Doron Kadosh
@Doron_Kadosh · Israeli journalists — military, security, Arab affairs
Doron Kadosh is Army Radio's military correspondent, consistently first on IDF procurement and personnel stories.
The media discourse these days surrounding the failures of October 7 reveals that there are still many who do not know the facts in full, and above all underscores how necessary an inquiry commission is here. But until that happens, here is an opportunity to bring back “The Story of a Failure” - the extensive investigative series we broadcast several months ago about the “Jericho Wall” failure and more. You’re invited
Translated from HebrewWe reported at @efitriger that the intelligence officer of the Gaza Division on October 7, Lt. Col. A, has petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit publication of his name and his version of the former division intelligence officer's failure. Lt. Col. A continues to wage a legal battle over his dismissal from the IDF – and now also over disclosure of his name and details. A is the only officer in the IDF whom the chief of staff decided to dismiss – and he still serves in the army and refuses to retire as the chief of staff demands of him. In the coming days, Lt. Col. A will petition the Supreme Court – against the District Court's decision to permit publication of his full name and the petition in which he lays out his version of the October 7 failure, in which he was a participant. The IDF stated unequivocally in its position to the court that there is no security impediment to publishing the name of the former division intelligence officer, and the court accepted the army's position and permitted publication of the name – but allowed Lt. Col. A a stay of execution of the decision, and he decided to petition the Supreme Court. The District Court ruled that this is “a clear case in which the public interest outweighs every other aspect or interest, and leads to the conclusion that it is appropriate to publish his name and identifying details”. The petition to the Supreme Court, incidentally, will be filed by the Military Defense, which represents A at the army's expense. For the sake of full disclosure, it should be noted that Galei Tzahal (along with another media outlet, ynet) is among those who approached the District Court with a request to permit publication of A's details and his petition. Lt. Col. A, who ended his post as division intelligence officer about two years ago, continues to serve in the army, has not yet been dismissed, and continues to receive a salary and a vehicle at the IDF's expense, and likewise to remain under the protection of the ban on publishing his name, even though almost all the other intelligence officers who were dismissed from the IDF have already been discharged and their full names have been published. No response was received from A's attorneys.
Translated from HebrewThis morning on #ספי_ויניר at @GLZRadio, the Shin Bet conveyed an Egyptian warning to Prime Minister Netanyahu, a few weeks before October 7: Hamas intended to “shake the earth.” The warning was passed from Egypt to the Shin Bet, and from it to the prime minister and all the other security bodies at the beginning of September. It was a general warning that provided no further details, and therefore the Israeli security establishment was required to give this general statement various interpretations. Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar assessed that the explanation for the Egyptian warning was connected to the Israeli hostage Elizabeth Tsurkov, who was being held in Iraq by the Iraqi “Kata’ib Hezbollah” militia. In those days, Israeli security officials received intelligence indicating that Hamas had managed to reach an agreement with Tsurkov’s captors, under which she would become a Hamas “SHUN asset”—meaning that she would not be physically transferred to Gaza, but Sinwar would manage the negotiations for her release, and Palestinian prisoners would be released in exchange for her. This intelligence was cross-checked within the Israeli security establishment from different directions, and when corroboration of the information arrived from several different directions, the security establishment’s understanding that the same “earthquake” was indeed connected to Tsurkov grew stronger. A senior security official explains that the understanding in Israel in those days was that Sinwar was frustrated because he was unable to advance a hostage-release deal with Israel—in exchange for Goldin, Shaul, Mengistu, and Sayed—and therefore Sinwar sought to “get the prisoner-release cart out of the mud.” Israel could not imagine at all a scenario in which this was a much broader surprise attack. “We told the prime minister,” relates a senior security official who served during that period, “that if we do not finish the matter of our hostages (= before October 7), you are leaving an open business. He kept thinking that we would wait, and somehow it would be resolved. We told him—Hamas will not lower the price for Goldin and Shaul; they are willing to wait. Sinwar sees that we are not serious, that we are stringing him along. Netanyahu preferred to wait.” The heads of the security establishment received no update from Prime Minister Netanyahu about the conversation that was reported with Mohammed bin Zayed, the ruler of the Emirates—not even from his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Avi Gil. “If the prime minister had updated us about such a conversation with MBZ,” a senior security official involved in the events of the night of October 7 tells us, “it could have changed the entire picture. We would have viewed the events of that night completely differently. All the signs we received on the night of October 7 were given reassuring interpretations. If the report is correct, then we were missing a piece of the puzzle that could have been the critical piece. We would have conducted the situation assessments with that in mind, and we would have connected the pieces of the puzzle as soon as the first signs lit up in Gaza on Friday evening.”
Translated from HebrewThe commander of the missile-boat flotilla, Col. T., in an interview with @Yael_Hadad97 and me on the broadcast marking the end of the naval officers’ course on @GLZRadio The challenge of defending the city of Eilat | On an incident in which the navy encountered an unmanned motorcycle in the maritime area of the Red Sea off Eilat: “It received a very quick response; there are no intelligence assessments as to who sent it. It is highly likely they were testing our alertness at the border. Our assessment — that of the chief of staff, the navy commander and the head of Southern Command — is that the Eilat arena is active and challenging and we need to tighten security there. It is safe to vacation there, and we are very strong there along the lines.” On the challenge of maintaining freedom of navigation at Eilat Port during the war: “We need to solve the problem at Eilat Port; we do not deny it. Eilat Port is a problematic point, and these days it is gradually returning to activity. But there is no cargo we wanted to bring into the ports that did not enter.” On the Houthis’ threats to impose a naval blockade on Israel at Bab al-Mandab: “We know how to operate at Bab al-Mandab, and we have operated in these areas. In every maritime space of the enemy, we have an operational plan to act. This requires a decision by the General Staff.” On the potential threat from Turkey, which possesses a huge navy: “We and the Turks have interests in the Mediterranean area, and there are places where these interests conflict. The Israeli Navy is highly advanced, and when measuring the strength of a fleet, you do not count only platforms but also operational experience. The Navy is very strong in the area and will be able to stand up to all the missions assigned to it in these areas.”
Translated from HebrewHezbollah personnel are present under civilian cover in the two pilot areas in southern Lebanon, which are supposed to be free of Hezbollah presence. A new study by the Amit Institute for Terrorism and Intelligence Research finds that there is “active activity” by organizations subordinate to Hezbollah or affiliated with it in the pilot areas in southern Lebanon, where the Lebanese army is supposed to operate and prevent Hezbollah from entering them. The two organizations most prominent in their activity in the area are the “Islamic Health Organization,” subordinate to Hezbollah’s Executive Council, and the “Wata'awano” Association, which works to promote aid projects and the rehabilitation of civilian infrastructure. According to Amit Institute researchers, the activity of these organizations in the pilot area contradicts the framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon, and demonstrates the difficulty and complexity facing the Lebanese government in acting against Hezbollah’s presence and its various civilian arms operating in southern Lebanon. Examples raised in the study include: 1. The presence of ambulances belonging to Hezbollah’s “Islamic Health Organization” in the village of Zouter al-Gharbija, considered one of the pilot areas, while ambulances from the “Red Cross” or other organizations are prevented from entering the village’s territory. 2. Residents of the village of Zouter al-Gharbija, known as Hezbollah operatives, were allowed to return to live there, including Hezbollah operatives whose role is to embed the organization’s military infrastructure within the urban environment. 3. The Lebanese health minister, who is a Hezbollah member, supports and publicly recognizes the activity of the “Islamic Health Organization” in the village. During the organization’s activity in the village, Lebanese army checkpoints at the entrance to the village conduct no searches of the belongings of residents returning to the village and do not verify their identities. 4. The “Wata'awano” Association, whose head is a Hezbollah member and who previously revealed that the association’s aid funds come from Iran, is also operating openly in the village of Zouter al-Gharbija. The association placed mobile structures in the village for the residents and sent supply trucks to it for the residents.
Translated from HebrewThe IDF Spokesperson said in response: “The trip was not coordinated with or approved by the IDF through the accepted channels, which are an official request via the brigade’s regional defense officer, and not an appeal to any other commander. The claim that the trip was coordinated with the IDF by invitation is incorrect and irresponsible. The IDF contacted the trip organizers and clarified that the trip is not approved. Coordination of trips can be considered through the accepted channel, while making contact sufficiently in advance, not just a few days before it is due to take place, and securing its approval within appropriate timeframes, in accordance with the heavy operational workload on the forces. The IDF calls on all parties involved in organizing trips, tours and activities in the area to act responsibly; entering areas from which danger may arise, without prior coordination and without an appropriate security framework, endangers those involved. Instructions must be followed and prior coordination required must be ensured. This conduct is an essential condition for maintaining the safety of the travelers and the security of our forces. Central Command works to enable normal life, realization of freedom of movement and visits to heritage sites, while uncompromisingly safeguarding human life and public security. To this end, an orderly coordination mechanism has been established through the regional defense officers in the divisions and regional brigades. Each request is professionally assessed, in accordance with the situation assessment and operational capability at the requested time. In an area where the activity can be carried out safely, each request is professionally assessed, and every effort will be made to assist and approve it in accordance with the situation assessment at the requested time. As lessons learned from past incidents and due to the lack of coordination with the IDF, forces in the sector are increasing vigilance and alertness on weekends in the face of possible friction.”
Translated from HebrewFirst report on @GLZRadio: A group planning to “tour” tomorrow near Palestinian villages in Area B in Samaria published an announcement for a trip “coordinated with the IDF” – but the IDF denies this: the trip is not approved – and this endangers the hikers. A group of hikers has circulated an announcement in recent days about a trip in the Nahal Kana area in Samaria, between Yitzhar and the Gilad Farm, and near the Palestinian village of Tel ליד Nablus. According to the route, it appears set to pass through Area B – and the announcement explicitly stated: “The trip is coordinated with the IDF.” But a check we conducted with the IDF on the matter found that, contrary to the false impression in the announcement, the trip was neither coordinated with nor approved by the IDF through the accepted channels – and the trip organizers did not make the required official approach to the brigade’s regional defense officer. The IDF contacted the trip organizers – and made clear to them that the trip was not approved, but as far as we know, as of this hour the organizers have not issued an announcement canceling the trip, nor a clarification or correction stating that the trip is not approved by the IDF. The IDF is preparing for another tense weekend in Judea and Samaria, and all forces in the area were instructed to increase their alertness and readiness in the face of the possibility of violent clashes between Jews and Palestinians. This morning, following a situational assessment, the chief of staff announced that another standing division command had been placed on alert for activation in Judea and Samaria – an exceptionally unusual and unprecedented move in recent years, indicating the extent of the tension and concern within the IDF about escalation and an outbreak in the West Bank arena.
Translated from HebrewFollowing the confrontation over the appointment of a new head of the Civil Administration—as we reported on Army Radio: The IDF chief of staff reached an agreement with the political echelon on appointing Brig. Gen. (res.) Ilan Malka as acting head of the Civil Administration. Malka, who previously served as commander of the Givati Brigade, an operations officer of Central Command, and chief of staff of Central Command, retired from the IDF in 2016. He replaces Brig. Gen. Hisham Ibrahim, who was appointed military secretary to the defense minister. Malka’s appointment as a temporary acting head comes following our report on Army Radio that the chief of staff had decided that a new head of the Civil Administration would not be appointed until after the elections, and on the confrontation that had erupted between the chief of staff and Minister Smotrich over the appointment of a head of the Civil Administration. The chief of staff pushed to appoint a reserve officer as acting head, while Smotrich pushed to make another officer a permanent appointment. Behind the scenes, we can report that it took many long weeks to reach agreement on the identity of the acting head. At least 5 possible officers were considered as candidates—and all were rejected by the minister or the chief of staff—until they agreed on the identity of Brig. Gen. (res.) Ilan Malka.
Translated from HebrewWho should we believe? Here is what an official representative of Israel said at the UN just yesterday: the Erez crossing is expected to open in September. The Israeli representative also said at the UN that a truck scanner has already been installed at the Erez crossing, capable of scanning more than 100 trucks a day. On the other hand, today’s statement by the prime minister and defense minister says there is no directive to open the Erez crossing. Netanyahu and Katz’s statement in Hebrew versus an official Israeli statement in English from the UN podium.
Translated from HebrewFollowing our publication and our appeal to the IDF spokesperson on the matter - the IDF video explaining to Haredi deserters how to evade an exit restriction order at Ben Gurion Airport - has now been deleted from the IDF's social media accounts
Translated from HebrewPay attention to the following story: A short time before the mass trips to Uman for Rosh Hashanah, the IDF explains in a video to the Haredi public how draft evaders can evade an exit order at Ben Gurion Airport. Here is a video posted a short time ago on the IDF’s official Instagram page for the Haredi public — haredim.idf — and it explains how draft evaders can avoid arrest at Ben Gurion Airport and an exit order. In the video, “Dudi the Explainer,” created with artificial intelligence, describes that a Haredi man who has a proceeding under Order 12 against him (ahead of being declared a draft evader with an arrest warrant) will be held at Ben Gurion Airport and will not be able to leave the country — during a period when this concerns many Haredim who wish to travel to Uman. Therefore, the explainer on behalf of the IDF explains: “This story also has another ending: a brief appearance at the enlistment office with the medical documents — and this order is behind you.” The video’s Instagram description even stated more explicitly: “How to solve this with a brief appearance at the enlistment office so that you can continue as usual.” In other words, shortly before the trips to Uman, the IDF is offering Haredim the option of appearing for the first draft summons at the enlistment office in order to evade arrest at Ben Gurion Airport. In practice, as is well known, what many Haredim do is deceive the military system using precisely this method: they appear for the first draft summons at the enlistment office, avoid being held at Ben Gurion Airport, and when they return to the country, they do not complete the enlistment procedures and in practice do not enlist in the army. In fact, the IDF is indirectly explaining here to the average Haredi draft evader how to evade an exit order at Ben Gurion Airport, on an official social-media page belonging to the IDF (!). The IDF has not yet issued a response to the matter.
Translated from HebrewThis morning we published on @GLZRadio new details about the uproar over the smashing of the monument in the village of Madma by MK Zvi Sukkot: MK Sukkot approached the IDF several weeks ago to coordinate his “monuments tour,” during the period of turmoil around the village of Qusra and the rioters’ activity there. The IDF replied that it had no operational bandwidth and no forces available for the mission (it is the same regional brigade, the Samaria Brigade), and diverting forces for such a tour would come at the expense of activity in Qusra. According to security sources, MK Sukkot threatened to carry out the tour alone without IDF security, relying only on Knesset Guard protection, and the military feared that if Palestinians from the village (which is in Area B) tried to harm him, there would not be a sufficient security force able to respond. The army contacted Sukkot and asked him not to go on the tour alone, promising to coordinate an approved and secured tour with him as soon as possible, after the Qusra events had calmed down. MK Sukkot agreed, and the tour was coordinated for this morning. Even without MK Sukkot’s action, the IDF had already planned and even set a date for demolishing this monument in the village of Madma—the intended date was next month, in September—with or without Sukkot. Chief of Staff Zamir himself approved MK Sukkot’s tour, because of the sensitivity of the issue during an election period, after the chief of staff had only last month stated in a document circulated to the IDF that “tours at places of a political nature should be avoided, with emphasis placed on prohibiting the use of the IDF for propaganda purposes.” Soldiers from Artillery Battalion 411, who hold the line in the area and were forced to secure MK Sukkot in the Palestinian village, testified as follows: “It was predictable that there would be chaos there; we felt that they were wasting our time and our forces. The feeling is that this is not why we came to this sector—we are coming off nights without sleep, many operational activities, entries into homes, searches for wanted men and weapons, and the feeling was that they simply wasted our time. We have to deal with things like this all the time; it was predictable that this would happen. We are stuck here between Jewish terrorism and Palestinian terrorism.” The commanders who led the event testified that they were “shocked” that MK Sukkot and his aides pulled hammers out of the vehicle when they arrived at the monument.
Translated from HebrewHere are records of Palestinian monuments that incited terrorism and were destroyed by the IDF quite legally only in the recent period in the Samaria area. But MK Sukkot will now spread his spin, and the IDF will be portrayed as one that opposes the destruction of Palestinian monuments. So just to set the record straight: no one is upset about any monument commemorating martyrs—but about diverting the forces, unnecessarily endangering the forces, and the political and manipulative use of IDF forces. This is dangerous in so many respects, and a word must also be said about the naivete and cooperation of the chief of staff and the Central Command chief with this: only a few months ago you saw MK Sukkot exploiting an ostensibly professional tour for political purposes, and you were outraged. So how did you allow such a thing to happen? Or as the familiar cliché goes—you opened the tap, what did you think would come out, Coke?
Translated from HebrewThis morning on @efitriger: Inside testimony: the Syrian soldier who admits there was a Turkish military presence at the base attacked by Israel near Idlib. Footage posted on social media, which experts say is highly likely to be authentic, shows a Syrian army soldier serving in the area of the Abu al-Duhur air base, which was bombed by Israel a week ago. The soldier, who is of Turkish origin, and who according to assessments was apparently a former jihadist who belonged to a rebel organization and joined the Syrian army when the new regime was established, says this in a video apparently filmed the day after the attack: “We were attacked by Israel last night. We are in Syria; there are Turkish soldiers and Syrian soldiers here – the army of the Muslim nation. Israel tracked the presence of Turkish soldiers here using UAVs for months. Israel deliberately attacked us in order to prevent the Turkish presence from expanding.” The soldier admits that, contrary to Turkey’s official denials, there was indeed a Turkish presence at this base during the past several months, and he also reveals that Israel tracked this presence using UAVs for months. Inside testimony – especially interesting, contradicting the Turkish version and confirming the Israeli claim on the matter. *Thanks to the Alma Research and Education Center for bringing the footage and to Dr. Hay Eitan Cohen Yanarocak for the translation.
Translated from HebrewThis response by Sohlberg casts the Shin Bet's response on the matter, delivered last night to the media, in a different light. That response said that the Shin Bet briefed that the agreement regarding Eisenkot's security was coordinated with and approved by Sohlberg, the chairman of the Central Elections Committee. Sohlberg is in fact saying that, contrary to the Shin Bet's briefings, he did not actually make a decision on the matter. In addition, the Shin Bet claimed that the body that decides the issue of protecting symbols of government is the Ministerial Committee for Shin Bet Affairs, but according to Sohlberg, Zini determined that “there is no apparent reason” to convene it. So Shin Bet chief Zini shifts the responsibility to the Ministerial Committee for Shin Bet Affairs, and even claims that Sohlberg approved it—but in practice Sohlberg denies being involved in making the decision and also reveals how Zini is not particularly pushing to convene the ministerial committee and even claims there is no need to do so… If so, Zini's response delivered yesterday to the media is turning out today to be not especially accurate, or at the very least one that slightly distorts the facts, as the chairman of the Central Elections Committee attests.
Translated from HebrewFootage - the wire trailing all the way from Gaza to the Gaza border area: It recalls the fiber-optic cable of the explosive drones Hezbollah launched toward the north - the sights are similar, as is the operational concept. Let us recall the fiber-optic concept for those who may have forgotten it: The difficulty in operating a fiber-optic drone is that it is hard to launch it along a route in which, throughout its entire length, the cable will not get caught on a tree, a power pole, or any other obstacle along the way. That is why Hezbollah trained in extremely complex terrain - how to launch drones along a route in which the cable would reach IDF forces in the security belt and even communities in Israeli territory - without the cable tearing along the way, on a planned and meticulously prepared route. The wires found today in the Gaza border area, trailing for kilometers from the Strip to Nahal Oz, underscore that the concept is similar - and it is not inconceivable that this was a Hamas field test.
Translated from HebrewThe number of departments in the Defense Ministry run by acting officials has risen to five: Following our reports on the subject in recent weeks, the Defense Ministry notified its employees in internal messages that an acting deputy director-general and head of the ministry’s Human Resources Division had been appointed. The outgoing deputy director-general, Orly Steinberg, retired—but although her retirement was expected, the tender to appoint a replacement to the position has not yet been completed, and therefore Defense Ministry Director-General Amir Baram decided to appoint an acting official once again. As a result, five central divisions at the core of the Defense Ministry’s work are run by acting officials: the Rehabilitation Division for disabled and wounded IDF personnel, the Human Resources Division, the security-political division, the Defense Export Control Division, and the Authority for the Removal of Mines and Unexploded Ordnance.
Translated from HebrewWe published with @efitriger the chief of staff’s workaround to the defense minister: the officer whose promotion the minister did not approve was appointed to a “project officer” position that does not require the approval of Katz, the defense minister. Katz had already determined more than a year ago that there are 3 senior IDF officers he is unwilling to promote, because of the positions they held on October 7. Katz’s decision was made without the minister explaining his decision, without thoroughly examining what part those officers played in the failure, and moreover, after the completion of the Turjeman Committee’s investigations into 7.10, the committee determined that there was no impediment to promoting those officers and that there was no stain on their performance, but Minister Katz remained adamant in his position. The most extreme case among the three is that of Brig. Gen. Eliad Muati: only one week before October 7, he was appointed commander of the Border Defense Corps, a position concerned with force building, and there is certainly no way to link the force-building measures he managed to carry out during that week to the years-long blindness along the Gaza border. Chief of Staff Zamir tried to insist, and a year ago announced Muati’s promotion to commander of the 210th Division in the Golan Heights. Katz continued to entrench himself in his position, canceled the appointment, and forced the chief of staff to appoint another officer to the post. This morning we are publishing about the workaround decided on by the chief of staff, and this is how he intends to bypass Katz’s arbitrary decision: Brig. Gen. Muati finished this week as commander of the Tzeelim base, the Ground Forces Training Center, and the chief of staff decided to appoint him “project officer in the Ground Forces.” In other words, an unofficial position that does not require the defense minister’s approval and signature. In this way, Zamir is ensuring that Brig. Gen. Muati remains in the IDF and continues serving in some position over the coming months, and after the elections, if the defense minister is replaced, Zamir will be able to promote Muati to commander of a division, as he originally wanted. The assessment, incidentally, is that Zamir intends Muati for the position of commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, and that is why, in the last round of appointments in which all the division commanders were appointed, the position of commander of the Judea and Samaria Division was left without a designated future appointee. This story is another example of the intense tension between the defense minister and the chief of staff: on the defense minister’s side, an attempt to prove “absolute control of the system,” as he said in the famous interview on Channel 14’s The Patriots when he dismissed the Central Command chief; and on the chief of staff’s side, a message to the officers that he is working to protect them from the minister’s arbitrary decisions. IDF spokesperson’s response: Brig. Gen. Eliad Muati finished his position as commander of the National Ground Training Center in the past week, after about a year in the role. In the near future he will go on leave, after which he will serve as a project officer.
Translated from HebrewA very interesting report tonight on Al Jazeera: airstrikes deep inside Syrian territory — at the Abu al-Duhur military airport in the Idlib area of northern Syria. This military airport is 300 km from Israeli territory — and only 60 km from the Syria-Turkey border. According to the report, the airport's runways were attacked with 4 missiles. No further details were provided, and it is unclear whether anything else on the ground was hit — or whether the attack was directed only at the runways. Israel is not commenting on the reports. How unusual is this? Israel has not carried out an airstrike in Syria since March 2026 (a strike to protect the Druze in al-Suwayda), and has not attacked deep inside Syrian territory since July 2025 (more than a year ago — the strike on the Defense Ministry headquarters in Damascus, which was also intended to halt the massacre of Druze in Suwayda). This time, it is a strike for which Israel is not taking responsibility, in a complicated political reality — unlike under the Assad regime, during whose rule Israel attacked in Syria with near-total freedom as part of Mabam (the campaign between the wars). That is not the situation under the regime of Ahmad al-Sharaa, who is accepted by the West and close to the United States. Israel is not attacking smuggling operations or attempts to build up military strength in Syria as it did in the past, so it can be assumed that if Israel nevertheless chose to strike deep inside Syria tonight, it concerns something important and significant. It is unclear whether this was an attack intended to hit a target on the ground (such as some shipment that landed at the airport) or to prevent such an aircraft from landing there (by attacking the runways), but the proximity to Turkey should also be considered — a military airport located very close to Turkey. It is not inconceivable that the target of the attack was connected to Turkey's attempt to arm and help build up the Syrian army (but this is only an assessment — as noted, Israel is not commenting on the reports).
Translated from HebrewDefense Minister Katz climbs down from the tree: After announcing that he had instructed the IDF to prepare to take over another refugee camp in the West Bank — and, as we reported, the military opposed the move — the minister issued another statement on the matter today, adding that such an operation would be carried out only “in any case of attempts to increase terrorism.” In other words — in practice — the defense minister is climbing down from the tree and giving up the demand to carry out such a move in the near term, unless there is an “increase in terrorism.”
Translated from HebrewWe reported at @efitriger that the IDF had been forced in recent days to cancel and postpone arrests of Palestinian terror suspects in Judea and Samaria because forces had to be diverted to other missions, including dealing with Jewish terrorism and handling clashes between Jews and Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. These were arrests that the Shin Bet had asked the IDF to carry out, and the army replied that it was unable to arrest all the suspects wanted for arrest. Golani's 51st Battalion, which had been stationed in the area of the village of Qusra in recent days and sent there from a refresher period, is leaving the area today, but the IDF decided that at this stage there must be a permanent military presence in the village. Therefore, it was decided to send another battalion to the area to replace the 51st Battalion, and the Haruv Reconnaissance Unit will arrive in Qusra starting today. The decision by Central Command is that a permanent military presence will be maintained in the village to prevent the illegal outpost from being reestablished, until further notice. The IDF Spokesperson's Unit said in response: The IDF operates in accordance with the situation assessment and changing operational considerations, and accordingly prioritizes and allocates its forces to the various missions.
Translated from HebrewAbove all, this morning one should wonder about the defense minister’s statement: Why does he continue issuing political statements that have nothing whatsoever to do with security, even though he already has a guaranteed slot in Likud? Wasn’t the guaranteed slot supposed to make the defense minister start dealing with security rather than politics?
Translated from HebrewThe defense minister’s statement should be read in its proper framework—and seen as one of two possibilities: either it is a spin intended to placate a particular political side and is impractical for many reasons that I will detail shortly, or it is another attempt by the minister to weaken the commander of Central Command and undermine his authority. It is also possible that both possibilities are correct. Let’s explain: 1. Already today, most enforcement powers concerning Israeli citizens in Judea and Samaria belong to the Israel Police, not the IDF. IDF soldiers have the authority to detain people and transfer them to the police—but the army does not hold Israeli citizens in custody, investigate them, or bring them to justice. In practice, the Israel Police does not enter Areas A and B, and therefore when Israeli citizens violate the law in those areas (for example, entering to carry out attacks in Palestinian villages), the Israel Police will not enter to arrest them. Therefore, the meaning of the defense minister’s statement is one of two things: either he wants no one to stop the citizens in these areas, not even the army; or his statement is merely spin because the police cannot enter Areas A and B. 2. It is unclear whether the defense minister means in his statement the enforcement powers against illegal outposts of Israeli citizens: even today, enforcement against outposts is largely in civilian hands, since the Civil Administration came under Minister Smotrich’s authority. Most outpost evacuations require approval from the civilian level (whether the minister himself or the deputy head of the Civil Administration subordinate to him). The outpost evacuations that remain under the authority of the commander of Central Command are evacuations of outposts in Areas B and A, fresh incursions, or violent outposts whose evacuation is required for security reasons. Apparently, the defense minister wants to take this authority away from the commander and create a situation in which the army cannot evacuate any outpost, even in exceptional and necessary security cases. 3. One of the only tools currently available to the IDF against Israeli citizens is the issuance of administrative orders (restriction orders by the commander of Central Command—house arrests and bans from Judea and Samaria). Although the defense minister did not explicitly write this in his statement, he has been trying for some time to pressure Central Command Commander Blot to stop using these orders, something outside his authority. His statement today is a more sophisticated attempt to stop the administrative orders, in an attempt to transfer enforcement powers. In practice, this is an attempt to harm security, as he takes away from the commander and the Shin Bet the authority to rely on intelligence and place Jewish rioters under house arrest and bar them from Judea and Samaria—the almost only tool they have left against Jewish terrorism. In summary, the defense minister’s statement: 1. Not practical. 2. Another attempt to weaken the commander of Central Command. 3. Another attempt to harm the shaky security stability in Judea and Samaria and enable Jews to act contrary to the law without any effective tool available against them.
Translated from HebrewA highly unusual development in the past hour in the village of Qusra, which is expected to trigger harsh international repercussions for the IDF: The IDF informed the head of Qusra village that it is about to launch an operation in the village that will last three days—until Sunday. Several security sources confirm to Army Radio that as part of the operation, army forces are evacuating Palestinians from their homes—to seize “defensive houses” (that is, taking over homes as part of the operation, where the forces will stay in the coming days). One of the homes the army ordered evacuated is the Palestinian home that rioters besieged in recent days. By decision of the commander of the Samaria Brigade, the IDF demanded this morning that the family members evacuate their homes (after Central Command chief Avi Blot personally promised the family members only yesterday to protect them, and promised he would not allow them to be evacuated from their home). According to the head of the Qusra council, a total of 16 Palestinian homes are expected to be evacuated in the village by the IDF. This is a fairly exceptional move that the IDF is about to carry out amid widespread international criticism, including from the U.S. administration, over the IDF’s failure in recent days to protect the Palestinians in the village. The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit has not yet responded to these claims.
Translated from HebrewWe reported at @efitriger: 151 illegal Jewish outposts were evacuated in the first half of 2026 — an average of almost one a day. The IDF and the State Attorney’s Office are working to sue outpost owners in civil court for the evacuation costs: only 2 lawsuits have been filed so far, with 15 more on the way. This morning we published the IDF’s latest figure on the evacuation of illegal Jewish outposts — 151 such outposts were evacuated in the first half of 2026. In many cases, these are the same outposts that were evacuated again and again after returning to the land. This is a record number of outpost evacuations compared with recent years, and may indicate the scale of the challenge facing the IDF: an average of almost one evacuation every day, drawing heavily on the IDF’s and Border Police’s forces and resources. The IDF and the State Attorney’s Office are currently finalizing the development of a new-old enforcement tool against the outposts: filing civil lawsuits against outpost owners, with the aim of recovering from them the evacuation costs incurred by the defense establishment. Each such lawsuit amounts to tens of thousands of shekels and can exceed NIS 100,000 — the cost of bulldozers, trucks, workers, and other evacuation expenses — with the aim of imposing the costs on the outposts themselves rather than on the IDF. So far, only 2 such civil lawsuits have been filed (compared with 151 outposts evacuated since the beginning of the year…). Nevertheless, the State Attorney’s Office is currently preparing 15 additional lawsuit files, and they are expected to be filed soon. Senior officials in the IDF and the State Attorney’s Office tell us that they believe this tool will prove effective against the outposts by hitting them in the pocket.
Translated from Hebrew
Connected stories
- Four Opposition Leaders Pledge Oct. 7 State Inquiry After UAE Warning Report
- UAE Leader Warned Netanyahu of Hamas Move Before October 7, Report Says
- Zamir Orders Another Standing Division Command on Alert for Judea and Samaria
- Netanyahu and Katz Deny Order to Reopen Erez Crossing
- Sukkot Demolishes Terror Memorial as IDF Says Action Was Unauthorized
- Mossad Chief Gofman Called Syria's Foreign Minister on Turkish Military Presence
- Israel Tells Syria It Seeks No Escalation but Rejects Turkish Military Entrenchment
- Syrian Foreign Minister Denies Turkish Buildup Before Israeli Strike on Abu al-Duhur
- Twelve Foreign Ministers Condemn Israel’s Abu al-Duhur Airstrikes
- U.S. Envoy Says Intelligence Found No Turkish Forces at Syrian Airbase
- Azerbaijan Moves to Defuse Israel-Turkey Tensions After Syria Airbase Strike
- Shin Bet Declines Security Detail for Eisenkot as Campaign Cites Rising Threats