Nicole Grajewski
@NicoleGrajewski · Iran watchers, nuclear experts & opposition
Nicole Grajewski is a Sciences Po professor and nuclear-security researcher specializing in Russia and Iran.
“The U.S. launched new attacks on Iranian oil tankers on Tuesday in response to a fresh attempt by Tehran to strike U.S. warships in the Middle East” https://t.co/S6NWhqS67j
“The Pentagon is investigating the high likelihood that an explosion in southern Iran that destroyed a home hosting a wedding celebration was caused by a U.S. bomb that missed a nearby target” https://t.co/ApeHqrKBoI
“U.S. government investigators have taken the extraordinary step of subjecting roughly 50 members of the U.S. military’s Joint Staff to polygraph tests over leaks to journalists, including about how the Iran war has created a shortage of crucial munitions” https://t.co/GOwOtDSGw3
A good reason to study what interests you instead of metaforecasting world events — when I started working on Russia and Iran it was a pretty fringe topic where I constantly had to justify the importance of studying both countries (more so Russia than Iran)
“In a joint appearance at a regional security meeting, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Tuesday thanked Russian President Vladimir Putin for his support in wartime and urged that their nations work together to oppose U.S. sanctions.” https://t.co/FzyXvYwfAg
“U.S. forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets including air defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine laying capabilities, and communications sites.”
Iran appears to be targeting Bahrain, the UAE, and Kuwait, expanding the scope of its strikes following earlier strikes against Jordan.
Major @FT investigation by @maxseddon, @MilesMJohnson, and @charles_clover: Moscow has been helping Iran acquire the engineering know-how to design and improve its own ramjet-powered supersonic cruise missiles. https://t.co/a3PyAawh5e
“The strikes hit several sites across Iran’s southern shores, including a military base in Bandar Abbas, the perimeter of the commercial airport on Qeshm Island, and targets in Sirik and Jask.” https://t.co/7mOi9UoIJn
Putin sees U.S. as weakened by Iran war, intelligence reports say https://t.co/EIiEiaoLsF
From Chapter 6 of my book: the first iteration of maximum pressure inadvertently pushed Iran closer to Russia (and China). Subsequent events only deepened that trajectory. It’s still important to consider the second- and third-order effects of what “economic D-Day” morphs into. https://t.co/rsNO0JMlkN
Interesting that the U.S. is seeking information on these very well-known figures, likely trying to get information from Iranians on their whereabouts within the country.
The central uncertainties are political as well as technical: whether weaponization has been authorized, what survived the war, whether Iran can reconstitute a covert production chain and what risks Tehran is willing to accept.
Rezaei’s statement should be read as evidence of a changing political debate, not proof that Iran already has embarked on an operational weapons program. Hidden centrifuges and surviving uranium would reduce warning time, but they would not eliminate the technical bottlenecks.
This explains the divergent timelines. Optimistic estimates assume Iran can recover its uranium, activate covert enrichment and use earlier weaponization work. Others anticipate months for a crude device and much longer for a reliable missile warhead.
Iran certainly has experience in many of these areas, especially from its pre-2003 weaponization work. But knowledge is not a functioning production chain. The war damaged facilities, supply networks and personnel, creating new technical bottlenecks.
A crude device would be easier to build than a warhead for a missile. Under the Amad Plan, Iran worked to integrate a nuclear payload with the Shahab-3, but a reliable warhead would still require miniaturization and extensive testing.
Iran would then need to convert uranium gas into metal, cast and machine the core, manufacture a precise implosion system, integrate the neutron initiator and firing system, and validate that the complete design would function reliably.
Iran may have hidden centrifuges, components or even complete cascades. But that does not prove a covert enrichment plant exists, is operational, has access to suitable uranium feedstock or can produce weapons-grade material without detection.
Before the war, Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium stockpile and advanced centrifuges produced very short breakout estimates (the time required to enrich sufficient material to weapons grade). They did not account for conversion, weapon assembly, testing or delivery
But a political decision to seek nuclear weapons would not make an Iranian bomb imminent. The debate often conflates three timelines: producing weapons-grade uranium, assembling a crude nuclear device, and building a reliable, deliverable warhead.
Those earlier statements advertised Iran’s proximity to the nuclear threshold without announcing a decision to cross it. Rezaei goes further by questioning the logic of remaining non-nuclear after threshold status failed to deter direct attack.
In 2024, Kamal Kharrazi warned that Iran might have “no choice” but to change its doctrine if its existence were threatened. Others also suggested that attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities could provoke a withdrawal from the NPT and the pursuit of the bomb.
Since the war, senior Iranian officials have been relatively quiet about a nuclear weapon. That contrasts sharply with 2022-24, when prominent figures repeatedly advertised Iran’s technical capacity and suggested that its nuclear doctrine could change.
This was not an off the cuff statement from some fringe MP or commentator in Iran. Rezaei is a former IRGC commander and now secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the institution responsible for coordinating Iranian national-security policy.
Connected stories
- U.S. Strikes Iranian Tankers After New Missile Attempt on Navy Warship
- Iranian Officials Say Four Killed, 50 Wounded at Wedding in U.S. Strike
- Vance Says U.S. Is Fully Investigating Reported Strike on Iranian Wedding
- Senior U.S. Military Officials Faced Polygraphs Over Iran-War Munitions Leaks
- U.S. Forces Begin Striking IRGC Targets in Iran After Attempted Attacks
- Iran Fires Ballistic Missiles at Two U.S. Bases in Jordan
- Jordan Says Eight Missiles Destroyed After Iran Targeted U.S. Bases
- UAE Air Force Responds to Drone Approaching From Iran Over Territorial Waters
- Iranian Lawmaker Calls for NPT Withdrawal Over Trump Economic War
- Iran Army Says ‘Offensive’ Doctrine Means Immediate, Broader Retaliation