Nadim Koteich
@NadimKoteich · Gulf & Arab world
Nadim Koteich is the general manager of Sky News Arabia and a Lebanese commentator sharply critical of Hezbollah.
Nadim Koteich in the fiercest dialogue about Sudan.. Iran and "Hezbollah" - high tension via @YouTube
Translated from ArabicDearest Ali, @alimouinjaber Thank you. For more than a generation, those of us who entered television, journalism, and entertainment in the Arab world did so measuring ourselves against the standards you set, and spent our careers trying to reach them. You were the leading authority in this industry. More importantly, you were its leading disruptor. You took the instincts of a war correspondent and turned them into institutions. Future TV, when Lebanese television needed to be rebuilt and modernized. Dubai's channels, when they needed vision and structure. Then more than fifteen years at MBC, where you shaped content, platforms, talent, and the very idea of what pan-Arab television could be. You treated news as story. Entertainment as craft. Young people as people worth discovering, developing, worth investing in, and worth betting on. My generation grew up watching the world you helped put on screen. Then we tried to work inside it. The professionalism. The restlessness. The refusal to accept that "this is how it has always been done." These were the bar you set. We are still measuring ourselves against it. Congratulations on the next chapter. An advisory role changes how you serve the industry you helped define. It does nothing to diminish what you built. That industry remains in your debt.
The complete fall of Mokha and the beginning of the Houthi/IRGC expansion toward the islands opposite the Mokha coast is the most dangerous security and geostrategic development since 2015 and a direct threat to the security of Bab al-Mandab and the entire Red Sea … This is happening after the success in opening the Strait of Hormuz by military force and reviving around 40% of the oil exports that used to pass through it before the war. A strategic catastrophe by every measure, even if it is not new today.
Translated from ArabicWho is bothered by the UAE's call today to exclude both parties to the conflict from monopolizing Sudan's political future? Who truly benefits from keeping Sudan hostage between al-Burhan and Hemedti? And who fears re-establishing legitimacy on a civilian basis that would return the military to their barracks? When the conflict between the two generals erupted in 2023, each capital acted according to its own measure for defining the threat. For Egypt, the Sudanese military establishment remained the closest guarantor of its concept of the state. For the UAE, however, the most pressing concern remained that the army might become a vehicle through which the Islamist movement and the networks of the old regime could return to power. Since the summer of 2024, the UAE's strategic shift began to take shape clearly. Abu Dhabi moved from the language of seeking a balance of power within the war, or arrangements to bridge the divide between the two generals, to an option that transcends the dynamics of the war altogether, by calling for an expanded arms embargo to cover all of Sudan, condemning violations by both sides, and strongly pushing for a political process led by a civilian government.
Translated from ArabicWhen the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemedti broke out in 2023, the regional capitals moved, each according to its own measure for defining the threat. For Egypt, the Sudanese military institution remained the closest guarantor of its conception of the state. As for the UAE, the most pressing concern remained that the army would become a vehicle through which the Islamist movement and the networks of the old regime would return to power.
Translated from ArabicThe Middle East does not operate according to the logic of clear-cut blocs. The states involved in its conflicts overlap and clash across a fluid geography and through temporary, sometimes improvised partnerships, generally unable to produce stable political identities. Sudan today is the most concentrated example of this regional chaos. Hemedti, whom some narratives insist on presenting as a purely Emirati proxy, from A to Z of his project, is the same man whose forces fought in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition. According to some reports, Hemedti's forces are still stationed at the southern border along the frontier with Yemen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was the one who led Sudan's normalization process with Israel, within a regional environment whose shaping the United Arab Emirates and the United States helped engineer in 2020.
Translated from ArabicAs the Sudanese scene grows more complex, narratives race to reduce it to a map of black and white: the army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, or the camp of angels representing legitimacy and backed by Riyadh and Cairo, and the Rapid Support Forces led by Hemedti, or the camp of devils backed by Abu Dhabi.
Translated from ArabicWhat national army in Sudan!!?? The New York Times published an investigation based on nearly 150 documents, photos, videos, and an audio recording, in addition to thousands of text messages, revealing details of a chemical weapons program within the Sudanese army during 2024. The most prominent name in the file is Brigadier General Tariq Hussein, who supervised the chlorine-bomb project, proposed using it in the battles of Khartoum, and circulated designs for munitions combining explosives with about 15 kilograms of chlorine. By October 2024, he said that about 300 chemical munitions had been manufactured. The documents indicate that these munitions were used at several sites, one of which, according to Hussein, resulted in heavy casualties, without a number or independent confirmation. The documents also indicate that Abdel Fattah al-Burhan knew about the project, and that some of the chlorine was taken from the Al-Manara water-treatment station in Omdurman, which was receiving relief supplies to fight cholera. After the U.S. sanctions, orders were issued to remove traces of the project, and then an investigation committee was formed of which Hussein himself was one of the advisers. The article notes that the war has led to the displacement of more than 12 million people since 2023, in addition to famine, disease, and widespread abuses.
Translated from ArabicThis was his promise.. And by virtue of his promise.. what is happening now is an absolute defeat for Hezbollah.. And every delay in acknowledging the defeat and acting in accordance with its realities is an ongoing crime against Lebanon and the Lebanese.
Translated from ArabicThey refused to hand it over to the state and agreed to surrender to Israel.
Translated from ArabicRussia secretly helping Iran develop supersonic cruise missiles https://t.co/x28QecwUaS @ft
This is how the UAE led the region in restoring pre-war oil export levels and broke the Hormuz trap 1/ Six months into the war, TankerTrackers says Iran has effectively become unable to deliver its crude oil to the markets, while the UAE is now exporting roughly the same quantities as before the war. While Iraq and Kuwait have each recovered about two-thirds of their pre-war exports, Saudi Arabia remains, relatively speaking, the hardest-hit Arab exporter, given the huge scale of its exports and the simultaneous pressure on its routes in the Gulf and the Red Sea. The strait crisis itself reveals radically different levels of resilience. 2/ Iran: –100% or zero exports: it has the oil, facilities and tankers, but it has almost completely lost access to the market. Tehran militarized the geography of energy and international trade, and ended up besieged by it. 3/ UAE: –0.02%. Almost complete recovery of pre-war crude export levels. The port of Fujairah was merely one factor among a package of factors. 4/ The UAE’s real advantage lay in having an integrated export system: a pipeline that bypasses Hormuz, multiple ports, protected and reinforced tanker voyages, ship-to-ship transfers STS, overseas storage capacity, shipping flexibility, and an advanced commercial-contract structure. 5/ Resilience was also a military choice. The UAE moved early to keep its tankers crossing Hormuz by force of arms, adding defensive measures aboard the ships and, at times, providing air cover with fighter jets. Later, the United States joined the broader military escort operation to secure passage through the strait. The UAE built an alternative route to Hormuz and also helped break Iran’s ability to control the strait 6/ Iraq and Kuwait, at –36%, are the revealing indicator of the depth of the transformations in the supply crisis and of Abu Dhabi’s role. The two countries recovered about two-thirds of their pre-war exports, despite possessing infrastructure for bypassing the strait that is far less capable than the region’s largest systems. This recovery depended on Hormuz returning to a level of usability, a process the UAE helped enable through exceptional strategies for moving oil to and through the port of Fujairah, and most importantly through the U.S.-UAE operation (according to an Axios report) that secured the southern channel against Iranian attacks. 7/ Saudi Arabia, at around –48% according to TankerTrackers estimates, falls into a different category. The estimates of other tracking companies vary because of gaps in AIS data and dark shipping, but the scale of the disruption remains substantial. Saudi Arabia also starts from a much larger export base, meaning that improving this percentage requires returning millions of additional barrels to the market, while bearing greater shipping risks. Although the East-West pipeline and Yanbu provide substantial flexibility to bypass Hormuz, this alternative corridor has itself come under pressure from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. 8/ This is where the UAE’s achievement lies: moving from building multiple infrastructure alternatives to engineering a flexible, integrated export system from the well to the buyer. • Geography helped. Fujairah opens directly onto the Gulf of Oman, outside Hormuz, and secures the route to Asian markets. • Pre-war planning added pipelines such as the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, provided alternative ports, supported the UAE’s ability to reach its customers from strategic overseas stockpiles, and strengthened shipping capacity through investment in a dedicated tanker fleet that would not be hostage to service providers and insurance companies. This was capped by flexible commercial arrangements and ownership of global infrastructure in the energy industry and its derivatives, supporting state revenues regardless of national export revenues. • With the outbreak of war, political will and firm military commitment protected this system’s operational capability through and around Hormuz. The result: Abu Dhabi engineered an integrated export infrastructure designed to continue operating even when the natural routes are disrupted.
Translated from Arabic📌🛢️📈 HOW THE UAE LED THE REGION IN RESTORING PRE-WAR EXPORTS AND BROKE THE HORMUZ TRAP 1/ Six months into the war, TankerTrackers says Iran is effectively unable to get its crude to market, while the UAE is exporting almost exactly what it was before the war. Iraq and Kuwait have fought their way back to roughly 2/3 of pre-war exports. Saudi Arabia remains relatively the most heavily disrupted Arab exporter, a particularly consequential setback given the sheer scale of its export system and the fact that both its Gulf and Red Sea routes are under pressure. Same chokepoint, radically different resilience. 2/ Iran: –100%. It had the oil, terminals and tankers, but lost the route to the buyer. It weaponized geography and ended up trapped by it. 3/ UAE: –0.02%. Almost complete preservation of pre-war crude exports. Fujairah was only the first layer. 4/ The real advantage was an integrated export system: bypass pipeline, multiple terminals, controlled shuttle crossings, STS transfers, storage, shipping flexibility and commercial control. 5/ Resilience was also a military choice. The UAE moved early to keep its tankers crossing Hormuz, adding shipboard defenses and, at times, fighter protection. Later, it partnered with the U.S. in the broader operation to secure passage through the strait. The UAE built the bypass—and helped break Iran’s ability to control the route itself. 6/ Iraq and Kuwait at -36% are the giveaway. Both restored roughly two-thirds of pre-war exports despite having far less bypass infrastructure than the region’s biggest systems. Their recovery depended on Hormuz becoming usable again, a process the UAE helped enable through Fujairah’s STS ecosystem and, more importantly, the U.S.–UAE operation securing the southern channel against Iranian attacks. 7/ Saudi Arabia, at around –48% in TankerTrackers’ estimate, sits in a distinct category. Other trackers vary because of AIS gaps and dark shipping, but the disruption is still substantial. Saudi also starts from a much larger export base, so improving the percentage means moving millions of additional barrels, and taking on more shipping risk. Its East–West Pipeline and Yanbu provide major redundancy, but that alternative corridor became contested as well, by the Houthi attacks. 8/ That is the UAE achievement: moving from infrastructure redundancy to export-system resilience. • Geography helped. Fujairah opens directly onto the Gulf of Oman and Asian markets beyond Hormuz. • Pre-war planning added pipelines, terminals, overseas storage, shipping capacity, flexible trade arrangements and global infrastructure ownership. • Once war began, political will and military commitment kept the system moving. The result: an integrated export architecture built to function even when normal routes fail.
You hit a Persian wedding and only four people die? Do the bride and groom even know anybody besides each other? A normal buffet line takes more lives than that before anyone even finds the zereshk polo. IRGC propaganda is finally getting really funny @BarakRavid
The wretched newspaper of Khamenei’s orphans. First, I spent two years at the helm of Sky News Arabia, not less than a year.. and I am still part of the media group, as the institution announced on the day of my resignation.. Information that would have required only a little effort to get right if the post were a newspaper in the first place… or if whoever runs it were a journalist.. or if the intention were to write an article… Then they need to decide.. was Nadim Koteich thrown out in disgrace.. or is he one of the UAE’s media arms… How can these two sentences be said in one line? The wonder disappears when you remember that they are among those who cheer divine and non-divine victories over ruins and corpses… Really, no wonder… Carry on, Bob .. carry on, my dear.. @AlakhbarNews
Translated from ArabicThe fact of the matter is that I informed the management of the Asas Media website, for which I hold every respect and appreciation, of my decision to stop writing. This decision came after the publication of an article entitled "A Chamber of Commerce or a Chamber of Normalization", signed "Asas". I saw that it contained direct insults against the United Arab Emirates, against the backdrop of the visit by a delegation of Emirati businessmen to Beirut and the linking of the visit to the issue of “normalization,” in a context that I see as far removed from its nature and facts, and in a manner involving the settling of regional scores in which I see no benefit for Lebanon. Naturally, my friend Nihad al-Mashnouq’s right to express his opinion and position remains fully preserved. I also retain the right to find that this position has become so distant from my convictions that continuing my cooperation with the website is inappropriate. A disagreement over an issue, however fundamental, does not spoil a personal relationship I cherish. Nihad will remain, to me, a dear friend and brother; he has his opinion and convictions, and I have my opinion and convictions. That is all there is to it. @asasmedialb
Translated from ArabicIran played the Hormuz card. Today, the card is no longer in its hands: Gulf oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which fell to nearly zero at the height of the crisis, have now returned to about half of what passed before the war, and to roughly two-thirds of the region's previous total exports. Iranian oil, by contrast, remains under blockade. This is the story in barrels. Before the war, about 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and products passed through the Strait of Hormuz, equivalent to nearly one-fifth of the world's seaborne oil trade. The Iranian equation was clear: close Hormuz, raise the cost for everyone, and keep Iranian oil flowing. Then the war began, and the equation collapsed. The trajectory in late February 2026: Iran plays the Hormuz card. Tehran treated the strait like an electrical switch it could turn off. Once transit was disrupted, one of the world's most important oil arteries was paralyzed. Early March: transit approaches zero. Oil volumes through the strait fell to about 0.5 million barrels per day, down ~98%. Non-Iranian shipments fell to ~0.4 million barrels per day. In practice, Hormuz became closed to almost everyone except Iran. Total crude and product exports from the entire region (through Hormuz and the other pipelines) fell to 5–6 million barrels per day, about one-quarter of prewar levels. That was the peak of the Iranian plan's success: we export, while you do not. March–April: the plan works solely for Iran's benefit. Tehran continued exporting ~1.2 to 1.9 million barrels per day of its crude, while the oil of the other Gulf states remained stuck or searched for exits through pipelines. The Hormuz card appeared to be working as Iran intended. Mid-April–mid-June: the beginning of the reversal. America imposed a blockade on Iranian ports. Iran's seaborne crude exports collapsed, and May loadings fell to marginal levels. The state that closed the gate became unable to use it. June 17: a temporary opening. A brief window opened after Washington and Tehran reached a memorandum of understanding, and the blockade on Iranian ports was lifted. Tankers that had been stuck departed, and Iran quickly increased its exports. For a few weeks, the pre-blockade picture returned. But it did not last. July: the Hormuz card breaks. The blockade returned 26 days after the memorandum of understanding. On June 25, the tanker Ever Lovely was attacked on the Omani route. Washington blamed Iran, while Tehran did not claim responsibility. On June 27, America struck Iranian coastal sites, and fighting resumed only ten days after the memorandum of understanding. On July 7, three tankers were attacked near Oman, the oil exemption granted to Iran was canceled, and Washington carried out more than 80 strikes, while Trump declared that the agreement was «over». Between July 8 and 11, Iran targeted American sites in the Gulf and then announced the closure of the strait. On July 13, the American blockade of Iranian ports returned. Iranian crude exports virtually stopped. Kharg port, which had handled about 90% of Iran's usual oil exports, became blockaded. Jask and Chabahar lie east of the strait, but they remain Iranian ports subject to the American blockade. By August, Iranian oil loadings had fallen to about 0.25 million barrels per day. Late August: a new map. Iran is stuck, while the rest of the Gulf is regaining its ability to export. Today, about 8–10 million barrels per day of crude and products pass through the Strait of Hormuz itself, about 40–50% of the prewar level. Crude alone is estimated by market participants to be passing through the strait at about 6–8 million barrels per day, also equivalent to about 40–50% of prewar levels. When all outlets are counted—the strait + pipelines, Fujairah, Yanbu, Ceyhan, and alternative transshipment operations—the region's total crude and product exports reach about 15–16 million barrels per day. That is close to two-thirds of the region's prewar exports, and about three times the trough recorded in March, at 5–6 million barrels per day. The level is still about 7–8 million barrels per day below the prewar world. Conditions have not returned to normal, and this is not a call for celebration. But the Gulf is no longer completely hostage to the closure of Hormuz. The Hormuz card was designed to impose a harsh choice on the world: either accept Iran's terms or endure a global oil shock. But the world found a third option: circumventing the threat through alternative routes. Escorting the shipments that can be secured. Encircling the party that closed the gate. And living with a strait operating at half capacity instead of a strait that is completely closed. And here lies the greatest irony: Iran used Hormuz to imprison the world outside the Gulf, only to end up as the most isolated party inside it.
Translated from Arabic📌🇮🇷🇺🇸🛢️📈 IRAN PLAYED THE HORMUZ CARD. THE CARD IS NO LONGER IN THE DECK. Gulf oil, which reached close to zero through Hormuz, is back toward half of pre-war Hormuz volumes and two-thirds of pre-war regional volumes, while Iranian crude is locked in. This is the story in barrels. Pre-war, the strait was Iran’s loaded weapon: about 20 million barrels a day of crude and products, roughly a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil, had to pass a 21-mile choke point Tehran could threaten. That was the design. Close the gate. Make everyone else bleed. Keep your own oil moving. Then the war started. And the design broke. THE PATH Late February 2026: the card is played Iran treats Hormuz as a switch. Flip it off. The world’s main oil artery seizes up. Early March: close to zero through the gate Visible oil through the strait collapses to about 0.5 million b/d. That is a ~98% drop. Non-Iranian cargoes fall to roughly 0.4 million b/d. For everyone except Tehran, Hormuz is effectively shut. Total Gulf crude and products leaving the whole region sink to a trough of 5–6 million b/d, about one-quarter of pre-war regional flows. This is the high-water mark of Iran’s plan: we export, you don’t. March–April: the plan works for Iran, and only Iran Tehran still pushes ~1.2–1.9 million b/d of its own crude. Neighbors are trapped inside the Gulf or scrambling to pipelines. The Hormuz card, as designed in Iran’s mind, is live. Mid-April to mid-June: the first reversal The United States blockades Iranian ports. Iran’s seaborne crude caves in. May loadings fall toward a trickle. The weapon starts pointing backward: the country that closed the gate can no longer use the gate. 17 June: a crack in the wall A short window opens. U.S. and Iran agreed on a memorandum of understanding, and Washington lifted the naval blockade of Iranian ports. Stranded tankers flee. Iran also surges. For a few weeks the old pattern flickers back. It does not last. July: the card snaps The blockade returns, 26 days after the MOU. Iran overplayed its hand. 25 June, Ever Lovely hit on the Omani route; U.S. blames Iran; Iran does not claim it. 27 June, U.S. strikes Iranian coastal sites; fighting resumes 10 days after the MoU. 7 July, Three tankers hit near Oman, oil waiver revoked, 80-plus U.S. strikes, and Trump says the deal is “over.” 8–11 July, Iran hits U.S. positions in the Gulf, then claims the strait is closed. 13 July, U.S. blockade of Iranian ports returns, 26 days after the MOU. Iranian crude stops getting out. Kharg, the terminal that handled ~90% of Iran’s normal crude, is bottled inside the Gulf. Jask and Chabahar sit east of the strait, but they are still Iranian ports. Geography does not beat a blockade. August Iranian loadings fall to about 0.25 million b/d. Late August: the new map While Iran is stuck, the rest of the Gulf is not. Oil (crude+products) transits through Hormuz itself: 8–10 million b/d — about 40–50% of the pre-war 20 million Hormuz stream. Crude only through the strait, per traders: 6–8 million b/d — about 40–50% of pre-war Hormuz crude. Total crude and products leaving the whole region (strait plus pipelines, Fujairah, Yanbu, Ceyhan, shuttles): 15–16 million b/d. That is two-thirds of pre-war regional exports, and roughly triple the March trough of 5–6 million. It is still 7–8 million b/d short of the old world. Not victory laps. Not normal. But no longer a hostage situation. The United States does not own the waterway. It does decide, for now, who exits. The upper hand has shifted. WHAT THAT MEANS Iran wanted a switch that turned their oil on and everyone else’s oil off. What it has now is the opposite. The Hormuz card was supposed to do one specific thing: make the world choose between Iranian terms and an oil shock. The world found a third option. Route around the threat. Escort what you can. Block the player who closed the gate. Live with a half-open strait instead of a closed one.
The Iranian president announced that he no longer follows state television. (The video is in the first reply to the post.) Pezeshkian accused the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting organization (IRIB) of censoring him and the other supporters of the memorandum of understanding with the United States, while the organization adopts a hard-line approach that “does not serve unity.” Thus, the current president has come to treat the regime’s official media apparatus as a hostile faction. Any effective authoritarian regime is careful to keep its propaganda machine and executive authority of one mind, or at least to pretend that it does. When the hostility between them becomes public, however, it usually reflects three facts: • Weakness at the center: Either the decision-making center (the Leader’s Office) is weaker than it should be, is newly established, or is so divided that it cannot impose discipline. The reality is that since the death of Ali Khamenei, the succession issue has not produced a figure with authority comparable to his. • The intransigence of the hard-liners: The hard-liners who dominate the security and media institutions prefer the continuation of confrontation and economic hardship to concluding any agreement that could bring stability to the country while risking the erosion of their political influence. • The president’s impotence: Despite holding the office of president, he lacks the authority to dismiss those responsible for shaping the official narrative, and can do nothing but openly complain about them. This combination points to a state of paralysis. The government is unable to deliver economic relief because the ideologues obstruct the diplomatic efforts necessary to achieve it; at the same time, the ideologues are unable to completely remove the government for fear of appearing to turn against their own regime. In the midst of this, the ordinary Iranian citizen, suffering under inflation that has reached 130%, sees state television giving him lessons about inflation in America, which does not exceed 2%, and realizes that the elite are fighting to control the narrative instead of managing the affairs of the country. Publicly acknowledging that state television is not trusted is tantamount to scoring an own goal, as it sends the people a message that the official narrative is nothing more than factional propaganda, not a national consensus. In a regime that feeds its survival on claiming political and divine unity, this admission is more corrosive and destructive to the regime’s prestige and image than most opposition statements. It is true that the regime will not collapse tomorrow, but it is clearly losing its ability to speak with one voice at a time when it is laboring under severe military and economic pressures.
Translated from ArabicTHE PRESIDENT OF IRAN JUST SAID HE NO LONGER WATCHES STATE TV. Pezeshkian accused IRIB of censoring him and other supporters of the U.S. MoU while pushing a hardline line that “doesn’t create unity.” The regime’s own official broadcaster is now treated as an enemy faction by the sitting president. A functioning authoritarian system keeps its propaganda apparatus and its executive on the same page, or at least pretends to. When they publicly feud, three things are usually true: • The center (the Leader’s office) is either too weak, too new, or too divided to impose discipline. After Ali Khamenei’s death the succession has not produced a figure with comparable authority. • Hardliners who control the coercive and media institutions prefer continued confrontation and economic pain over any deal that might stabilize the country and reduce their own political leverage. • The president, despite holding the title, lacks the power to fire the people who run the official narrative. He can only complain about them in public. That combination signals paralysis: the government cannot deliver economic relief because the ideologues sabotage the diplomacy required for it, yet the ideologues cannot fully sideline the government without looking like they are overthrowing their own system. Ordinary Iranians watching 130% inflation while state TV lectures them about American 2% inflation see the elite fighting over the remote control instead of governing. Publicly advertising that the state’s own television is not to be trusted is an own-goal. It tells the population the official story is factional propaganda, not national consensus. In a system that survives on the claim of divine-political unity, that admission is more corrosive than most opposition statements. The regime is not collapsing tomorrow, but it is visibly losing the ability to speak with one voice while under military and economic pressure. https://t.co/6JHRcJW2KM
Because the UAE's vision has made it the region's pioneering and leading financial and commercial market, placing it among the world's most capable markets. This reality attracts major investors, hedge funds, traders, and global companies, and also attracts those trying to evade international sanctions mechanisms. That is why there are constant reviews to ensure the model's flexibility and protect it from the side effects of great openness and a high pace of work.
Translated from ArabicIran announced that oil revenues worth $7.5 billion had "already entered the central bank's accounts," asserting that this liquidity was sufficient to secure its needs until winter arrives. The real picture reveals a deceptive Iranian propaganda ploy. Did Iran sell oil worth that amount? That is possible. Did it receive $7.5 billion in cash? That is far from reality. The vast majority of the proceeds from Iranian oil sales are deposited in China in restricted accounts and may be used only to purchase Chinese goods. In other words, most of this amount is merely a "gift card" redeemable only in Chinese stores. Only a small portion of these revenues is converted into real dollars through evasion and circumvention operations that begin and never end. Under normal conditions during the years of sanctions, this portion did not exceed one dollar out of every ten dollars. June, however, brought an exception, as the United States allowed buyers, under a temporary license lasting only a few weeks, to pay for Iranian oil directly in dollars, even for the benefit of the Iranian central bank. As a result, it is logical that the liquid cash share of those shipments rose markedly. Tanker-tracking data indicate that June exports amounted to about $4.5 billion, and it is reasonable to assume that a higher proportion of sales of those barrels was settled in real dollars, compared with what is customary in ordinary sanction years. Despite this temporary easing, however, the banks chose to exercise caution, which kept the actual cash proceeds modest. Of the total sales value of $7.5 billion, the share that actually reached the central bank exceeded only slightly what normally reaches Iran under sanctions. Accordingly, what Iran received at best approaches $1.5 billion. If all the oil revenues the Iranians refer to had been received entirely in cash, bread and medicine prices, and exchange rates, would not have reached their current catastrophic levels, with one dollar exceeding the two-million-rial threshold. The government counted all oil revenues as immediate cash liquidity, then its media rushed to sell the lie. The reality now is that oil shipments have collapsed under the weight of the reimposed naval blockade, recording only 250,000 to 260,000 barrels per day this August—a sharp decline of more than 70% compared with July and more than 80% compared with last year. The excessive boasting about the gains of the previous phase, and talk of achieving 99% of the budget, is nothing more than a show of strength and an attempt to raise morale in preparation for the "economic day of reckoning." The louder the government becomes in marketing a better past, the more clearly it shows that it fully understands how harsh the new policies are and, before anyone else, is certain of the lean days awaiting it.
Translated from ArabicIran says $7.5bn in oil money “hit the Central Bank” and they’re covered till winter. Here’s the bluff: Selling $7.5bn of oil? Possible. Pocketing $7.5bn in cash? No. Most of that money is stuck in China in restricted accounts allowed to buy Chinese goods. Most of the $7.5bn is a gift card that only works in Beijing. A much smaller slice becomes real dollars. In a normal year that’s about 1 dollar in 10. June’s license, however, allowed buyers, for few weeks, to pay for Iranian oil in dollars, even to the Central Bank, so the cash share of those cargoes was likely much higher. maybe half or more. Trackers put June exports around $4.5bn. It is reasonable to assume a slightly larger share of those barrels settled in real dollars than in a normal sanctioned year. Even so, banks stayed hesitant, so the cash uplift is modest. On the full $7.5bn gross equivalent, the slice that actually reached the Central Bank is only a bit fatter than a standard evasion year—on the order of $1.5bn at best, rather than well under $1bn. If the whole pile were cash in Tehran, bread, medicine, and the dollar rate wouldn’t look like this. 1$= 2 Million rial. They sold oil, counted the gift card as cash, and held a press conference. Current loadings have collapsed under the reimposed blockade, to roughly 250–260k bpd in August, more than 70% below July and over 80% below last year. Talking up the earlier haul and the 99% budget print is bravado aimed at Economic D-Day. The louder they sell a better yesterday, the clearer it is they already know how sharp the new policies will cut, and how little cash is coming in behind them.
Dear @araghchi you’re not only a liar, you’re a pathetic terrible one. •$7.5B is old money, not current flow. That period (late March–late July) includes the brief June–July window when the US lifted the blockade and licensed oil sales during talks. Iran used that opening to dump stored crude, mostly toward China. •August reality: tanker data shows loadings around 260k barrels a day. Down 80%+ versus last year. The blockade is back on. Iran’s Central Bank governor already said they are not exporting oil. •“Funded through January” only means the regime claims enough hard currency for official government bills. It does not mean shops, wages, or the wider economy are fine. •Street: the rial is about 2 million per dollar, inflation is around 90%, food inflation is over 120%, and people face kilometer-long petrol queues. Stations are running dry, with a 14–15 million liter daily gasoline shortfall. •Fars and Oil Ministry numbers are not independently audited. Tehran has every reason to claim “we’re fine” while the pressure campaign is underway. •Economic D-Day launched after this four-month window. Using a lagging official press line as proof the choke already failed is the actual spin. •Past sales are not current exports. Government cash on the books is not the public economy. That’s total BS.
Together with the United Arab Emirates, a U.S. military task force started guiding ships through the southern channel of the strait while giving them air cover and intercepting Iranian drone and cruise missile attacks.
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