun bin Zayed in Sardinia…🤔 UAE President receives phone call from US President. https://t.co/h68ZsjkcqI
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