Saeed Ghasseminejad
@SGhasseminejad · Iran watchers, nuclear experts & opposition
Saeed Ghasseminejad is an FDD senior advisor on Iran's economy and sanctions.
Producer prices nearly doubled year-on-year; agricultural PPI rose 144.3% What happened. SCI’s spring 1405 producer-price index stood at 614.1. Overall producer prices rose 28.3% quarter-on-quarter, 98.9% from spring 1404, and 66.7% on a four-quarter-average basis. Agriculture registered the highest broad-sector year-on-year increase at 144.3%, while its four-quarter-average increase was 86.9%. Essential background/context. PPI measures prices received by producers for output at the production stage. It is not a direct measure of producers’ input costs, profit margins or household retail prices. However, it indicates how prices will move. Agriculture’s 144.3% year-on-year PPI does not mean every agricultural input became 144.3% more expensive, nor does it imply consumer food prices must rise by the same amount. Donya-e Eqtesad’s claims about margin compression rely on interviews and cost evidence in addition to the PPI itself. Economic significance. The PPI numbers show extremely strong price pressure at the production stage. Agricultural output prices more than doubling year-on-year raises procurement costs for food processors and wholesalers, even if weak household demand prevents full pass-through to retail prices. The more serious medium-term risk arises if farm input costs rise faster than farm selling prices. In that case nominal revenue can increase while real margins and working-capital capacity deteriorate, reducing fertilizer, feed, seed or equipment purchases for subsequent production cycles. Implications/future trends. The likely adjustment can occur through two channels: higher downstream food prices or weaker future supply. The balance depends on household demand, subsidies, administered prices, access to credit and agricultural inputs. What to watch next. Watch subsequent PPI releases, food-processing producer prices, feed and fertilizer availability and physical production. Do not use the spring PPI mechanically to forecast September CPI; its greatest value is as evidence of severe upstream price pressure and potential supply impairment.
In the Islamic Republic, the Hashd al-Shaabi terrorist who intends to assault an Iranian girl is supported by the government, while the Iranian girl and the Iranian boys who support him end up in prison.
Translated from PersianTehran Plans to Expand Trade Through Türkiye What happened Donya-e Eqtesad reports that Iran’s cabinet has issued a 15-point package aimed at removing infrastructure, logistics, and administrative bottlenecks at the country’s northwestern border terminals, particularly Bazargan. The measures give the governor of West Azerbaijan greater coordinating authority, seek to improve cooperation among government agencies, expand truck-processing capacity, upgrade infrastructure, and ensure that border operations can continue during digital-system outages. Essential background/context Bazargan has become increasingly important as maritime disruption pushes a larger share of Iranian commerce toward Türkiye and overland routes connecting Iran to Europe and West Asia. But land crossings cannot automatically absorb port-scale trade volumes. Earlier Iranian reporting has documented truck queues, longer transit times, and rising freight costs along alternative land corridors. An open border can therefore remain a serious economic bottleneck if its processing capacity is insufficient. Why it matters economically The government is focusing on transaction times and physical capacity rather than merely signing additional trade agreements. Every day a truck or container waits at the border ties up cargo, transport capacity, and working capital. For intermediate and capital goods, slower clearance can disrupt factory production and investment even when shipments ultimately clear customs. If implemented effectively, a higher-capacity Bazargan corridor could partially reduce Iran’s dependence on southern maritime routes and lower the cost of trade with Türkiye and Europe. Implications / what to watch next The key indicators are daily truck crossings, average customs-clearance times, queue lengths, and the frequency and duration of IT-system outages. The package will matter only if these operational indicators improve. If trade volumes increase faster than border capacity, the 15-point package may simply prevent further deterioration rather than restore prewar logistics costs. Washington, in turn, can respond by intensifying diplomatic pressure on Ankara and strengthening sanctions enforcement against Turkish entities that facilitate Iran’s efforts to circumvent U.S. sanctions and maritime restrictions.
Iran’s Economy: What to Watch? September 9, 2026 First, watch Iran’s oil-export supply chain. As the United States targets oil tankers while maintaining its blockade and enforcing sanctions, Tehran’s capacity to transport oil even in future is shrinking. Second, watch the 233,000-toman dollar and the roughly 44% foreign-exchange premium. A move toward 240,000 would heighten the risk that the latest depreciation becomes entrenched in industrial and retail pricing as businesses adjust prices to reflect higher replacement costs. Third, watch the sanctions risk arising from the IAEA referral. Russia and China make immediate UN punitive action unlikely, but Iranian retaliation against inspectors or violations of safeguards obligations could prompt fresh U.S. and European measures, even without Security Council sanctions. Finally, distinguish temporary adaptation from lasting structural change. Tehran can reroute part of its trade and use alternative payment systems at significant cost to its economy . But neighboring countries are simultaneously investing billions in infrastructure designed to bypass Iran, and permanently erode its geographic leverage. Bottom line: Iran’s economy is increasingly managing scarcity and access rather than expanding underlying economic flows. Unless fresh oil exports recover, trade costs fall, and access to foreign exchange becomes more reliable, the most likely trajectory remains a weaker rial, import compression, declining investment, and further erosion of real household consumption.
Six brothers from a working-class neighborhood in Tehran built a small furniture workshop into a successful nationwide business. Then, in January 2026, one of them, Hamid Arzanlou, was shot in the head by regime forces in Tehranpars. His brother Vahid ran to help him. He was shot twice in the neck. Both brothers fell into comas. Hamid died first. Vahid died days later. Their mother lost two sons. Five children lost their fathers. They were heroes. They had also played an important role in the furniture market strikes that accompanied the January uprising.
A great piece by members of the Iran Prosperity Project’s water experts.
Join the #lastbreath campaign to raise awareness about the execution wave in Iran.
“I ask Iranian psychologists, psychiatrists, and therapists to step forward to provide immediate, ongoing, and confidential support to the families of the fallen. I also ask all my compatriots not to wait for a request for help. If you know a family of the fallen, reach out to them; ask how they are, listen to them, and stand by them.” Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi
Translated from PersianVahid and Hamid Arzanlou, patriots who sacrificed themselves and heroic entrepreneurs, were two of six brothers from one of Tehran’s working-class neighborhoods. They managed to turn a small furniture-making workshop into a successful business throughout the country. But in Dey 1404, one of these brothers, Hamid Arzanlou, was shot in the head by direct fire from regime forces in the Tehranpars area. When his brother Vahid rushed to help him, he too was severely wounded after two bullets struck his neck. Both brothers fell into comas; Hamid died before his brother, and Vahid also died a few days after him. In this tragedy, a mother was bereaved of her two children, and five children lost their fathers. Hamid and Vahid were not merely passersby who became victims of this violence; they were heroes who also took part in the furniture-market strikes that occurred alongside the Dey uprising.
Translated from PersianIran’s Economy Today: Managing Scarcity Not Solving It September 7, 2026 Iran’s gasoline reform is moving from announcement to implementation. Starting September 8, the price of third-tier gasoline purchased with filling-station cards will double from 5,000 to 10,000 tomans per liter; other pricing tiers remain unchanged. Officials have also disclosed a gasoline deficit averaging roughly 10 million liters per day over the past five months and hope that the higher price could reduce consumption by at least 3 million liters per day. The rial recovered some ground during Monday’s trading but remains severely weakened. The free-market dollar ended Monday at 222,100 tomans, compared with a regulated commercial remittance rate of 161,466 tomans, a free-market premium of roughly 37.6%. Meanwhile, reported average daily turnover in the official commercial foreign-exchange market has risen to $131 million in September, from $46 million in April. Authorities are pursuing two parallel tracks: channeling more trade through formal foreign-exchange mechanisms and supporting banking-system liquidity. This week, the Central Bank supplied 70 trillion tomans through repo operations. The conflict is also prompting structural adjustments across the region. The UAE says it is accelerating investment in east-coast ports, pipelines, railways, and alternative trade corridors to reduce the dependence of its energy exports and commerce on Hormuz. Qatar, meanwhile, is working to reopen the Strait and create conditions for renewed U.S.–Iran negotiations. Domestically, tax receipts rose about 55% year on year to 800 trillion tomans during the first five months. But the annual tax target increased by almost exactly the same percentage, so the headline revenue growth does not, by itself, demonstrate a faster pace of budget execution. Electricity shortages continue to constrain production: the Labor Ministry has authorized factories to shift workers’ weekly rest days to make up for production hours lost to power curtailments. The regime is also seeking to expand overland transit through Iraq and accelerate renewable-energy investment. The balance of risks remains tilted to the downside. The regime is trying to reroute trade, ration supplies, and manage economic flows. But sustaining those flows is becoming more costly, while the external shock is driving lasting changes in regional trade routes and energy infrastructure.
Iranians are mobilizing and they say clearly what they want. “Iran will rise again, with solidarity and national will. Long live the Shah.” https://t.co/qOFFNtoGAM
As the United States steps up sanctions enforcement against the Islamic Republic in Iran and its energy sector, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has increased its imports of Iranian fuel. It is time to sanction the Pakistani entities involved for their blatant violations of U.S. sanctions.
Iran’s Economy: Scarcity Management Intensifies The most important new development is Tehran’s announced plan to establish an additional restricted maritime zone around the Strait of Hormuz, extending from the U.S. blockade line to Iranian loading ports. Mohsen Rezaei says vessels approaching the Strait without coordinating with Iranian authorities will be added to an Iranian sanctions list. Rezaei also claimed that Hormuz is “completely closed.” That assertion, however, conflicts with observable shipping traffic and U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s statement that more than 9 million barrels per day are currently transiting the Strait. The second major development is a domestic gasoline price increase. The government announced that, beginning September 8, gasoline purchased with filling-station cards, the third pricing tier, covering purchases beyond the 110-liter monthly quota, will cost 10,000 tomans per liter. Prices for the first 60 liters will remain at 1,500 tomans per liter, and the next 50 liters at 3,000. Meanwhile, Iran claims it used an earlier ceasefire window to move 70–80 million barrels of previously accumulated oil outside the blockade area and is now selling those stocks. Tehran is also combining temporary relief with tougher enforcement of its trade controls. Foreign-exchange repatriation deadlines have been extended because of wartime disruptions, but unresolved obligations exceeding €3 million will eventually be referred to prosecutors. Separately, surging Pakistani demand for Iranian liquefied petroleum gas is overwhelming the Rimdan border crossing, while the Central Bank is preparing a gold-linked securities offering equivalent to 100,000 coins. The outlook remains negative. The gasoline price hike will add to inflationary pressure as the blockade persists and sanctions enforcement intensifies. More broadly, the regime is increasingly managing scarcity and access rather than expanding underlying economic flows. Unless fresh oil exports, banking access, and high-capacity trade routes recover, the economy will remain exposed to further currency depreciation, increasingly expensive imports, and weakening real economic activity.
«I say to the Zahhaki regime and its missing leader:..Do not think that by killing tens of thousands of patriots you have been able to break the nation's will. The fire of the people's anger and protest has not been extinguished. A nation that has stood for freedom, prosperity, and a better future will not remain silent in the face of repression, corruption, incompetence, and the imposition of poverty.» Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi
Translated from PersianPrecisely and correctly, from Kamyar Behrang “For this very reason, the political struggle against the Islamic Republic is not a peripheral matter or a choice among several priorities for an Iranian nationalist. As long as a regime rules Iran that defines its own interests as being in conflict with the national interest, defending Iran and working to bring it to an end are not two separate matters.”
Translated from PersianI thank the Iran-Germany Society and its partner groups for organizing this meeting, and all the participants who took part in this program from near and far. Along with the other people involved in the Iran Prosperity Project, I thank Prince Reza Pahlavi for trusting us to work on this national project. @PahlaviReza
Translated from PersianWhy Does Tehran Threaten U.S. Forces but Spare Israel? We are seeing a great deal of huffing and puffing from pro-regime figures about how the Islamist regime escalated the military confrontation, targeting U.S. naval assets, and is wiling to impose significant American casualties. What is striking, however, is the absence of comparable actions and even threats against Israel. American military strategists should be asking why Tehran is reluctant to escalate directly against Israel, a much smaller and weaker country than the U.S., while increasingly willing to expand its operations against U.S. forces. That asymmetry reveals something important about the regime’s calculations, perceived vulnerabilities, and deterrence thresholds.
Iran’s trade under a three-prong attack! The immediate threat Tehran faces is the tanker campaign. Saturday’s U.S.-confirmed strikes on three Iranian tankers materially increase physical oil-transport risk. The threat is expansion of the operation to oil and gas and gasoline infrastructures. The second threat is secondary-sanctions contagion. Golden Global is a small institution; the larger question is how banks in Turkey, the UAE and China alter their behavior before Treasury announces its next target. Third is the 227,000-toman dollar. With a roughly 41% gap between the free-market and “Mobadelei” rates, both inflation pass-through and the economic value of preferential FX allocation are becoming more extreme. Fourth, actual industrial electricity allocations deserve close attention. Steelmakers receiving 15% of requirement despite a promised minimum of 40% demonstrate that the claimed improvements in national electricity balance have not yet translated into predictable supply for energy-intensive industry which casts a shadow of doubt on the claim itself. Finally, the interaction among the new gold-linked monetary instrument, kalabarg expansion and gasoline policy will show how the government intends to manage a difficult three-way trade-off: absorbing inflationary liquidity, keeping producers financed and preserving household purchasing power. The newest information points to an economy facing simultaneous pressure on all three sides of its external transaction chain: physical shipment, financial settlement and domestic currency conversion. Saturday’s tanker strikes attack transport capacity; the Golden Global action raises the cost of moving exports proceeds; and the dollar’s rise to 227,000 tomans increases the domestic price of whatever foreign currency still reaches the economy. Meanwhile, energy rationing constrains production and monetary authorities must choose between suppressing liquidity and supplying enough working capital to prevent further output losses. Without a material reopening of export and payment channels, the baseline remains continued depreciation, very high inflation, import compression and weakening real productive capacity.
Oil minister discloses major damage to Asaluyeh gas refineries, Tehran fuel depots and petrochemical utilities What happened Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad provided one of the most detailed official accounts yet of wartime damage to Iran’s energy infrastructure. He said that on March 18, 2026, four South Pars gas-processing plants, Asaluyeh refineries 3 through 6, were struck. A significant share of production initially had to be reduced, although some units returned within hours and reconstruction began within several days. Paknejad says a “significant portion” of the lost capacity has since been restored and expects further production recovery over the coming months. These are official Iranian claims and have not been independently audited. Paknejad also confirmed that the Rey, Shahran and Ghochak fuel depots in Tehran were hit during earlier attacks and that Rey’s loading facilities were damaged. The ministry shifted part of the fuel-distribution logistics from southern and central regions to compensate. He further said petrochemical facilities in Mahshahr and Asaluyeh were struck, including utilities supplying steam, electricity and nitrogen as well as process units, causing a significant initial loss of petrochemical production capacity. Background The regime entered the conflict with structural shortages in gas and electricity already in place. Energy infrastructure is also highly networked. Damage to a utility plant, gas-processing train or fuel-loading terminal can constrain output far beyond the physical footprint of the damaged facility. Why it matters economically The Asaluyeh damage matters directly for the coming winter. Gas processing determines how much field production becomes usable pipeline gas for households, power plants and industry. Any capacity still offline when temperatures fall increases the probability that industrial consumers will again be rationed first. Petrochemical damage also has a foreign-exchange consequence. Petrochemicals are among Iran’s most important non-oil export categories, so lost output weakens an alternative source of FX at precisely the moment crude exports are constrained. Damage to Tehran’s fuel depots similarly reduces distribution resilience even if aggregate gasoline production appears adequate which is not. Outlook Watch actual gas processing, petrochemical production, loading capacity at the Tehran depots and industrial gas allocations as temperatures decline. Paknejad’s statement that further production gains should appear over the next several months is a forecast, not yet a realized recovery.
In his speech at the historic Munich gathering, he said: “In these 47 years, it has not only been the Islamic Republic that has prevented the freedom of our Iran; there have also been individuals and groups whose interest and benefit lay in ensuring that the Islamic Republic remains in power and massacres the young people who sacrifice themselves for the freedom of our Iran.”
Translated from PersianA generation did not stand beside Aryamehr, and Iran fell into the bottomless pit of history. We will stand beside Aryamehr's son until our last breath to bring Iran out of this deep abyss.
Translated from PersianGasoline Stocks Come Under Severe Pressure as Daily Distribution Reaches 150 Million Liters What happened A Donya-e Eqtesad analysis reports a warning from an unnamed official that Iran’s strategic gasoline inventories have reached a “dark red” condition. According to the report, daily gasoline distribution increased from an average of 138 million liters in Mordad (August) to 145 million liters and then to 150 million liters per day. Because the actual level of strategic gasoline stocks has not been publicly disclosed, the “dark red” characterization should be treated as an official warning reported by Donya-e Eqtesad, rather than as an independently verifiable inventory threshold. Donya-e Eqtesad also argues that part of the recent surge may reflect precautionary filling driven by uncertainty over future gasoline quotas and prices. Expectations of scarcity or higher prices can themselves temporarily increase demand. This, however, is an economic interpretation rather than a directly measured decomposition of consumption. Background Two refineries, Adish Jonoubi and Mehr Persian Gulf, are expected under current plans to add approximately 12 million liters per day of gasoline production by year-end equivalent to roughly 8% of consumption at the current 150-million-liter daily distribution rate. The two projects are also expected to add around 5 million liters per day of diesel production. These figures represent prospective production capacity, not current output. Why it matters economically Strategic gasoline stocks are valuable precisely because they provide a buffer against refinery outages, import disruptions, war-related damage, and other supply shocks. If those inventories are routinely drawn down to cover a structural gap between domestic production and everyday consumption, Iran is consuming the emergency buffer it would otherwise need during a more severe disruption. The imbalance also has fiscal and external-sector consequences. A persistent gasoline deficit can force Iran to import fuel, consuming scarce foreign exchange, even though maritime trade is significantly curbed now. Outlook The key indicators to watch are actual daily gasoline distribution, the pace of strategic-stock replenishment, and the commissioning dates of the two new refineries. An additional 12 million liters per day of gasoline production would be significant, but it would not eliminate the imbalance if consumption remains near or continues rising above 150 million liters per day.
Israel has disciplined the Islamic Republic so thoroughly that the “absent leader” does not dare throw anything toward Israel.
Translated from PersianGasoline stocks come under severe pressure as daily distribution reaches 150 million liters What happened A Donya-e Eqtesad analysis reports a warning from an unnamed responsible official that Iran’s strategic gasoline inventories have reached a “dark red” condition. The publication says daily gasoline distribution rose from an average of 138 million liters in Mordad to 145 million and then 150 million liters per day. Because the underlying strategic-stock level has not been publicly disclosed, the “dark red” characterization should be treated as an official warning reported by Donya-e Eqtesad, not as an independently measurable inventory threshold. Donya-e Eqtesad argues that some of the recent surge may reflect precautionary filling caused by uncertainty over future quotas and prices: expectations of scarcity can themselves temporarily increase demand. That is an economic interpretation rather than a directly measured decomposition of consumption. Background Two refineries, Adish Jonoubi and Mehr Persian Gulf, are expected, according to current plans, to add about 12 million liters per day of gasoline production by year-end, equivalent to roughly 9% of current consumption. They are also expected to add around 5 million liters per day of diesel production. Those are prospective project figures, not current output. Why it matters economically Strategic stocks are valuable precisely because they provide flexibility during refinery outages, import disruption or war damage. If they are routinely used to cover a structural gap between domestic production and everyday consumption, Iran consumes the buffer it would otherwise need for a more severe emergency. The problem is also fiscal and external. A gasoline deficit can require imports, consuming scarce foreign exchange; alternatively, it prevents Iran from exporting refined products that could otherwise earn FX. Outlook The next key indicators are actual gasoline distribution, strategic-stock replenishment and the commissioning dates of the two new refineries. A production increase of 12 million liters per day by the end of the Persian year ,six months from now, would be significant, but it will not eliminate neither the current nor the future imbalance if consumption continues rising toward or above 150 million liters per day. Demand management and vehicle efficiency therefore remain as important as new refinery capacity.
Iran’s Economy: What to Watch This Week? Hormuz is now the immediate priority. One should wait and see whether today’s limited military confrontation will lead to further escalation or not. The G20 meeting is the key sanctions-policy test. Washington is trying to move from unilateral secondary-sanctions threats toward international compliance. The behavior of China, India, the UAE, Turkey and other major trading jurisdictions will matter more than diplomatic wording. Banque Misr is the first concrete test of regulatory contagion. If UAE-Egyptian coordination produces restrictions on Iran-related banking, foreign institutions will expedite de-risking before being directly sanctioned by Washington. The rial remains the fastest domestic stress indicator. A free-market dollar near 208,000 tomans despite substantial unused formal banknote capacity suggests that expectations and access restrictions are overwhelming the Central Bank’s cash-supply signal. Inflation and food welfare are the next domestic policy test. National inflation is already 89% point-to-point, while the government and parliament are discussing doubling food-credit support. Whether that support is financed through real fiscal reallocation or additional monetary expansion will determine how much lasting purchasing-power relief it provides. Today’s military developments worsen the near-term balance of risks for the Iranian economy. Furthermore, the renewed military activity threatens to complicate the very shipping normalization that could lower regional energy risk, while Washington is simultaneously broadening the financial and diplomatic campaign against the regime. In short term, Tehran retains some policy tools to ration foreign exchange, finance essential imports and protect some household consumption, but these are increasingly insufficient defensive measures that should be executed by a deeply corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy. Without a material recovery in oil exports, external payments and secure trade routes, the economy remains on a path of import compression, weak real activity, currency depreciation and persistently extreme inflation.
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