Bachar El-Halabi
@Bacharelhalabi · Energy, economy & shipping
Bachar El-Halabi is an Argus Media journalist and researcher covering energy, OPEC+, climate, and Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Talking #Opec+, Hormuz and the changing global oil map with the great Tom Reed, my @ArgusMedia colleague, in #Singapore 🇸🇬🛢️. #oott https://t.co/0nTOwLcTuV
NEW🇷🇺🇨🇳🛢️: #Russia’s Rosneft boss Igor Sechin said on Thursday #China has effectively “taken the lead from Opec(+)” in stabilising the global oil market, pointing to Beijing’s extraordinary ~5.5mn b/d reduction in crude imports this year. Indeed, China’s ability to manage inventories, refinery runs, oil product exports and ultimately its own demand has arguably been one of the most consequential balancing forces during the Strait of #Hormuz disruption. Sechin also notes China’s influence over energy markets will grow as the number of @Osint613 members declines. And yes, there’s been plenty of talk lately of China becoming the “new OPEC”. But I’d be careful with that. China’s balancing power is enormous, but finite. It can defer purchases, draw stocks and suppress demand for months, but it cannot do so indefinitely. The real test comes if the supply deficit drags on and those buffers begin to run down, or, conversely, once Hormuz reopens, barrels return and the market eventually swings back into surplus. China may have been the more powerful “short-term shock absorber” in 2026. But managing the next glut could remind everyone why #Opec+ still matters, including long-time Opec-sceptic Mr. Sechin. #oott
NEW🇮🇶⛽️: #Iraq is facing a domestic fuel products shortage as the continuing disruption around #Hormuz complicates tanker movements, another sign of how deeply the crisis is biting one of the world’s biggest oil producers. Iraq’s oil ministry acknowledged a “negative gap between production and consumption”, noting that Baghdad had been relying on seaborne imports to cover the shortfall. But the regional conflict has caused “logistical problems” for tanker movements, delaying their arrival or leaving vessels waiting at Iraqi ports, the ministry said. Baghdad said it is now chartering additional tankers to secure daily fuel requirements and rebuild strategic inventories, while urging Iraqis not to crowd petrol stations or panic-buy gasoline. Imagine this; Iraq is simultaneously discounting its crude heavily to push barrels out through Hormuz, while struggling to bring enough refined products in. Again, this drives the point that huge reserves and higher upstream production don’t necessarily translate into energy security when refining, logistics and export infrastructure remain vulnerable. #oott
#Singapore bound 🇸🇬🛢️ Very much looking forward to joining my colleague Tom Reed, @ArgusMedia’s resident oil-market oracle, next Monday at the Argus Oil Markets & Future Fuels Forum. We’ll be asking what’s next for #Opec+ & global oil markets following the recent #Hormuz shock. https://t.co/p8oWjS3re2
Ummm… who’s going to tell the President of the United States and his Syria envoy? 🤦🏻♂️ Geography can be inconvenient sometimes. #oott https://t.co/pVI3zhzt1w
8/ This brings us back to #Opec+. Venezuela remains exempt from Opec+ production quotas, meaning leaving the producer group is hardly necessary at today’s production levels. Wright, when asked about a potential exit, publicly left the decision to Caracas: “That’s a decision for them,” he said in a televised interview. A US-aligned Venezuela incentivised to maximise production would eventually sit awkwardly inside a producer group built around supply management. 9/ There is also a second-order market question. Washington wants more Venezuelan barrels because they strengthen US energy security, feed US Gulf Coast refineries and can help contain prices. But enough additional supply eventually weighs on prices too, potentially squeezing US shale economics. And that gets considerably more interesting if #SaudiArabia and other producers choose to defend market share rather than absorb the additional barrels. 10/ Finally, the political risk hasn’t disappeared. Acting president Delcy Rodríguez says Venezuela will hold elections “without a doubt”, but only “when Venezuela is ready”, with no timetable yet. That leaves a fundamental question hanging over all of this: Can an energy architecture being constructed this quickly survive the political transitions that will come in Washington? And, perhaps, eventually in Caracas?
“CENTCOM told Hegseth, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine and the White House in recent days that the military might need to strike Iran periodically in order to keep moving dozens of oil tankers out of the Gulf relatively safely every day.”
NEW🇮🇶🛢️: #Iraq’s state oil marketer SOMO has denied any commercial or contractual relationship with the sanctioned BINARY STAR tanker (IMO 9380570), following recent social-media reports linking the vessel to Iraqi oil movements. SOMO said in its statement neither the tanker, its owner nor operator has any relationship with the state marketer, stressing that vessels nominated for Iraqi crude/product exports undergo sanctions and compliance screening before acceptance. The clarification comes after BINARY STAR, a US/EU-sanctioned products tanker previously linked to Iranian oil-product trades, drew attention from vessel trackers during an August Hormuz transit. AIS data has also placed the vessel in Iraqi waters/Khor al-Zubair this month. SOMO cautioned that a vessel’s presence in Iraqi waters — or appearance on tracking systems — does not establish a commercial relationship with the company, while also pointing to AIS manipulation/spoofing risks. #oott
“Over the past 28 days, Arab states shipped out 6.92mn b/d of crude oil via the US Navy blockade line. Of that total, 2.53mn b/d came from oil terminals in the Gulf of Oman while another 4.39mn b/d passed through the Strait of Hormuz mostly to supply other tankers waiting in the Gulf of Oman.” @TankerTrackers
NEW🇮🇶: Oil production in #Iraq's Kurdistan region has resumed at 220,000 to 230,000 b/d after companies returned to work following disruptions caused by drone strikes during the Iran war, the acting natural resources minister said on Saturday. H/t @staunovo #oott
NEW🇻🇪🇺🇸🛢️: A little caution on media reports suggesting #Venezuela is considering leaving #Opec+. An eventual Venezuelan Opec-exit is NOT far-fetched. But I think it remains premature to treat it as a policy being actively pursued by #Caracas. It surely has more allure in Washington, @ArgusMedia understands. 1/ The idea certainly makes strategic sense from a US perspective. #Washington is discussing potentially enormous access to Venezuela’s oil sector, reportedly involving fields containing around 90bn bl of proven reserves. If US firms eventually deploy billions to rebuild production, having complete freedom to maximize output is hardly an unimaginable objective. 2/ But Venezuela currently produces only around 1.1-1.2mn b/d and is exempt from Opec+ production limits. So Opec membership isn’t actually constraining Venezuelan output today. That question becomes considerably more relevant if/when Venezuela successfully rebuilds several million b/d of production capacity. 3/ There is also a political calculation for Caracas that shouldn’t be underestimated. The #Trump administration has just over two years remaining in office. There is no guarantee the next US administration maintains the same approach towards Venezuela. Leaving an organization Venezuela helped create in 1960 would therefore mean making a potentially generational oil-policy decision against a US political relationship whose post-2028 continuity, in its proposed form, remains uncertain. 4/ And there is an interesting potential contradiction within Washington’s strategy. A US-Venezuela oil alliance capable of eventually adding substantial unconstrained production would strengthen US energy security and put downward pressure on prices. But sufficiently low prices eventually become uncomfortable for another important US constituency, shale producers. 5/ Then there is #SaudiArabia. If Venezuela eventually leaves Opec, maximizes production alongside the US and begins taking market share from the producer group, don’t automatically assume #Riyadh’s response would be to surrender that share indefinitely. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated before that, when necessary, it is prepared to defend market share even at the expense of lower prices. 6/ So yes, an Opec-exit could eventually become part of a much larger US-Venezuela energy bargain. But Caracas would be trading a 66-year institutional relationship for considerably greater production freedom while betting on long-term US policy continuity, future oil prices and the reaction of some very powerful producers. For now, conversations suggest the idea has considerably more momentum in Washington than Caracas. #oott
#CORRECTION☢️: One important 🇸🇦🇺🇸 #nuclear deal timing detail is that US Congress does NOT need to affirmatively approve the proposed 30-year agreement. The 90-day review is measured in “continuous session”, with pro-forma sessions allowing the clock to keep running. Congress is expected to remain in continuous session through early December, meaning the review could be completed before the current Congress ends, albeit after the 3 November midterms. Unless Congress acts to block the agreement during the statutory review period, it can then proceed. So, procedurally, the key question may be less whether Congress approves the nuclear deal, and more whether there are sufficient votes and political appetite to stop it. #oott
On timing🇸🇦🇺🇸☢️: the agreement has been submitted to Congress just 10 weeks before the 3 November midterms. The 90-day review is measured in congressional session days, meaning it could extend beyond the election. So the submission gets the process underway under the current Congress, but the political landscape surrounding the deal could look rather different by the time that process runs its course. #oott
UPDATE🇸🇦🇺🇸: A month after President @realDonaldTrump approved the proposed 30-year US-#SaudiArabia civilian nuclear agreement, the pact has now reportedly been submitted to Congress, triggering a mandatory 90-day review, although Trump administration officials say it remains conditional on Riyadh joining the Abraham Accords. The deal would open the door for US civilian nuclear technology exports to the Kingdom and calls for Saudi Arabia to build AP1000 reactors, potentially worth tens of billions of dollars. President Trump has also said the agreement would not allow Saudi uranium enrichment, although regional sources initially suggested otherwise, as per @ArgusMedia’s understanding. #oott https://t.co/6lgA3GDmi4
NEW🇮🇷🇴🇲: #Iran and #Oman have agreed to establish a joint maritime-security mechanism in the Strait of #Hormuz, aimed at ensuring safe navigation and protecting commercial shipping. In a joint statement, the two sides said the proposed framework includes creating a joint coordination corridor through Hormuz, agreeing procedures for identifying and communicating with commercial vessels, and establishing an information-sharing mechanism. Tehran and Muscat also called for continued dialogue with other Mideast Gulf countries, stressing freedom of navigation and respect for international law. #oott
NEW🇸🇦🇫🇷: #SaudiArabia and #France have unveiled a series of energy and industrial agreements during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to France. @Saudi_Aramco signed $3.7bn of procurement deals with France’s SLB and Vallourec for oil and gas drilling materials and steel pipes. Saudi Electricity also agreed cooperation and financing with Bpifrance to support expansion and modernization of the kingdom’s power grid, building on a previously agreed financing facility of up to $3bn. #oott
NEW🇯🇴🇨🇳: #Jordan is a resource-poor nation, but sits on extraordinarily strategic geography. The Hashemites have historically compensated for the former by being exceptionally attentive to shifts in the latter. That is the lens through which I would view King @KingAbdullahII’s visit to #China and meeting with Xi Jinping. 🧵 1/ From the late King Hussein to King Abdullah, Jordan’s survival strategy has depended partly on recognizing geopolitical change early, maintaining multiple relationships and positioning the kingdom several moves ahead whenever the regional order begins shifting. So I don’t think the timing of this visit is a detail. 2/ There is an economic dimension too. China became Jordan’s largest trading partner in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching nearly $6.7 bn. But that trade remains heavily tilted towards Chinese exports. King Abdullah’s visit has included engagement with Chinese companies across energy, mining, fertilizers, food and advanced industries. 3/ But, to be very clear, this is NOT, by any means, a Jordanian pivot away from the US. #Washington remains fundamental to Jordan’s security and economic architecture. This is instead about recognizing that the regional and international system around Jordan is changing, and positioning accordingly. 4/ Nearly three years after 7 October, and six months into the US-#Iran war, the regional crisis has expanded far beyond its original theatres. #Hormuz remains disrupted, Arab Gulf (#GCC) economies are absorbing substantial costs and the consequences increasingly extend into the global economy. 5/ Stabilizing this region, therefore, seems to require more than Washington alone. China increasingly has both an interest and potentially a larger political role in that process. Today, Jordan and China explicitly called for maintaining the US-Iran ceasefire, restoring normal passage through Hormuz and reaching a broader negotiated settlement. 6/ Perhaps #Amman sees where this is heading. King Abdullah’s #Beijing visit may therefore be less about Jordan choosing China, and more about Jordan recognizing early that China could become increasingly important to whatever regional architecture emerges from this crisis. #oott
❗️Worth reading this @FT piece, which reinforces a point many of us have been making since the #Hormuz crisis began, that not all Mideast Gulf producers are absorbing this shock equally. 🧵 1/ #Qatar & #Kuwait were always among the most vulnerable because, unlike #SaudiArabia and the #UAE, they have virtually no meaningful alternative export routes outside Hormuz. We are now seeing the economic consequences. 2/ Qatar has reportedly cut some government department budgets by as much as 30pc and overseas aid funding by ~85pc, while the IMF expects its economy to contract 8.6pc this year. Lost energy revenues are estimated at $1.5bn-$2bn per week for Qatar and Kuwait, as per @GoldmanSachs. 3/ But there is a wider geopolitical point worth highlighting too. Iran may be betting, at least partly, on the very real differences and trust deficits among Arab Gulf states. Yet there is a point at which that calculation begins producing the opposite result. 4/ The #GCC countries do not always see eye to eye. Yes, we know that. But none has an interest in seeing the economic or national security of another fundamentally threatened. 5/ The longer Hormuz remains effectively closed and the more Gulf infrastructure and shipping come under attack, the stronger the incentive becomes for these countries to treat their vulnerabilities as increasingly collective rather than individual. That is already starting to happen, as per senior gulf officials I’ve spoken to. 6/ Iranian pressure intended to exploit differences within the #GCC will eventually accelerate security coordination, shared infrastructure and a common push to reduce Iran’s leverage over regional trade and energy flows. This is becoming existential. #oott
UPDATE🇮🇶🇸🇦: and all smiles in Riyadh. Saudi energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman has now met the Iraqi delegation sent by PM Ali al-Zaidi, including oil minister Basim Mohammed Khudair and finance minister Taif Sami. Baghdad is pushing for a higher #Opec+ production allowance as it revives ambitions to raise crude output. #oott
PM Al-Zaidi’s ambition is significant, but #Iraq has been here before. Baghdad previously targeted capacity of ~8mn b/d before scaling back its plans in recent years to 6mn b/d by 2027. Getting anywhere near 8mn-10mn b/d will require massive investment, export capacity and an Opec+ allowance rivaling #SaudiArabia & #Russia’s. #oott
NEW🇮🇶🛢️: #Iraq’s PM Ali al-Zaidi today said he has sent the oil and finance ministers to #SaudiArabia to push for a higher #Opec+ production quota, as Baghdad targets crude output of 8mn-10mn b/d within six years. The move comes ahead of crucial Opec+ discussions in October over new production baselines for 2027. #oott https://t.co/ueNPoxNqiW
NEW🇮🇷🛢️: Iran’s parliament deputy speaker Hamidreza Hajibabaei on Thursday said Arab Gulf states should not build alternative #oil pipelines because doing so would diminish the strategic importance of the Strait of #Hormuz. He described gulf states’ efforts to build such pipelines as effectively “firing missiles at Iran”, adding that US or EU assistance to those countries should be viewed similarly. “We must prevent them from doing so,” he said. h/t @MohamadAhwaze #oott https://t.co/HiqoOZEHX7
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